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Abstract
This thesis seeks to examine if the conservative victory in the 1964 Republican
presidential primaries was inevitable. Based on archival research, primary source
materials, and secondary source materials, it is concluded that conservative candidate
Barry Goldwater faced numerous instances when his campaign could have been defeated
by Republican challengers, campaign blunders, and internal party factions. This thesis
focuses on liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller’s campaign with the intention of
articulating the fracturing of the Republican Party in the early 1960s. Rockefeller’s quest
for the nomination is emblematic of the changing nature of presidential politics in the
post-World War II era leading to changes in voter preferences, campaign tactics, and
ultimately the path to the White House.
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Introduction
Nelson Rockefeller waited in anticipation. Louis XV-style furniture dotted the
forty-seven foot living room, touched off by cutting-edge furnishings and art, gilded
consoles, ivory tables, and large Picasso paintings. Occupying most of the twelfth floor
with a view of Central Park, Rockefeller’s residence consisted of a living room, a formal
dining room, a library, a massive two-bedroom master suite complete with a spacious
master bath, a staff bedroom with its own bathroom, and a large family room off the
kitchen.1 It was Friday night, July 22, 1960, three days before the opening of the
Republican National Convention in Chicago. Rockefeller prepared himself for the arrival
of Richard Nixon to his apartment at 810 Fifth Avenue in New York City.
Days earlier, Citizens for Rockefeller, a political action group spearheading the
draft Rockefeller campaign, made a newspaper and television appeal to voters that
brought in over a million pieces of mail and telegrams to the Chicago convention along
with a flood of telephone calls overwhelming the mail delivery services around the city.2
People demanded that Rockefeller be placed on the ballot for president. Throughout the
election cycle, Rockefeller remained coy about the nomination, never fading too far out
of focus. By May of 1960, when disarmament talks with had Russia broken down and
American interests abroad suffered, Rockefeller sensed a troubling future ahead for the
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country. These factors all reinvigorated his drive for the presidency. Like Taft in 1952,
Rockefeller’s supporters envisioned themselves streaming towards the convention hall
singing the praises of their nominee. To Governor Rockefeller, it seemed like a grand
possibility.
Nelson’s grandfather, John D. Rockefeller, was once the richest man in the world,
after having built the family fortune through the merciless business practices of Standard
Oil. Estimates of the Rockefeller fortune ranged from three to six billion dollars.3 A sum
so large that the Rockefeller family saw fit to re-envision the skyline of New York City,
build the Lincoln Center of the Performing Arts and the Museum of Modern Art, and
give rise to the Rockefeller plaza and the Rockefeller Center. The name “Rockefeller”
became an institution unto itself, not confined to New York or even the Northeast, but all
across the country. Money poured into an array of projects ranging from medical research
and education to real estate and missile development. Despite this immense power, John
D. Rockefeller closed himself off from the public. He taught his children and
grandchildren to avoid bringing bad publicity on the family name by staying out of the
newspapers. He, a titan of nineteenth-century finance, tried to avoid the press.
Rockefellers were not to have their picture in any publication nor were they to publically
participate in politics aside from discreet donations to the Republican Party. Nelson
Rockefeller changed all of that by accepting Franklin Roosevelt’s offer to become
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs in 1940. He then served as a special advisor on
international affairs in the Truman administration followed by a position as a diplomat
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under Dwight Eisenhower before becoming the governor of New York, the most
populous state in the country. Rockefeller, in the words of a friend, “felt he had to run for
elective office, because nobody really paid any attention to someone who was only an
appointee.”4 He was an egalitarian extrovert who succeeded by using his charm and
persuasion, prompting his defeated opponents to marvel at his political magic.5 By 1960,
Nelson Rockefeller appeared as the liberal Republicans’ golden boy, the New York
governor with the potential to swing the presidential election and Richard Nixon took
notice.
Nixon arrived at the Fifth Avenue apartment under unusual circumstances.
Rockefeller had requested a secret meeting with Nixon and wanted there to be an
announcement afterwards that the meeting had taken place at the vice president’s request.
He also wanted a “joint” agreement over changes to the party platform ahead of the
convention.6 Accompanied by an aide and a Secret Service agent, Nixon took the elevator
up to the twelfth floor at 7:30 that evening. Rockefeller’s shift from not seeking the
candidacy in December 1959 to announcing that he would not campaign but make
himself available for a party draft at the convention had kept him on the cusp of the
nomination, at least in the public’s eye. He spent that time advocating liberal Republican
ideals that threatened not only party unity but Nixon’s chance at winning the election.
Nixon, toeing the line between being shrewd and pragmatic, was trying to have it both
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ways. He appealed to the conservatives while repeatedly seeking liberal Republican
support, sending mixed signals to both factions. Republicans like Barry Goldwater
pushed Nixon to take a strong stand on conservative issues like reducing spending,
balancing the budget, and ending bureaucratic growth. Nixon agreed to their points and
even promised to advocate for a right-to-work plank in the Republican Party platform.7
To ease the worries of conservatives, Nixon told Goldwater that he had no intention of
meeting with Rockefeller until after the convention. But, Rockefeller’s sudden surge,
bolstered by the Citizens for Rockefeller, changed the political calculus. Nixon believed
that if he did not meet with Rockefeller he would risk losing New York and potentially
the support of northeastern Republicans.
After exchanging greetings, Nixon and Rockefeller ate together in the opulent
dining room of the Rockefeller residence while discussing their experiences in
Washington. An hour or so later, they retired to the next room to focus on more pressing
matters. Nixon wanted to discuss the vice presidency. In the aftermath of John F.
Kennedy’s selection of Texas senator Lyndon Johnson there appeared to be a growing
weakness in the South for the GOP. By choosing Johnson as his running mate, Kennedy
increased the pressure on Nixon to hold the northern industrial states including New
York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio. Nixon’s campaign data suggested that
Rockefeller could add as much as two points to the final tally. Knowing how close
pollsters projected the election to be, Nixon offered the vice presidency to Rockefeller.
Nixon promised Rockefeller control over the party platform, foreign policy, and New
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York state patronage.8 To Nixon’s dismay, Rockefeller refused the offer, saying that he
was not interested in standing by while someone else took the lead.9
Sometime around ten o’clock the pair began to work on Rockefeller’s desired
changes to the party platform. Thinking that he could still change Rockefeller’s mind on
the vice presidency, Nixon prepared to give ground to the governor. Rockefeller gave
Nixon a draft of fourteen points that he wanted to see in the platform and the two began
their work long into the night. At midnight, a four way phone call between platform
committee chairman Charles Percy in his Chicago hotel room and Rockefeller’s
command center was established. They went over the defense budget, the issue of
funding a federal program of medical care for elderly Americans, the rate of economic
growth, and the proposal for the Atlantic confederation. Nixon did not stand in the way of
Rockefeller’s civil rights plank that praised the actions of demonstrators protesting at
southern lunch counters reserved for whites.10 At 3:30 a.m., it was all over. With Nixon
on his way to catch a flight at La Guardia destined for Chicago, Rockefeller telephoned
his staff to tell them what had happened. At 5:00 a.m. a press release went out from the
Rockefeller people: “The Vice-President and I met today at my home in New York City.
The meeting took place at the Vice-President’s request. The purpose of the meeting was
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to discuss the platform of the Republican Party.”11 Members of the press the next day
called the meeting “the Truce of Fifth Avenue.”12
It was a big story: reaction to the meeting was explosive but neither side came
away looking good. President Eisenhower accosted Nixon for “repudiating” the
administration’s record and Rockefeller for “personal treachery.”13 Goldwater could not
believe that Nixon had given in to Rockefeller. He was outraged, calling the meeting the
“Munich of the Republican Party,” a “surrender” that spelled defeat in November.14
Nixon had been summoned by the conservatives’ arch-rival within the party, had crawled
his way into his apartment in New York City, and had signed on to the liberals’ platform.
Party regulars long believed that there had been an eastern liberal conspiracy against
them, working behind the scenes to impose its will on the rest of the party. Nixon’s
meeting with Rockefeller confirmed their suspicions, giving the leverage not to the vicepresident and likely nominee, but to a northeastern liberal from New York. Rockefeller’s
naked grab for power was too much for the right wing of the party. They looked like
fools, having worked to write and rewrite the platform in Chicago while the real platform
was being made in a luxury apartment on Fifth Avenue.
When Nixon arrived at the convention just before noon on Monday the 25th, he
was caught in a precarious situation. Over the weekend, Eisenhower had formed a third
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faction working independently of and, more often than not, against Rockefeller, but he
still in supported Nixon’s nomination. On the far right of the party, conservatives bristled
with contempt for Nixon’s appeasement of the liberal wing. Not only had Nixon not even
bothered to tell Goldwater about his meeting with Rockefeller, which he could have done
so during the pair’s telephone call Friday morning, but he also refused to budge on the
issue of civil rights. Before Nixon’s meeting with Rockefeller, members of the platform
committee had worked to write an acceptable civil rights plank. South Carolinian’s Roger
Milliken and A. Dabney Barnes sought to counter the Democrat’s liberalism with a more
conservative approach. During the writing session, liberal Republicans protested that
Nixon would not support the language put in by Barnes, to which she countered by
quoting lines from Nixon’s book on the topic. With that, the committee adopted the civil
rights plank. Much to the dismay of Barnes and other conservatives at the convention,
when Nixon arrived from New York he insisted that the original plank be substituted for
the one directed by Rockefeller.15 Meanwhile, Milliken inserted conservative ideology
into the business and labor sections that came closer to Goldwater’s brand of politics. A
delegate from the Virgin Islands commented to a Texan, “If they had a couple more
people like that red-headed fellow over there (Milliken), they could turn this party inside
out.”16
Many Republicans and Democrats alike foresaw a looming shift in the electorate
from the South that could hinge on how each party would approach the concerns of the
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people. There existed an opportunity for Republicans to change the mindset of southern
voters when they went to the ballot box thus giving Republicans an opening to take the
region away from their opponents. One line of reasoning, put forward by Rockefeller,
held that due to the demographic changes, stemming from the northern migration of
African-Americans to the cities, Republicans needed to make progress towards stopping
the loss of African-American votes by outflanking the Democrats on civil rights. Another
view, predominantly held by Southern Republicans, focused on the issue from a states’
rights perspective that wanted to limit the power of the federal government including the
enforcement of civil rights. If African-Americans, who were already voting in large
numbers for Democrats, were going north, then Republicans would have free rein over
the South. A middle ground, proposed by the Platform Committee, avoided outright
support of the sit-ins across the South, but refused any federal intervention to secure
equality for African-Americans. Both points stood in opposition to the Democratic
platform. Nixon chose to favor Rockefeller’s position to garner votes from AfricanAmericans in the North because he believed in it on principle. Those on the far right
would later cite this decision for Nixon’s defeat in the general election.17
On the opening day of the convention, Goldwater had his own decision to make.
Arizona and South Carolina Republicans agreed to pledge their thirteen delegates to the
Arizona Senator on the basis that if Goldwater’s name were nominated then conservatism
would be represented at the convention. Amid cheers from supporters, Governor Paul
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Fannin of Arizona trumpeted Goldwater’s authenticity, “He is not a ‘me too’ person.”18
Goldwater shared their philosophical sentiments but, in light of recent events, he was
compelled to respond as a force for the conservatives rather than act as a mere symbol. In
doing so, he withdrew his name from the nomination. Inside the convention hall
Goldwater gave a stirring speech to his supporters. He withdrew his candidacy then
called on conservatives to “grow up” and support Nixon. In a boisterous tone he appealed
to their sense of reason, demanding that they cast their ballots for the party against the
tide of liberalism. Then in a moment that would change the direction of the party, he
appealed to their sense of frustration, “If we want to take this party back, and I think we
can some day, let’s get to work.”19 In an instant, Goldwater became a conservative icon
for having stood up to eastern liberals while supporting the Republican Party at large.
Nixon won the nomination on the first ballot, and he then selected Henry Cabot
Lodge as his running mate. Lodge was a part of the eastern internationalist wing of the
party, a moderate hailing from Massachusetts like the Democratic nominee. Kennedy, in
fact, had defeated Lodge in the latter’s bid for reelection to the Senate in 1952.
Conservatives viewed Lodge as one more attempt at winning over the liberal East, but
come election time, he was unable to turn the tide against Kennedy in the region.
Goldwater refused to allow himself to be a victim of defeat; instead, his principled image
gave supporters hope that conservatism would have its day.
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Rockefeller endorsed Nixon, pledging all ninety-six votes of the New York
delegation to him. “We want to be the first state to put the key in the lock and open it for
you,” Rockefeller told Nixon.20 Flashbulb explosions captured the two of them with their
arms around each other, grinning as members of the convention and national television
audience looked on. An undercurrent of anger and resentment festered over Rockefeller’s
heavy-handed attempt to make changes to the platform after it had been agreed upon by
the Committee members. Unable to sense the blunder, Nixon announced that Rockefeller
would be campaigning for him throughout the election cycle. Henry Kissinger later
revealed Rockefeller’s view of the vice-president, saying, “He loathes Nixon.”21
South Carolina party chairman Greg Shorey foresaw a vicious battle on the
horizon, “Senator Goldwater is the man the liberals will have to climb over to get what
they want.”22 In the months that followed, John F. Kennedy defeated Nixon in one of the
closest elections in American history. As with any major political defeat, the party
faithful were left to ponder what went wrong. For conservatives, the answer was clear.
The Republican Party embrace conservatism, distinguish itself from liberal Democrats,
and give the electorate a clear ideological choice. On the other hand, Rockefeller and
liberal Republicans concluded that aside from Nixon’s tactical errors, the party appealed
to a broad base of Americans who, by nature, were drawn to moderate left-leaning
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politics. When the final ballots were counted in 1960, the race was on for control of a
contentious Republican Party in 1964.

Chapter 1: Rockefeller Decides to Run
A Brief History of Liberal Republicans
“I’m feeling like a bull moose,” Theodore Roosevelt declared to reporters in 1912
shortly after forming the Progressive Party.23 Political writers and cartoonists seized on
the mental image of a bull moose pushing the Democrat’s donkey and Republican’s
elephant to the side with an imposing physique, boundless energy, and sharpened antlers.
Roosevelt’s progressive ideals careened into his opponents forcing a political battle
unlike any other in American history that would divide Republicans, and, as a result,
elevate the Democrats with consequences that reverberated into the middle of the
twentieth century. This ideological split serves as a crucial moment for understanding the
dynamic between party factions up to and during the 1960s.
When Republican leaders showed a preference for keeping the party in the hands
of President William Howard Taft for the election of 1912 instead of Theodore
Roosevelt, the party split in two. Conservatives kept their allegiance to their president, a
level-headed if uncharismatic politician who longed to be in the courts instead of the
White House. Taft’s pragmatism and deft legal work instituted a number of progressive
changes to the law which were not politically feasible under Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s
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supporters loved their candidate’s energy, his sense of adventure, vigorous spirit, and the
romantic image that he had crafted for himself since his days as a Rough Rider in Cuba.
Taft and Roosevelt’s fight for the nomination sparked the states to adopt a primary
system. In order to get Roosevelt to the top of the ticket, his Republican supporters
reasoned that they needed to bypass party regulars at the convention. They strategized
that Roosevelt had to demonstrate his popularity in order to sway the political bosses to
give their support to the candidate. To do this, backers convinced five states to join the
already existing primary states to create a larger series of primary elections.24
Initial opposition to Taft had come from Robert LaFollette in Wisconsin, George
Norris in Nebraska, and Hiram Johnson in California. They represented a form of
progressive militancy that was growing in western and farm states and was aimed at
railroad companies and other business influences that controlled the party structure.
Leaders within the movement found support among farmers and small business owners
who raised concern among eastern progressives because of their attacks on eastern
corporations and intellectuals. Eastern progressives shared the radicals’ desire to curb big
business and were equally upset with Taft’s decision to raise tariff rates after he had
promised to reduce them when he got elected in 1908, but progressives feared a growing
movement. Sensing trouble, progressives urged Roosevelt to run. Reading the situation,
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Roosevelt made overtures towards the radicals by ratcheting up his rhetoric, thus
placating their concerns.25
In the primaries, Roosevelt crushed Lafollette and Taft only to be denied the
nomination. Taft had managed to keep control of the Republican National Committee by
wielding his presidential patronage powers in the South. Since the end of Reconstruction,
southern delegates could be coerced into either delivering votes to a candidate or not
giving votes or support if patronage could be had. Republicans in the South essentially
held little power except during national functions. Their influence exceeded the electorate
value that each state possessed.26 Roosevelt, a towering political figure, was convinced
that the Republican Party had gone astray so when he walked out of the Chicago
convention millions fled the party with him. Swept up in election fever, Roosevelt
maintained that only he had the experience and political acumen to advance his brand of
progressive conservatism into a new era. Woodrow Wilson exploited the Republican
Party’s dysfunction and won the presidency in an Electoral College landslide.
During the election of 1916, Roosevelt urged his fellow progressives to make
amends with conservatives. Four years later, Warren G. Harding returned the Republican
Party to the White House by signaling the end of the sweeping changes of the Progressive
Era, thus making way for a “return to normalcy.” Throughout the 1920s Republicans in
the West and Midwest quarreled with the eastern wing of the party over the issues of
farming and agriculture and the evils of corporate capitalism. Many were strong
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advocates of isolation stemming from their German ancestry. They accused easterners of
being internationalists who brought America into an unnecessary war in Europe that
damaged the country’s image in front of the world.27 When Democrats nominated a
Catholic in Al Smith in 1928, Herbert Hoover rallied Protestant support in these areas by
running as a businessman whose strong organizational skills could keep the country’s
economy booming. But when the stock market crashed in 1929, ushering in the Great
Depression, the Hoover administration was overwhelmed by bank failures, property
foreclosures, falling wages, a dramatic increase in hunger, and rising unemployment.
During his inaugural address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt condemned the business
practices propagated under the years of Republican rule, “Yes, the money changers have
fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that
temple to the ancient truths. The measure of that restoration lies in the extent to which we
apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit.”28 Roosevelt and his
administration passed numerous liberal policies to jump start the nation’s economy. In
light of the financial crisis, conservatives initially sided with Roosevelt until another bad
year at the polls triggered them to act by equating the New Deal’s centralization of
economic power with fascism and communism. This tactic failed miserably in 1936
because Democrats tarred the Republicans with the image of uncontrolled capitalism that
put the American democracy at risk; they were the ones at fault and the Democrats
wanted to save the country rather than destroy it. During the 1930s, the Republican Party
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saw its support and influence plummet. Faced with such adversity and the real threat that
the party might never again regain the White House, many Republicans moved to adopt
liberal policies.
Conservatives found their opening in the 1938 mid-term elections when the
Republicans won eighty seats in the House and six seats in the Senate. Among the
freshman class was Robert Taft of Ohio, the son of President William Howard Taft. His
midwestern politics placed him at odds with eastern Republicans who represented
corporate interests and Wall Street. Taft vehemently argued against the New Deal and the
Republican penchant for making concessions rather than presenting viable alternatives.
He called Republicans weak and confused; he believed that many of them did not
understand that the New Deal had been stopped. The returns in 1938 proved that when
Roosevelt attempted to pack the courts, he had reached the limits of his powers under the
Constitution and voters had had enough. The Republicans’ victory offered them a
glimmer of hope that they could avoid the fate of the Whigs and Federalists from
generations past.29 As Senator, Taft formed a coalition with conservative northern
Republicans and southern conservative Democrats to block civil rights legislation, lower
taxes, restrict unions, and limit spending on social programs.30
Taft’s isolationist stance amid escalating tension in Europe coupled with his antiinternationalist views made easterners consider a nominee who, up until 1938, was an
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active Democrat known for his speeches against the New Deal and support of the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Emboldened by his progress in Congress, Taft set his sights
on the Republican nomination in 1940, only to be beaten out by Wendell Willkie of
Indiana. Willkie’s nomination came as a surprise to many but it was also emblematic of a
progressive resurgence in the works. Wilkie sold himself as an Indianan, but he was a
part of the eastern, Wall Street establishment. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes
called Willkie “a simple, barefoot Wall Street lawyer.”31 He had earned his spot at the top
of the ticket only a week after the fall of France, which raised doubts about isolationism
moving forward. Even then, he was nominated on the fifth ballot.32 In a fierce and bitter
campaign, he kept Republicans closer to the center on domestic and international issues
which, in turn, angered the likes of “Mr. Conservative,” Robert Taft. Wilkie received 6
million more votes than the more conservative Landon and cut dramatically into FDR’s
margin of victory, leading eastern liberal Republicans to conclude that their ideological
stance offered the party a better path to victory.
Republicans nominated New York governor Thomas Dewey in both 1944 and
1948, maintaining the grip of the eastern wing of the party. Dewey represented a valuable
piece of the puzzle for Republicans. He was a moderate from the nation’s largest state,
and he had proven vote getting ability in traditional Democrat strongholds like urban
areas. Winning New York had been an essential part of the electoral math in presidential
politics since the Antebellum era. The winner of the national election carried New York
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state in 28 out of 32 elections between 1832 and 1964, and a New Yorker was on the
ticket for president or vice-president for at least one party from 1868 thru 1948. Based on
this historical trend, Republicans became convinced that they would need a New Yorker
to win the White House. Dewey’s candidacy appealed to middle-class professionals who
agreed with many of the Democrats’ positions on social issues but were alienated by
racist Southern Democrats, ethnic urban machines, and the anti-business attitude of the
New Deal and Fair Deal.33 Critics charged that Dewey’s liberal stance on social reform
and internationalism was “me-too” politics that did nothing to advance the Republican
cause. From his base of operations in New York, he organized a far-flung network of
support for his candidacy, demonstrating that the party was indeed moving in the right
direction. His loss to Roosevelt was expected but his loss to Harry Truman sent
shockwaves. Stunned, Republicans convinced themselves that Dewey’s ineptitude and
Truman’s searing attacks that accounted for the loss. He had missed an opportunity to
strike at the Democrats vulnerability on communism, opting instead to show support for
internationalist programs like the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO when
he instead could have focused on two crises between the United States and communism:
the Soviet-backed Czech coup and the Berlin airlift.34
A series of events followed that inflamed anti-communist feelings. In 1949, Mao
Zedong’s communist army defeated the U.S.-backed nationalist army led by Chiang KaiShek. State Department documents show that there was debate as to whether the U.S.
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properly armed Chiang’s army or if the regime simply disintegrated.35 The question
became, “Who lost China?” While U.S. intelligence reeled from the emergence of Red
China, Russian scientists detonated a nuclear device. In response, Truman ordered the
hydrogen bomb to be built and established the Office of Civil Defense. Adding to the
hysteria, Alger Hiss came before the House of Un-American Activities Committee pitting
New Dealers against their detractors. Grabbing headlines and basking in the spotlight of
television was California Congressman Richard Nixon. To ensure a conviction, J. Edgar
Hoover supplied him with FBI files that exposed Hiss as a Soviet spy in an effort to put a
stop to secret communist activities.36 Hiss’s trials and conviction became the tipping
point for the McCarthy era. When North Korean forces poured across the South Korean
border in 1950, soon followed by U.S. and Chinese troops engaging in combat,
communism came to the forefront of national politics. Wisconsin senator Joseph
McCarthy spearheaded a political movement that targeted communists in all levels of
government and society, including Hollywood and, fatally for him, the military.
Republicans did not unite in their support of the Senator. Taft at times showed reluctance
and characterized McCarthy as reckless, yet he said McCarthy should “keep talking and
if one case doesn’t work he should proceed with another.”37 Moderates noticed that
McCarthy’s obsessive anti-communist rhetoric seemed to be targeting the East. Maine
Senator Margaret Chase Smith, from the moderate wing of the party, was one of his
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sharpest critics. Still, Taft saw McCarthy as a useful political tool and coveted his
grassroots support for the 1952 nomination.38
Standing in his way was retired general Dwight D. Eisenhower. The eastern wing
of the party was determined not to let an isolationist like Taft represent the party, and
Eisenhower had more than enough credentials to make the case for commander-in-chief.
He was not taken in by “the false doctrine of isolationism,” nor was he keen on
McCarthy’s red-baiting.39 Sweetening the deal, Eisenhower could not be blamed for the
Republican defeat in 1948. He was a centrist candidate acceptable to moderate
Democrats. In fact, Truman offered to not run if Eisenhower would accept the
Democratic nomination.40 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was dispatched
to gauge the general’s interest and convinced him of the dangers that lay ahead if an
isolationist were permitted to lead the Republican Party. At the convention in Chicago,
moderates and conservatives clashed in a particularly wild scene. Dewey convinced
Republican governors to adopt a “fair play” amendment barring delegates from voting in
contests concerning their own credentials. In other words, Southern delegates could not
vote for their own right to be seated at the convention thus undercutting Taft’s support in
the South.41 Furious over such strong-arm tactics, Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen
screeched at Dewey, “We followed you before and you took us down the path to
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defeat!”42 Taft handled his third unsuccessful run at the nomination, like a professional
but his followers harbored deep resentment towards the eastern liberal faction made up of
Dewey, Lodge, and New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams. Eisenhower selected
Nixon as the vice-presidential nominee to try heal the fractious party after the convention
and quell conservatives’ resentment. He did not take part in any pre-convention attacks
on Taft, and he was a compromise choice between liberals and conservatives.43
Eisenhower’s victory ended the two decade long drought for Republicans seeking the
presidency.
Eisenhower’s “modern Republicanism” meant to balance the federal budget and
reduce the size of the federal government while, at the same time, acknowledging public
support for social welfare programs like Social Security. Conservatives wanted to
overturn major components of the New Deal but Eisenhower pushed back on the issue
over concern that voters would not look kindly on the administration come re-election.
Again, Eisenhower faced criticism from within the party when he aimed to cut defense
spending. During the Second World War, he was the Supreme Allied Commander yet
rank-and-file Republicans cried out that Eisenhower was leaving the country vulnerable
to attack from the Soviet Union. Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater insinuated that Ike had
been lured by “the siren song of socialism” then moved to increase defense
appropriations.44
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On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first satellite to be placed
in orbit. Nelson Rockefeller issued a report that instilled national paranoia over a
nonexistent missile gap.45 His own foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, wrote in an
editorial for the New York Herald Tribune, “The Soviets have outstripped us. We’re
really in trouble now. We’ve been pushed back gradually, position by position…The
basic trend is against us.”46 Unbeknownst to them, the American military had been flying
over Soviet airspace since July and U-2 photographs gave evidence that there was no
missile gap. John Foster Dulles urged Eisenhower to make the information public but he
refused, preferring to maintain the extant strategic advantage over the Soviets.47 A few
years earlier at the behest of Eisenhower, Rockefeller assembled a group of experts at
Quantico, Virginia and produced a concept known as “open skies” that called for mutual
aerial inspection by both the Soviets and the Americans.48 Rockefeller would go on to use
Kissinger’s theories on “limited nuclear war” as a basis for his foreign policy that ran
contrary to Dulles’s strategy of massive retaliation.49 Eisenhower became increasingly
irritated with Rockefeller’s persistent opposition to the Oval Office. Ike would not soon
forget Kissinger’s and Rockefeller’s criticisms of his foreign policy. Goldwater took a
similar position, though philosophically different from Rockefeller, and he worked with
Rockefeller to make changes to military policy.
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When the Republican nomination came open again in 1960, Nixon received
Eisenhower’s tepid support. By the same token, when Rockefeller sought Eisenhower’s
opinion on his potential candidacy, Ike waited two days to reply and then brought up the
subject of foreign policy before chastising Rockefeller’s indecisiveness during the
campaign.50 After Soviet aircraft shot down a U-2 spy plane in May, leading to the failure
of the Paris summit to implement a nuclear test ban treaty that same month, Rockefeller
increased his profile in the hopes of being drafted at the convention. Hoping to make a
splash by creating the Republican equivalent of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, Nixon met
with Rockefeller in his Fifth Avenue apartment just before the convention to offer him
the vice-presidency which he refused. Disappointed but not devastated, Nixon
rationalized that Rockefeller’s independent temperament might have been a detriment in
the long run and chose Henry Cabot Lodge in his place.51 At the convention, both
Goldwater and Rockefeller spoke, with Rockefeller introducing Nixon before his
acceptance speech. Nixon hoped for a display of party unity that night, but when the
Republicans were once again defeated on Election Day, conservatives could no longer
hold back their frustration with the direction of the party.
For liberal Republicans, Wendell Willkie was a transformational figure that
moved the Party to Dewey, then to Eisenhower, and finally to the nomination of Nixon.
However, conservatives believed that the election of John F. Kennedy ended the liberal’s
run of success. Rockefeller’s critique of Eisenhower and Nixon stifled party unity, and
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the last minute changes he forced into the party platform drew the ire of conservatives.
Over the years, they had seen their best and brightest falter at the finish line. After
Kennedy’s inauguration, the party was once again scrambling to put the pieces back
together. For all of his political posturing and free-wheeling personality, Nelson
Rockefeller would be the liberals’ best chance to win back the White House if he could
stay out in front of a growing wave of conservative momentum.

Rockefeller as Governor and the South’s Discontent
As governor of the most populous state, Rockefeller enjoyed considerable
political privilege. Upon his election to the governorship of New York he was viewed as
a rising star within the party at a time when returns from around the country indicated
that the party was slipping. He then ran a national campaign for president that earned
enough attention for his “liberal Republican” philosophy that even Kennedy thought
would be enough to beat him had he stayed in the race.52 Barring any major changes to
the field, his path to the nomination was relatively clear.
New York has a long and distinguished history of producing national candidates
for president from both parties: Martin Van Buren, Grover Cleveland, Theodore
Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt not to mention almost presidents like Al Smith and
Thomas Dewey. New York City was older than the Puritan colonies in Massachusetts.
During World War I, as Europe destroyed its economic and monetary supremacy, New
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York City became the center of global finance, and during the interwar years, it kept the
entire system of international debt afloat. After World War II, hundreds of millions of
dollars’ worth of federal grants and loans poured into the state, some of the best
universities in the world were located within its borders, and for thousands of
immigrants, it was the first place they saw when they came across the Atlantic.
Nelson Rockefeller was at the helm of a powerful instrument. On his way to his
seat in Albany, Dewey and his circle of friends played a key role in Rockefeller’s
campaign. In return, the people of New York gained a governor with years of business,
philanthropic, and governmental experience and who had some of the world’s leading
experts at his fingertips; a treasure trove of facts, charts, and reports could be had with a
single phone call, and, above all, he was a man of action.53 He was a rich man, but he was
not a rich man who merely wanted to survive, he wanted to build, he wanted to lead.
Rockefeller surrounded himself with experts, while his dyslexia (undiagnosed at the time)
prevented him from reading their reports; instead, he insisted that they use visual aids
when they talked face to face with him. This could have been interpreted as selfindulgence or as evidence that he lacked the intellectual capacity to do the job, but, given
the circumstances that he was running a massive and complex state while remaining
active in national politics and dealing with a reading disorder, this was the best course of
action. His dyslexia hindered him in his formative years, but he persevered to find a
workable solution. The impact of the disorder on him and how others around him
perceived his character cannot be overstated, it was a significant part of his persona. It
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influenced not only how others viewed him, but how he came to view himself. In spite of
it all, he possessed a talent for sifting through mountains of information from a verbal
presentation and ability to focus on their best ideas. His expert panels produced findings
and studies that resonated with the intelligence world and with presidents.
Conservatives in the Empire State loathed his internationalist views and
seemingly perpetual centralization of power within the governor’s office. Rockefeller
advocated the construction of better highways, ports, and federal offices. He had grand
ambitions for improving healthcare, education, and social programs. He saw himself as
an architect with an artist’s touch, but conservatives heard what sounded like the New
Deal all over again. Rockefeller wanted all of these things at the expense of the taxpayer
as evidenced by his tax hikes during his early years as governor. During the 1960
convention, members of the media crowded around him and referred to his ideology as
“progressive” to indicate its origins with Teddy Roosevelt.54 Easterners argued that
Rockefeller was the one who could remove the stigma of vested interests attached to the
party, citing a 1959 Gallup Poll that showed that independents preferred him to Nixon.55
Conventional wisdom suggested that Nixon represented the Old Guard, and that he would
not be able to swing voters in the North. Simply put, conservatism would not lead to
victory. All of his finagling and ideologically soft visions of the future made Rockefeller
anathema to conservatives. They could not help but be reminded of another New York
governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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By the mid-twentieth century, choosing a governor as a candidate seemed more
likely than choosing someone from the legislative branch. Only two previous twentiethcentury presidents had served in Congress prior to becoming president: Warren G.
Harding and Harry S. Truman. Harding was the beneficiary of a powerful political
machine and Truman ascended to the presidency after the death of FDR before winning
in his own right in 1948. As history would prove, this was not a trend that would
continue. In his article “Why the Odds are Against a Governor Becoming President,”
pollster Louis Harris concluded that governors were no longer on a clear path to the Oval
Office. Writing in the autumn of 1959, he noted the conventional wisdom of desirable
traits for a president: governors share many of the same basic responsibilities as a
president, governors also have a legislative and judicial branch that they must learn to
work with, and, if need be, they can stay out of any polarizing national issues on which
members of the House or Senate must take a stand. All of this seemed like a reasonable
way to conclude that governors were a fixture of national politics, but he concluded that a
shift was taking place. Amid the vastness of both domestic and foreign policy, governors
who had traveled abroad struggled to build a national image, and their actions were
dwarfed by a vice-president. Following World War II, America grew at an exponential
rate thus the governorship became so complex that it was nearly impossible to emerge
under the spotlight unscathed from negative press in a governor’s home state. No doubt,
opponents would seize on a particular controversial issue and exploit it to their
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advantage. His analysis proved prescient when both parties selected nominees who were
not governors.56
Looking back on Harris’s findings ten years later, Joseph A. Schlesinger wrote
that a governor’s powers and responsibilities were similar to those of a president, and
they did make a governor a likely option. However, these similarities were by no means
an accurate predictor of getting the nomination. Schlesinger argued that regional
distributions of strength within the party system were a greater factor in the nominating
process. Selecting a governor was a strategic choice made by the minority party in a
specific region of the country. For a party to win, it needed to poach voters from its
opponent’s region of strength and any governor the minority party would elect in that
area was of significant value. Majority parties tended not to nominate governors, rather, it
tended to be the “out-party” that was also the minority party who chose governors. For
example, Republicans in 1944 and 1948 enjoyed relative strength in the Midwest and
West but were not strong in the East, so they nominated New York governor Thomas
Dewey.57 Of course, this strategy is predicated on the assumption that the party makes a
correct assessment of its own strength and has a strong pool of candidates from which to
choose, which is not always the case.58
During Governor Rockefeller’s first bid for the presidency, Jack Platten of J.A.
Ward, Inc. advised him that his best chances to win were in 1960 and 1964. Above all,
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Rockefeller had to demonstrate that he could carry New York. Party members must be
convinced that he had voter appeal, and that he could entice independents and disgruntled
Democrats to pull the lever for the GOP. If Rockefeller chose to accept Nixon’s offer of
the vice-presidential nomination, which Platten advised against, he would have to carry
his state or lose influence within the national party. Agreeing to run on the ticket would
put him in the precarious situation of wanting to do well, but not too well. Rockefeller’s
chances for 1964 rested on Nixon getting the nomination in ’60 and then losing. No
matter if he agreed to be the vice-presidential nominee or not, Rockefeller needed to
exude strength and a desire for party unity to maintain his golden boy status. He could
achieve this by agreeing to campaign for Nixon but allowing Nixon’s strategists to dictate
how he should help. Thus, if Nixon were defeated then Rockefeller could show that he
was not to blame for the loss.59
Kennedy carried New York by five percentage points over Nixon, a drop of
nearly fourteen percent from Eisenhower’s margin of victory in the state in 1956.
Rockefeller was unable to deliver Albany for Nixon and Kennedy’s overall victory in
New York City won the day for Democrats. It was a disheartening blow for the party and
for Rockefeller’s chances in 1964. Nixon did well in the West, winning California by the
narrowest of margins, he also performed admirably in the Midwest by taking Ohio and
Indiana but losing in tight races in Illinois and Missouri. Reflecting on the bitterness of
the campaign, Nixon believed that members of the media had used their “substantial and
influential power” to shape how the public heard and saw the campaign. He believed that
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the media had slanted coverage towards Kennedy. He found it disconcerting and clever
that the Kennedy campaign made the religious issue “a referendum on tolerance versus
bigotry.” Most resentful of all, “Kennedy’s organization approached campaign dirty
tricks with a roguish relish and carried them off with an insouciance that captivated many
politicians and overcame the critical faculties of many reporters.”60 Rockefeller had little
sympathy for Nixon, blaming the loss on Nixon’s efforts in the South when he should
have been concentrating on voters in the Northeast and African Americans. Goldwater
reached the opposite conclusion, believing Nixon had spent too much time in the North
and not enough time picking off electoral votes in the South.61
Republicans found that conservatives within the Democratic Party, especially
Southerners, were no fans of the Kennedys either. Voter turnout throughout the South
was much lower than in the North and in places like South Carolina conservatives of all
stripes were wary of a northeastern liberal running the country. In Alabama, arch
segregationist Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia received six Electoral College votes. At the
Republican convention, both South Carolina and Arizona pledged their delegates to Barry
Goldwater. Race relations during the Eisenhower administration were a hot-button issue,
it was a concern for southerners that a liberal president would continue to side with
proponents of civil rights. Even Nixon was known to make different comments on the
issue depending on which side of the Mason-Dixon Line he was on. In Asheville, North
Carolina he was quoted as saying “I must emphasize that there are drawbacks to efforts to
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achieve racial progress by way of law…They (laws) tend to provoke the extremists on
both sides. They can even have the effect of silencing moderate and constructive
elements that have been trying for years to bring justice and harmony into our racial
picture.” A month later a congressman from Connecticut commented, “(Vice-President
Nixon) is determined to do all he can to get the Civil Rights Bill passed, no matter how
long it may take.”62 Most southerners were averse to any kind of federal intervention to
enforce Supreme Court rulings like the Brown decision, and they did not take Nixon’s
comments on the subject lightly.
Southerners felt this issue, among others, was not being addressed in the proper
way by their fellow party members. Democrats took the South for granted. It had
virtually been a one-party system since Reconstruction, but pairing Texas Senator
Lyndon Johnson with Kennedy came across as a cynical ploy to get the southern vote.
James Jackson Kilpatrick, a leading segregationist spokesman and editor of the Richmond
News-Leader, captured the sentiment, “In putting this Counterfeit Confederate on the
ticket, Mr. Kennedy and his advisors have blundered. If Mr. Kennedy sweeps the South,
it will not be because of Lyndon, but in spite of him; for the Senator from Texas,
however he may be respected on the Senate floor, is neither liked nor admired below the
Potomac. In the South of 1960, as in the South of 1870, a carpetbagger may be bad, but a
scalawag is worse… bit by the Presidential bug… Lyndon turned his back upon the
South.”63 Republicans ascertained that there were cracks in the “solid South” that merely
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adding a southerner to the ballot would not fix but they also needed to be careful that
their own nominee struck the right tone with voters.
Rockefeller took a clear stance on civil rights: he was strongly in favor of it. The
Rockefeller family had been supportive of African-Americans since the antebellum era,
when they sought to prevent slave owning missionaries from speaking at their northern
Baptist church. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, John D. Rockefeller
funded foundations provided crucial support for black churches and black education.64
On this issue, Nelson Rockefeller could not understand how the party of Lincoln could
bring racist elements under its tent, but that was what was happening. Republicans in the
West and Midwest were looking to unite with conservative Democrats from the South
and bring down their liberal opponents with the issue of government intervention in civil
rights as the fulcrum for success. Rockefeller’s response to the subject might swing the
1964 nomination one way or the other.

Chapter 2: Picking Up the Pieces
Ideology and Factions
At the start of 1961, three names swirled around to lead the party for the next
election: Nelson Rockefeller, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon. What exactly the
party was going to look like by the time the next campaign season was underway was a
matter of speculation. In broader terms, there was a debate among academics on the left
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and right in the 1950s and early 1960s over what was termed “the end of ideology.”
American sociologists Daniel Bell and Edward Shils, and French sociologist Raymond
Aron were chief among the intellectuals popularizing the idea that the achievements of
postwar Europe’s partially managed, mixed economies made it possible for an end to the
ideological politics of class conflict and polarization between left and right.65 Shils cited
the decline of marxism, national socialism, and fascism. Aron contributed to this with a
chapter in his 1955 book, called “The End of the Ideological Age?”, which pointed out
the disappearance of social-structural conditions in the advanced nations of the West
created by the failures of nationalism, classical liberalism, and marxism.66 By 1960,
Daniel Bell had concluded in his collection of essays, The End of Ideology: On the
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, that while the welfare state that was created in
the wake of the political and economic turmoil of the 1930s, was ripe for criticism, it had
resolved the ideological crisis between bourgeois capitalism and socialism by eliciting
concessions from both.67 This was a historical precedent on which liberals within the
Republican Party could base their actions.
Aron’s works on moderation would serve as an influence for Charles De Gaulle
and Rockefeller advisor Henry Kissinger. Aron occupied a space in the political
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discourse that brought him attacks from both sides. Moderation was not an easy stance to
take considering its paradoxes, inconsistencies, charges of pusillanimity, and the question
of whether it is possible to be a passionate moderate. Aron’s view of moderation rested
on reason, prudence, an understanding of the nuances of political action, the rejection of
the political prophecy that Marxists claimed existed, and the distrust of moral posturing.68
When combining the “end of ideology” argument with Aron’s moderation, the context
within which liberal Republicans were operating in at the start of the decade becomes
clearer. There was indeed a widening gyre between operatives on the far-right and farleft, but moderates had reason and philosophical support to believe that they were a
valuable piece of the American democracy that was necessary for the advancement of
modern politics.
Liberals saw their stock rise when Earl Warren became governor of California in
1942. Warren’s policies managed to fuse Democratic ideology with Republican
principles to support responsible government spending and taxes, bolster free enterprise,
and build up social and educational programs.69 Warren would go on to be considered a
dark horse for the presidency in 1948 but it was his appointment to the Supreme Court
and subsequent rulings that made him a favorite target for liberal opponents. Liberal
stalwart, friend of Nelson Rockefeller, and New York Senator, Jacob Javits was a fixture
of the party as well. He was representative of the liberals who emerged in the Northeast
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in the late 1930s and who accepted and defended the New Deal.70 Javits was a key player
in the redirection of the Republican Party in the aftermath of the Roosevelt presidency. In
1950, he joined Republican Advance, a political group that served as a counterbalance to
the liberal ideology, centered-around the political organization Americans for Democratic
Action (ADA), espoused by Reinhold Niebuhr, Joseph P. Lash, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr
among others. While members of the ADA held the idea that liberalism would succeed
over time through passivity and reason, Advance sought a consensual approach to solving
domestic and international problems. Members of the organization included Javits,
Margaret Chase Smith, Henry Cabot Lodge, New York Herald Tribune editorialist
August Heckscher, McGeorge Bundy, and Congressmen Clifford Case, Kenneth Keating,
Hugh Scott, and Richard Nixon.71 Advance, like the ADA, opposed communism, but
while they denounced the tactics of Joseph McCarthy, they were also supporters of
Truman’s foreign policy. They wanted to limit federal intervention in the economy to
protect the private sector, and within the party they competed against Taft and his
supporters in the struggle for reorienting the party’s philosophy. Their overall goal was to
form a coalition with Democrats based on an anti-statist and anti-communist ideology.72
Advance would neither last nor make any major changes to the party, but it did add to the
disdain for northeastern politicians felt by conservatives in the Midwest and West.
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Liberals were disappointed with Eisenhower when he left office. While Ike had
focused on healing the rift between the Northeast and Midwest, he did little to reconcile
the party’s extremes. Margaret Chase Smith wrote a “Declaration of Conscience”
opposing McCarthyism in 1950 yet Eisenhower appeared on the campaign trail in
Wisconsin with the polarizing Senator in 1952. Liberals in the Senate, put off by
McCarthy’s recklessness, signed Chase’s petition. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower worked
to undermine McCarthy, though, at the time it appeared that he wanted to avoid a
confrontation.73 Liberals had gravitated towards Nixon’s anticommunism, his
internationalist ideals, and support for civil rights legislation in 1957 and 1960. They
stood to gain from Rockefeller’s pre-convention meeting with Nixon to rewrite the party
platform but they misread the situation.
Liberal Republicans, like their Democratic counterpart, took conservative support
within the party for granted. Following Nixon’s defeat, conservatives, who had never
liked the New Deal and were kept in the margins during the Eisenhower years, were
emboldened to act. William F. Buckley’s National Review became a mouthpiece for
conservatives to vent their frustrations during the 1950s. Buckley soon paired his
syndicated column, On the Right, circulating in over 300 newspapers, with his television
show, Firing Line.74 Buckley also founded a conservative group known as the Young
Americans for Freedom (YAF), comprised mostly of early Barry Goldwater supporters,
which made waves the previous fall when they produced the Sharon Statement, a
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declaration of conservative principles. Groups like the YAF had their own vision of the
party that departed from previous attempts to work together with Democrats. This “New
Right” much like the “New Left” of Tom Hayden and the Students for Democratic
Society (SDS), wanted to shake off the rust of the establishment and forge a new path.
Liberal Republicans, in their attempts to modernize the party by adopting major liberal
Democrat policies, managed to drive voters back into the arms of the Democrats. Though
it was not their intention, their efforts to bend the Republican Party towards are more
liberal stance resulted in a loss of votes.
On the fringes of the party was an anti-communist group known as the John Birch
Society. Led by Robert Welch, they considered themselves to be the vanguard against the
communist infiltration of America; Joseph McCarthy had been mostly right, Eisenhower
had been either “a mere stooge, or… a Communist assigned the specific job of being a
political front man,” Gen. Douglas MacArthur had been fired by Stalin, and the American
government had failed to protect middle-class democracy.75 Historians of the era noticed
a definite correlation between McCarthyism of the 1950s and the John Birch Society. In
1954, sociologist Martin Trow put his findings in an article entitled, “Small Businessmen,
Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy.” Trow visited Bennington, Vermont and
found that less-well-educated, small business owners overwhelmingly supported
McCarthy. After spending time in Dallas, Texas, sociologist Alan C. Elms found that
rightists tended to be married to businessmen or high-income salesmen. Over in the
Pacific Northwest, sociologist Ira Rohter linked a decrease in social prestige with middle-

75

Robert Welch, The Politician, Appleton, WI: Robert Welch University Press, 2002, 278.

37
class status among groups of right-wing supporters. Trow concluded that the far right
consisted of men and women who held “a generalized hostility toward a complex of
symbols and processes bound up with industrial capitalism.” Among their grievances
were the “growth and concentration of government,” an emphasis on the growth of
business and production, and “the men, institutions, and ideas that symbolize these
secular trends of modern society.”76
Later in the decade, Daniel Bell put forth his theory of the radical right in his
book, The New American Right, that tied together much of the thinking that pervaded
intellectual circles. His idea was based on two things: his personal disillusionment with
liberalism and a disdain for a Marxist reduction of causation. Bell asserted that “the
social group most threatened by the structural changes in society is the ‘old’ middle classthe independent physician, farm owner, small-town lawyer, real-estate promoter,
homebuilder, automobile dealer, gasoline station owner, small businessman, and the
like.”77 In short, Bell concluded that supporters of the John Birch Society and others on
the far-right were clinging to values that, through modernization, improvements in
society, and changing social convictions, were no longer within their grasp. They were
reactionaries in the sense that they wanted to return society to some previous state,
unchecked by the pressures affecting post-war America.
While this line of reasoning has mostly held true, it fails to acknowledge
additional circumstances overlooked by their author or at least unstated in their writings.
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Americans during the 1950s were undergoing changes that went beyond how they made
money. Numerous works of fiction and nonfiction illuminate the dissatisfaction that the
middle class was feeling, such as Revolutionary Road, The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit,
and The Organization Man. These books captured the sentiment of a generation, of
people trying to find themselves in a world unlike anything previous generations had ever
faced. Later theorists and political pros found that cultural and political beliefs were not
necessarily tied to any socio-economic base, as evidenced by fundamentalist
Christianity.78 Also, among many of the changes taking place in the mid-twentieth
century were a challenge to traditional gender roles. Women increasingly asserted
themselves in the masculine arena of politics. Wives and mothers were not immune to
societal changes. They felt the effects of their husbands responding to pressure to achieve
a certain level of middle class prosperity, and the men in turn responded to that additional
pressure. As what would become evident to future historians reflecting back on the
campaigns of 1960 and 1964, women could be independent enough to solicit others to
join in party activities, organize meetings, and vote in large numbers. Women would have
their own part to play in Republican politics of the early 1960s.
Equally important to understanding the Republican field is the distinction between
conservatives like William F. Buckley versus extremists like Robert Welch. Welch gave
financial support to get the National Review off the ground in the mid-1950s and both
men were anti-communists, but Buckley grew increasingly worried about the damage to
the conservative movement caused by groups like the John Birch Society. Subscribers
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looked to Buckley for intellectual guidance and if he denounced Welch then it could be a
financial setback as well as a potential misstep for the direction of the party.79
Conservatives and the far right had overlapping principles, like opposing communism
and government overreach, but they were not the same group. On the contrary,
conservatives were not alienated, maladjusted, or hostile to modern society. Northeastern
conservatives, like Buckley, were interested in different issues representing different
social and demographic sources. This brand of conservatism drew from a subsection of
Americans concerned with economic and social policy not a domestic communist
conspiracy; they tended to younger, better-educated, and successful to some degree not
older and less successful. These conservatives were better able to adjust to the
psychological constraints of modernity that the other exhibited hostility towards.80
Barry Goldwater’s book, The Conscience of a Conservative, had been a huge hit
during the previous election cycle, rocketing up the New York Times bestseller list, and
by the end of 1960, half a million copies had been sold. L. Brent Bozell, Buckley’s
brother-in-law and a senior editor of the National Review, was the ghostwriter in charge
of articulating Goldwater’s conservative ideals. His skills were recommended by South
Carolina Republican, Clarence Manion, a former official in the Eisenhower
administration who left his position over the failure of the Bricker Amendment, which
would have restricted presidential powers on foreign policy. Manion first met Goldwater
in 1957 when he appeared on a radio program attacking Eisenhower’s ‘modern
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Republicanism’ but not until Goldwater gave a speech in South Carolina, criticizing
Brown v. Board of Education, was Manion able to convince enough Republicans to
realize Goldwater’s potential. Manion had previously declared of Goldwater, “I hear
from millions of people and I conclude that Senator Goldwater is the only hope of the
party.”81 Manion reached out to key political players like industrialist Roger Milliken, a
leading member of the South Carolina Republican Party, to raise money and support from
corporations and small businessmen. He need them to buy into Goldwater’s gospel of
conservativism that included limiting government interference on issues like civil rights,
education, and welfare.82 Not all of the resulting pages met Manion’s approval; for
example, the Senator favored breaking diplomatic ties with Russia, something Goldwater
insisted be retained.83 Manion capitulated and Conscience of a Conservative became a
recruiting tool for the conservative movement, positioning Goldwater as Rockefeller’s
challenger in 1964. However, Goldwater was not entirely sold on the idea that he should
be the one to get in the race. Conservatives would have to persuade and cajole Goldwater
to take up the mantle, but for the time being, he was their shining star.
Toward the ideological center of the party Advance: A Journal of Political
Thought, a progressive magazine run by college students, offered an alternative.
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“America continues in need of a new political philosophy, one that borrows freely from
the best of ‘conservatism’ and ‘liberalism’ and whose essence is not mere moderation.”84
Republican leadership, they argued, needed to expand intellectual and policy-generating
resources, and in the next election they needed to reach out to people in the cities,
minorities, intellectuals, and young people; groups that had not been supporting the party
in the past.85 Advance could have been a starting point for liberals to find their balance.
Its writers were young, enthusiastic, highly educated, and motivated to contribute.
Moments like these, that produce organic political support for a candidate’s philosophy,
are rare and cannot be paid for. It thus comes as a surprise that Rockefeller did little more
than write checks to the editors. This decision would come back to haunt him three years
later.
Rockefeller was too preoccupied to realize the error. He raised serious doubts
about his own qualifications to run the party, not the least of which involved bringing
conservatives, who were still angry about his conspiring with Nixon before the 1960
convention, back under the Republican tent. He would need to act with grace and care to
avoid stepping on the toes of an already seething opposition. Rational observers saw him
as a responsible choice, one that fit into previous molds of thought about the candidate. If
Rockefeller could make some meaningful gesture to put the past behind him or, at the
very least, not do anything to rile up the far-right then it might be possible to get through
another convention with his name at the top of the ticket. Among the political experts and
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the press, Rockefeller was the frontrunner for the nomination because the northeastern
Establishment had controlled the pick for at least two decades. Conservatives were not
seen as an insurmountable threat, because they were active but not powerful in the early
sixties.86 Liberals and moderates alike underestimated the groundswell of support and
determination that conservatives were able to conjure, but their candidate was in position
to win the nomination in 1964.

1961: Kennedy and Rockefeller Face Setbacks
When the CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba failed on the beaches in mid-April,
stranding over a thousand Cuban counterrevolutionaries with no air support, the Kennedy
administration took a huge blow to their new image of optimism. Detractors painted
Kennedy’s team as inept, easily manipulated, and lacking in the courage to do whatever it
took to make sure that the operation was a success. The Bay of Pigs put the whole world
on notice that the United States, with all of its military might, could not execute an
invasion of a small island nation just ninety miles from its coast. It was a rude surprise for
the young president that would lead to even greater danger between the United States and
the Soviet Union. In a letter to the Soviet Chairman, Nikita Khrushchev, the president
wrote, “I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet government using the situation in
Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think
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that your government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any
enterprise so dangerous to general peace.”87 Time would prove otherwise.
A week after the invasion, Kennedy agreed to meet with Rockefeller in the hopes
of maintaining a bipartisan front and taking the Cuban situation out of the domestic
political arena. Afterwards, the governor released a statement that the situation in Cuba
put the security of the United States at great risk, adding that all Americans should “stand
united behind the president in whatever action is necessary to defend freedom.”88 Nixon
made a similar statement that was met by a harsh denunciation from some quarters of the
party. Rockefeller’s words seemed to go a step further given that a shooting war with
Castro’s forces was no longer as likely as originally feared in the early days of the fallout
from the invasion. Kennedy tried to do political damage control by appealing to
Republicans sense of patriotism while the administration worked to create a new strategy
for the region. Conservatives were already angry about Kennedy’s failure to overthrow
the Castro regime followed by his attempt to cloak the situation in national unity, and
they saw Rockefeller either a dupe or complicit in Kennedy’s maneuvering. For
Republicans, this was a political issue that could be used down the road. The majority of
the party was liberal but that did not mean that they had to help smooth over every
mistake that the president made.
As the summer approached, Rockefeller had to be cautious about his actions in
public. He was already making moves that pleased the party faithful by keeping a
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somewhat low profile as he made appearances around the country with the occasional
splash, calculated for national exposure. By presenting himself in this low-key manner
with precision attacks, Rockefeller was beginning to put some distance between his
present situation and the anger over his moves at the convention. Meanwhile George
Hinman, Republican national committeeman and close political advisor to Rockefeller,
ingratiated himself with Congressmen, state chairmen, and national committeemen.
Hinman’s smooth persona and charm were of the New York City variety making him the
perfect choice for gauging interest in the governor.89 With Hinman stirring interest in
Rockefeller among Establishment members of the party above the surface, below the
surface something much different was taking place. Rockefeller would have to choose
his spots carefully if he wanted to build upon his previous successes. As he would come
to learn, GOP voters were not just concerned with what lawyers and politicians thought
of the candidate.
In June, Martin Luther King flew with Rockefeller on his private plane from New
York City to Albany to address a rally at the Wilborn Temple of God in Christ. Despite
the warnings of his image-conscious staff, Rockefeller introduced the civil rights leader
to the crowd, telling his staff, “If it’s morally the right thing, it’s the politically right
thing.”90 During his remarks, Rockefeller applauded King for his dedication and
motivation, calling him a spiritual leader akin to Ghandi. King would later write to
Rockefeller, “Your statement in the public meeting gave not only new inspiration and
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hope to us who work on the front line, but also to many people of color who are burdened
by racial discrimination.”91 Rockefeller saw the visit as an opportunity to help King and
show his support for the civil rights movement. To be sure, it was a political risk. The
governor reasoned that the United States could not hope to maintain its prowess around
the world as a defender of liberty and equality “until we have honored the citizenship of
Negroes in Georgia and Alabama.”92 As part of his Cold War agenda, it was imperative
to use liberal social policies to win the support of African-Americans to advance the
cause of the free world.93 Considering the other likely candidates in the Republican Party,
Rockefeller, with his history of support for civil rights and Martin Luther King Jr.,
presented a viable option for what remained of African-American support for the GOP.
Privately, Rockefeller’s life was suffering. He had been married to Mary
Todhunter Clark since he was twenty-two years old and fresh out of Dartmouth. Now, at
the age of fifty-three, he was no longer in love or faithful to the woman he had been with
for so long. Their marriage, like many of their generation and social status, was a
formality. Mary was never comfortable being a politician’s wife, and she had never even
been to Albany. She was not considered an asset on the campaign trail, was
uncomfortable with voters to the point of embarrassment, and she was bored with the
other wives of politicians and women’s tea receptions. In contrast, Nelson relished the
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physical contact with voters and admirers, and enjoyed himself in front of the camera.
Their divorce was not a surprise to his staff who saw the couple’s relationship up close.
Nelson was a deeply flawed husband and had fallen madly in love with the wife of a
microbiologist at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.94 Happy was eighteen
years younger than Nelson, and was the mother of four children. Carl Spad, an advisor
and companion, recalled on a plane ride with the governor that Rockefeller had suddenly
announced that he was going to divorce Mary and wed Happy. Spad went over the
political ramifications of such a decision with Rockefeller, exacerbated as they were by
his coming re-election campaign and his ambition for the White House. Rockefeller,
however, would have none of it, “I’m telling you, Carl, not asking you.”95 Kissinger,
amid his own marital troubles, remarked that Happy “would be disappointed and
unhappy if she ever married Nelson; that he was a lonely man, remote and indifferent, for
all his surface amiability, and that she would find herself excluded from his life as the
first Mrs. Rockefeller did.”96 Other reactions ranged from subdued to disbelief.
Goldwater said Rockefeller’s family troubles should not be a factor in 1964, Adlai
Stevenson recounted his own experience with divorce before an election, and Nikita
Krushchev was baffled, thinking Rockefeller’s divorce was somehow linked to U.S.
troops in West Berlin. Kennedy chimed in, “I don’t believe it. No man would ever love
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love more than he loves politics.”97 Party leaders, not knowing the governor well, were
surprised by the divorce and reached the conclusion that the divorce would not help
Rockefeller, but likewise, it was not likely to cause any major political damage. 98
Then, less than two days after Nelson and Mary’s announcement, an unspeakable
tragedy befell the Rockefeller family, Michael Rockefeller, Nelson’s son, had
disappeared off the coast of New Guinea. Michael had gone to New Guinea to study the
Stone Age Dani natives, collect pieces of primitive art and artifacts, and, in Michael’s
words, to “do something romantic and adventurous.”99 Governor Rockefeller’s spirits
were lifted as he was en route to the jungle island from New York when Michael’s
companion was saved. Upon his arrival, Rockefeller’s pronouncements of optimism
faded with each passing day, despite the frantic search from the air and the sea, rescuers
found no traces of Michael that provided conclusive evidence of his whereabouts.
Heartbroken and exhausted, the governor returned to New York.100
As the year came to a close, Rockefeller’s fortune and chances for the nomination
needed to be recalculated. Nineteen sixty-two was an election year in New York and the
outcome was seen as a barometer for the future of both parties. Kennedy’s headquarters
still viewed Rockefeller as a major threat to re-election even with the events of the past
year. To win his own reelection, Rockefeller emphasized his experience and
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achievements while downplaying his personal life. His announcement to his divorce
plans and Michael’s disappearance could hardly be ignored by voters. It was naive to
think that the public would not be interested in what had happened and it was impossible
for any politician to keep such sensational personal affairs out of the political discussion.
This included squelching rumors of cannibals’ role in Michael Rockefeller’s death.101
Rockefeller maintained the illusion that he was focused on the gubernatorial race but he
left himself an out. During a news conference in Albany, he asked voters to reelect him
on the premise that they should vote for him based on his record. His presidential
ambitions, he believed, should have no bearing on his reelection campaign. Voters
argued, they should have no objection and even encourage him if he had the opportunity
to win the presidential nomination. Thus, a pledge to serve a full four-year term would be
unnecessary to win reelection in 1962.102 He was hedging his bets, counting on a strong
showing in the gubernatorial race to launch him into the race for the White House. It had
been a tumultuous year with wild swings of emotion, but he was still standing and
remained confident.

1962: Rockefeller on the Rise
Rockefeller’s time as governor often stretched beyond the Empire State whether
he was inserting himself into national issues or meeting with officials from D.C. He was
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a powerful man with grand ambitions. A speech at the start of the year to the New York
State Legislature shed some light on his conflict with both liberals and conservatives in
his home state, but also served to show how he approached a situation that called for
gaining liberal votes while maintaining a decent relationship with conservatives. Political
observers saw the governor’s chances for re-election hinging on his support among
liberals. The Liberal Party had contributed in 1960 to the election of several key
positions. They assisted in electing Republicans for mayor in Buffalo, the U.S. Senate, a
judgeship on the Court of Appeals, and Speaker of the Assembly. In addition, they had
strengthened Kennedy’s hold on the electorate in his bid for the presidency. If
Rockefeller was going to win the governorship in convincing fashion, he was going to
have to please the Liberal Party, and liberals in the Republican and Democratic Party as
well.
Since its inception in 1944, New York’s Liberal Party was never large but it did
have the power to provide decisive electoral margins for Republicans by swinging
supporters away from Democrats. Some Republicans, like Thomas Dewey, thought that
siding with the Liberal Party was more trouble than it was worth and put a candidate at
serious risk of alienating conservatives. Rockefeller disagreed, believing that securing
votes from liberals, whether they be from the Liberal Party or liberals from the two major
parties, was more important than building a coalition with conservatives.103 This strategy
had worked before, but now, with Rockefeller facing increasing scrutiny from around the
country, this ploy could be seen as Rockefeller refusal to cooperate with the interests of
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the party. Moreover, with the attention on the race for Albany, if Rockefeller’s strategy
backfired in any way then it could give leadership, lukewarm about his national
candidacy already, a reason to believe that his power was not as great as once believed.
At any rate, Rockefeller made up his mind and dismissed Dewey’s argument. He
had other plans. Inside the Assembly chamber, listeners may have been struck by
Rockefeller’s words at the conclusion of his speech that sounded more like he was talking
to voters about his credentials for 1964 than addressing the state legislature, “All of us
believe that New York can and should lead, by act and example, in giving proof of the
creativeness, the vigor, the vision and the leadership of free government,” he declared.
He continued by extending his speech far beyond the state’s borders, “The full meaning
of this challenge reaches far beyond our boundaries. The world is filled with nations
either dedicated to the destruction of freedom, or coveting and struggling for the
blessings of freedom. It is the supreme task – for all Americans, in such positions of trust
as you and I – to do all in our power to refute and deny those predicting the death of
freedom and to assure and hearten those craving a life of freedom.”104 Rockefeller’s
speech and strategy reveal a governor with more on his mind than re-election. Based on
what had already transpired in 1961, Rockefeller was optimistic that he would win in
November. Once the party regulars saw him win, then they would throw their support
behind him, locking up the nomination more than a year in advance. This time honored
tradition spoke to the importance of New York to the nomination process. Both parties
viewed the state as a crucial part of their electoral success, but this would not last as the
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population of Sunbelt states began to expand, draining New York’s importance in the
electoral math.105
Rockefeller was not the only potential candidate with a governor’s race to win;
there was George Romney in Michigan, Richard Nixon mounting a political comeback in
California, and William Scranton in Pennsylvania. Among the three, Nixon was seen as
the best candidate should he win the California governorship while Romney was a
question mark, and Scranton gave no clear signal that he even wanted to be in the race.
For Republicans in the West and Midwest, their choice was and had been Goldwater.
Rockefeller had lost his place as a serious contender. With his pending divorce becoming
final, the New York governor lost favor with voters outside of the eastern seaboard. Even
liberal Republicans were speculated to side with either Romney or Nixon depending on
how their races were decided. Goldwater’s rallies were well attended and drew in excited
crowds to hear him. Goldwater liked to criticize the Kennedy administration and relate
his humble beginnings to presidents of the past, “I was born in a log cabin, which I had
moved to Phoenix and except for some air-conditioning, a swimming pool, a bowling
alley, a bar, a shooting range and a golf course, remains the same simple log cabin it
always was.”106 Goldwater’s stock was rising. When the party appeared weakest,
Goldwater got stronger. When Kennedy appeared strongest, Republican leadership
moved towards giving conservatives a chance at the nomination.
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In the early months of 1962, the political life of Nelson Rockefeller turned grim.
A fundraising dinner was held in seventeen cities across the U.S. with brief remarks over
closed-circuit TV by such party leaders as Goldwater, Eisenhower, and National
Committee Chairman William Miller. When Rockefeller’s face appeared on the screen he
was booed from Boston to Tulsa.107 In New York, Democratic gubernatorial nominee
Robert Morgenthau Jr. led a strategy to smash Rockefeller’s image of bipartisanship.
Four years earlier, New Yorkers viewed Rockefeller as apolitical, commending him for
getting into politics with no axes to grind, and running to serve the best interests of the
people rather than those of a particular party.108 After serving as governor and acquiring
enemies on both sides of the political aisle, Rockefeller was vulnerable to attacks. With
news of his divorce still filling up columns in the daily newspapers, voters in New York
and around the country showed signs of being put off by the once bright star from the
Northeast. Making matters worse, an overflow crowd of conservatives attended an anticommunist rally at New York’s Madison Square Garden denouncing liberalism and
challenging the Kennedy administration. Conservatives from across the nation attended,
bringing in thousands of dollars of donations and national media attention. Goldwater’s
voice rang out, “We gather here tonight to celebrate recent advances, and to plot new
victories…we have come far, and we are going strong.”109 Conservative’s had come into
Rockefeller’s backyard and made their voices heard; he would have to respond.
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To combat his sinking popularity, Rockefeller set out to make amends with
conservatives. He eased tension in his home state by making fewer and fewer public
appearances with Democrats and avoiding meetings that made him look like he was
merely appeasing their interests. In May, he struck out on the national trail, making stops
in the West and Midwest. At a dinner in Seattle, he received a standing ovation when he
was introduced by Washington Governor Albert D. Rosellini, a reception far greater than
that received by Vice-President Lyndon Johnson at the same event. A day later, at the
Cheyenne airport in Wyoming, State Senate president Al Harding handed Rockefeller a
cowboy hat saying, “This is either for wearing or throwing in the ring.” Rockefeller then
mounted a stage coach drawn by two horses, took the reins, and rode down the airport
runway.110
By the first week of June, a Gallup Poll of rank-and-file Republicans found
Rockefeller with 32%, Goldwater with 23%, Milton Eisenhower with 14%, and George
Romney with 8%. Nixon was left out because he was insisting that he was not a
candidate.111 Rockefeller’s efforts to support the party by speaking and raising money
were paying off. He was intent on mending fences with conservatives who were still
upset over the 1960 convention. The millionaire governor joked, “I have as much to
‘conserve’ as anyone.”112 Now it was Goldwater who was losing ground, with the pros
questioning if a conservative could win a national election or if Goldwater was the right
person to fill the vacuum left by Eisenhower’s aloofness and with Nixon, busy as ever,
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was holding off an unexpectedly strong far-right resistance within the California
Republican Party.
That summer it appeared that Goldwater and Rockefeller might not clash at all
quite the opposite, they could run together. “Rockefeller and I are not nearly so far apart
as you might think,” Goldwater told a staffer in 1960.113 Both were ambitious and
passionate and if Rockefeller appealed more to the head then Goldwater appealed more to
the heart. A Rockefeller-Goldwater ticket was not so far-fetched as to be outside the
realm of possibility. Both would have something to gain, but Rockefeller would benefit
more. Together they had a common enemies in Nixon and Eisenhower, who could not be
trusted to follow through lest another opportunity should present itself or if their ideology
got in the way. When Eisenhower held the All- Republican Conference at his farm in
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, neither Goldwater nor Rockefeller attended out of suspicion of
the organizers. Goldwater had no tolerance for Eisenhower. His advisor, F. Clifton
White, warned that a conspiracy was afoot to minimize the growing conservative
movement and nominate someone else.114 After the conference, Goldwater telephoned
Rockefeller and Hinman about a link between the formation of a new National
Republican Citizens Committee and the Nixon and Romney campaigns. 115 Both men
were highly suspicious of treachery from above. Eisenhower’s attempt at uniting the
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candidates was a disaster. Conservatives were further alienated and Rockefeller was
spooked by the moderates’ attempts to find a replacement for him.
That fall, Rockefeller received an unexpected boost when Goldwater curtailed his
cross-country speechmaking. Goldwater was tired from visiting rallies, business
conventions, and college campuses; he wanted to focus more on his Senate duties, and he
recognized that his support in New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan,
and Ohio was not as strong as a top candidate needed to win. Goldwater was encouraged
by Rockefeller’s moves towards the right and, if necessary, columnists noted Goldwater
would be available to serve as vice-president in 1964 when his Senate term ended.116
Down South, southerners boiled with anger over President Kennedy’s decision to send
federal troops into Mississippi after segregationists attempted to block James Meredith
attempted desegregation of the University of Mississippi. Kennedy’s status as a villain of
the old Confederacy was cemented; locals were already complaining about the rising
national debt and the presence of communists off the coast of Florida. They liked the
benefits of federal programs but opposed their costs and requirements to meet such
federal standards as equal employment for blacks.117 Kennedy’s decision served to drive
a deeper wedge between Democrats and the South. For a brief moment, the Cuban
Missile Crisis stymied any talks of the election as people around the world were on edge
fearing a nuclear strike between the Soviets and the Americans. Mercifully, with the
minute hand dangerously close to striking midnight on the nuclear clock, the two sides

116

“Boost for Rocky Seen As Goldwater Curtails Nationwide Politicking,” Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 14, 1962.
117

“How They Fight Elections in South Carolina,” New York Times, Oct. 19, 1962.

56
reached an agreement, pulling the world back from the brink of annihilation. Less than a
month after the events of Mississippi, a television audience witnessed Jackie Robinson
name Rockefeller “Layman of the Year” at an African-American church for being
“forthright in his enunciation of social, political, economic, and educational justice for
the Negro.”118 Segregationists in the South took notice of this and now had one more
reason to distrust him.
Elections that November brought clarity to the race for the nomination: Romney
and Scranton enjoyed impressive victories, and Rockefeller won but by a thinner margin
than in years past. Nixon, in contrast, was defeated, seemingly writing his own political
obituary by announcing his retirement, punctuated with a jibe to reporters that, “You
won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore.”119 Nixon’s defeat in California was ominous
for liberals and moderates looking towards 1964. Birchers egged on by Robert Welch
fused with conservatives populating Southern California proved too much for the former
vice-president.120 Scranton’s victory in Pennsylvania ended the Democrats’ eight-year
hold on the governorship, while Romney’s election ended a fourteen-year drought for
Republicans in Michigan. Rockefeller’s win felt more like a loss in many ways. He
gained in New York City but lost ground in upstate areas. The election thus reinvigorated
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the effort of segregationists in the South to jumpstart a draft-Goldwater movement while
Nixon supporters began singing the praises of Romney.121
By December, with the excitement of the election returns dissipating, party
leaders at a meeting of the Republican National Committee concluded that Rockefeller
was back at the top for the nomination. “Romney is too new and Scranton talks like he
really doesn’t want it and Goldwater can’t win, so it’s got to be Rockefeller,” reasoned
one Congressmen.122 For all of his posturing, Rockefeller remained officially out of the
race and made an effort to stop grassroots support. Hinman sent letters from New York
silencing supporters’ efforts to hold campaign drives for the governor who was neither
declaring his candidacy nor seeking delegate commitments. Meanwhile, conservatives
continued building an army, covertly working to nominate Goldwater. At the end of the
year, Rockefeller had no sway among the southern-wing of the party, where party
stalwarts saw Goldwater as the true soul of Republicans, but, in northern industrial states,
Rockefeller was the stronger candidate and, in the Midwest and Rocky Mountain states,
Rockefeller’s popularity was on the rise.123 At the end of the year, Rockefeller was the
candidate with the best chance at winning the nomination. Only a major blunder could
bring him down.
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Chapter 3: An End to the Beginning
1963 – Love and Politics
At the beginning of 1963, Rockefeller had two major plans for improving his
chances of earning the nomination. First, attack Kennedy’s record on Cuba, the economy,
and civil rights. Second, convince conservatives that he was neither a radical nor an
enemy of the Republican Party. Rockefeller criticized the president for halting
underground nuclear tests during negotiations with the Soviets on a nuclear-test ban
treaty and for being susceptible to the notion “all too popular in high places, that the
public cannot be told the whole truth about the international situation, because people
might panic.”124 Kennedy was not only keeping Americans in the dark, but he was also
showing weakness by not pushing harder to get Soviet troops out of Cuba. Domestically,
he was failing to reenergize the country through his economic policies.125 On the issue of
civil rights, Rockefeller chided the president for appointing known segregationists to
federal judgeships in the South. To the governor, this was an opportunity to remind the
public of the Democratic Party’s roots in supporting slavery and the current support of
southern Democrats for Jim Crow segregation.126
When the topic of conversation turned to him, Rockefeller defended his decision
to increase the New York state budget and pay for it with liquor taxes and auto
registration fees. This allowed him to claim that he was liberal in social policy but
124

“Rockefeller Hits U.S. Cuba Policy,” Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 31, 1963.

125

“Rockefeller Tunes Up for ’64,” The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 9, 1963.

126

Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume III, New York:
Vintage Books, 2003, 132-223.

59
conservative when it came to economics, much like the modern Republicanism proposed
by Eisenhower.127 He had chosen the grounds on which to fight Kennedy and was ready
to stake his claim. All indications were that Rockefeller was not ready to concede the
White House to Kennedy for another four years, since he knew as well as anyone, how
quickly fortunes could change. Unable to stand idly by while the governor bad-mouthed
their party’s leader, Democrats charged that Rockefeller was an “absentee governor”
roaming the country “on a political sideshow of criticism of the national
administration.”128 Political sniping aside, Rockefeller stuck to his strategy by touring
the Midwest and appearing at a Lincoln Day dinner, where he emphasized that the terms
“liberal” and “conservative” were nonsense yet proceeded to tell the audience of his
“traditional” political philosophy.129 He was talking out of both sides of mouth, but it was
working. At each stop, the usual refrain became about jobs, the budget, providing tax
incentives to industry, NATO, and nuclear weapons with an occasional appeal for civil
rights legislation and more pressure on Kennedy to take a tougher stand on Cuba. With
Rockefeller on the road, his staff insisted that it was premature to call the governor a
candidate. Meanwhile, Romney and Scranton continued to indicate no desire to get into
the race, and Goldwater was a reluctant as ever to run. New York Times columnist Tom
Wicker wrote that experts had now concluded that America’s honeymoon with Kennedy
was over. The burdens of the office were weighing on his administration, that each
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decision took off a bit more polish, and that he was running on star power rather than as
the nation’s unchallenged leader. However, Wicker concluded it was far too early to
declare him finished or even that if some or any of his political troubles would prevent
him from a resounding victory the following November.130
At this point, Rockefeller’s strafing attacks on Kennedy helped to build up
political capital, but he repeatedly missed opportunities to do something about the
infighting within his own party. In February, William Rusher penned an influential article
for National Review titled “Crossroads for the GOP” which called on Republicans to
work with segregationists and to nominate Goldwater because of his conservatism. This,
he argued, would finally wrestle the South away from Democrats.131 F. Clifton White had
long been in the political shark tank, feeding interest in a conservative candidate.
Goldwater would later comment in his memoir that White was a “pro, much more than a
mere public relations man or college instructor in political science…a very experienced
technician.”132 Conservatives like White were a minority within the party with their own
agenda. Rockefeller first got a taste of conservatives’ strategy during his 1958
gubernatorial campaign that resulted in a bitter feud between White and State Chairman
Jud Morhouse over the latter’s rough tactics.
As early as 1961, White sent confidential memos solidifying the Draft Goldwater
organization, appearing at Republican National Committee meetings, raising money,
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strategizing, and counting delegates.133 All the while, Rockefeller’s lieutenants fired off
remarks to the press like, “When you’re the only candidate you can afford to wait.”134
Their overconfidence blinded them to a growing threat. Party leadership was as much to
blame as Rockefeller, having allowed Goldwater to become chairman of the Republican
Senatorial Campaign Committee, which he subsequently bent to his political will. They
also applauded Goldwater and I. Lee Porter’s “Operation Dixie” which courted
segregationist whites.135 In South Carolina, state party chairman Drake Edens remarked,
“I don’t think it is any secret that the majority of South Carolina Republicans and
Independents prefer Senator Goldwater.” He added, “a Republican administration headed
by any of the persons currently mentioned as possible nominees would be far more
preferable that four more years of rule by the Kennedy clan.”136 Goldwater himself
commented that because of the lagging national economy, an increase in the jobless rate,
and the sour mood over the truth of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy was not
unbeatable.137
Less than a month after Goldwater’s assessment, Martin Luther King Jr. penned a
poignant message to extremists and moderates alike on the issue of civil rights in his
“Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” Fed up with the NAACP’s attempts to achieve equality
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through the court system, and whites for a failing to properly assess the moral gravity of
the situation, King wrote “I must confess that over the last few years I have been gravely
disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion
that the Negro's great stumbling block in the stride toward freedom is not the White
Citizens Councillor or the Ku Klux Klanner but the white moderate who is more devoted
to order than to justice.”138 King lambasted the moderates’ argument that law and order
should preclude justice; moderates were fond of telling blacks that they agreed with their
plight but then rejected direct action in favor of stability. At least, according to King,
racists were honest about their beliefs and clear about their goals. Moderates, however,
occupied a space that was neither in line with fundamental American values, such as
equality, nor with Christian notions of brotherhood. Nonviolent protestors were not
responsible for the tension that existed in the South; rather, they had brought it to the
forefront for the world to see. If this made moderates or the clergy uncomfortable, that
was a small price to pay for what was at stake.139 On this point, members of both parties,
including President Kennedy and vocal civil rights supporters like Rockefeller, would
have to shoulder some of the blame as well as responsibility for taking action.
That May, after emerging from political hibernation, Richard Nixon gave an
interview relating his advice for the Republican field. First, he insisted that the candidates
should not wait to be nominated, they should seek it out. Second, candidates should start
right away, and if they did not, then this implied that the candidate had no intention of

138

Martin Luther King Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” accessed January 6, 2017
https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/Letter_Birmingham_Jail.pdf
139

Bass, S. Jonathan. Blessed Are the Peacemakers: Martin Luther King, Jr., Eight White Religious
Leaders, and the "Letter from Birmingham Jail," LSU Press, 2001, 124-126.

63
entering or did not think he would defeat Kennedy. Third, all candidates should enter
some of the primaries and Nixon would support whoever won in California. Fourth,
primaries gave voters a chance to see the candidates in action and gave the candidates a
head start on the national campaign.140 At this stage, Rockefeller and Goldwater were the
likely candidates, but Nixon did appear to have ulterior motives for his comments. A few
ideas come to mind on this: Nixon wanted Goldwater and Rockefeller to mutually
destroy each other in the primaries, in which case a third candidate, possibly himself,
could take the nomination. A second possibility was that Nixon did not want the
nomination but did want either Rockefeller or Goldwater to get it and lose to Kennedy so
that neither would be in position for 1968 if Nixon should run again. A day after Nixon’s
advice to the candidates appeared in print, he announced that he would seek employment
as a lawyer in New York, effectively quieting if not altogether ending the speculation that
he would become a candidate.
Whatever Nixon’s true intentions, the race for the nomination was irrevocably
changed when newspapers reported that Nelson Rockefeller wed Happy Murphy on
Saturday, May 4th. Looking back on the events that transpired in the lead up to the
wedding and its aftermath, the only thing that is clear is that Rockefeller became a
different candidate overnight. At first, the reaction from party leaders was rather positive.
Some even downplayed the marriage as a private matter while others thought that it
might actually help Rockefeller. New York Senator Jacob Javits, like most of his peers,
believed that the Rockefeller’s divorce fifteen months earlier had larger political
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implications, “I believe that it will not have any material effect on his political future. I
believe any effect there was to be came after his divorce. I don’t think this will affect his
situation any further,” he said.141 This was not just a kind statement by another liberal;
Javits had been a key supporter of Rockefeller for years, and while he had met with the
governor the day before the wedding, he had not been told of it. David Rockefeller,
Nelson’s brother, ultimately informed Javits, not Nelson. Hinman called other members
of congress reassuring them that the fervor over the wedding would quiet down while
also trying to assess their reactions.142
Weighing in from counties and hamlets across the map, key members of the party
issued warnings that the American public was not comfortable with broken homes,
especially considering that Happy had finalized her divorce only a month earlier. Roman
Catholics, Fundamentalist Protestants, and Episcopalian clergy around the country took
the opportunity to express their disapproval and to remind their congregations of the
sanctimony of marriage.143 Large numbers of women were equally outraged over the
matter. Happy had effectively given up her children to be with Rockefeller who himself
had divorced his aging wife for a bride nearly two decades younger than him. After a
group of women descended on his office to register their outrage over Rockefeller’s
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conduct, Maryland Republican congressman Charles Mathias, Jr. began to tell friends
that Rockefeller’s chances were finished.144
Today, it seems almost absurd that Rockefeller should be punished so severely for
his marriage; after all, he had the choice of keeping the affair private while she was still
married or getting a divorce and remarrying so that their love could be public knowledge.
President John F. Kennedy was a known philanderer among the press and Washington
regulars, but his escapades did not become front page news while he was in the White
House or when he was on the campaign trail. For that matter, Happy’s ex-husband
remarried just as quickly as she did. Since the 1960s, historians have recounted numerous
tales of the infidelity of presidents, and the public has become far more accepting of
divorced candidates for office, but the American public of 1963 was not willing to accept
Nelson and Happy’s marriage. Many felt insecure about their own lives, and others were
scandalized by a woman leaving her family to be with a billionaire. The average voter
believed this simply was not something that a proper woman was supposed to do. When
women got married they were expected to stay married, and women’s lives were tied to
their husbands in romantic and financial terms. For many women and men alike, divorce
was intolerable. Nelson and Happy ventured a step too far. Rockefeller wanted love and
power, and he was not about to choose.
If this seems to be an incomplete explanation of Rockefeller’s fall from
frontrunner status, then there is another explanation. Events of the civil rights movement,
including recent flare ups in news coverage, combined with Rockefeller’s stance on civil
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rights added to the climate of racial hostility felt in the South. Furthermore, a desire for a
conservative candidate to pair with a southern strategy made it possible for disgruntled
Republicans to justify their support for Goldwater. In other words, Rockefeller’s
marriage was a convenient out for some conservatives. They wanted Goldwater to be the
face of conservatism because he was respectable and a true believer. Rockefeller would
never be that candidate so conservatives used any reason they could to distance
themselves from him. Rockefeller’s marriage further substantiated their claims that he
was not the right fit for the Republican Party. In addition, Rockefeller’s own staff may
have retroactively blamed his marriage for his defeat to avoid any further controversy.
This is evidenced by an unpublished chapter in Rockefeller’s campaign biography by
Frank Gervasi, The Real Rockefeller: The Story of the Rise, Decline and Resurgence of
the Presidential Aspirations of Nelson Rockefeller. Gervasi explicitly states that
Goldwater “ran a poor second to Rockefeller until Bull Connor catalyzed the counterrevolution to the Negro Revolution.” This piece of inside information supports Joseph
Alsop’s reporting in the Washington Post singling out Rockefeller’s liberal stance on race
as his Achilles heel.145 It is also possible that Rockefeller’s liberalism towards civil rights
and his remarriage combined, depending on the voter’s region or religious views or
gender or any number of other factors, to sink the governor’s poll numbers.
Conservatives leading the Barry-for-President movements in Texas,
Massachusetts, Alabama, Minnesota, California, Oklahoma, and Arizona were ecstatic
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over the marriage. Goldwater no longer made an attempt to stop the growing movement
of support. Political pros were less convinced about the Senator’s chances, Goldwater
agreed, reasoning that wealthy eastern moderates were still unlikely to support a
conservative candidate. There was the possibility that Romney would become a
compromise candidate put forth by the so called “kingmakers” to avoid an either-or
scenario at the convention.146 Goldwater seemed to be anticipating that the convention
would be deadlocked or moderates would find a way to block his nomination. Goldwater
pressed on, motivated either by his desire to see the process through for the sake of the
conservative movement or by the vanity that accompanies men who pursue power. His
gruff public persona made him appear as if he was almost put up to all of this by
supporters. He continued to appear at Republican fundraisers, including a $1,000-a-plate
dinner in New York where he received another standing ovation while Romney looked
on. Rockefeller skipped the event to go on his honeymoon in Venezuela.147 When
Rockefeller returned after gallivanting on the beaches, a Gallup poll showed that
Goldwater was leading Rockefeller, 35% to 30%.148 Rockefeller was stunned by the
realization that the lock he had on the nomination was no more.
Danger crept closer for Rockefeller at the Young Republicans Convention in San
Francisco. Political observers viewed the event as a prelude to the primaries and an
indicator of the party’s feelings. At the convention, conservatives routed Rockefeller’s
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supporters. Neither Rockefeller nor Romney attended it, but Goldwater did, receiving a
standing ovation before lighting a fire under conservative stalwarts. Amid the banners
and balloons, conservatives blasted liberals for their detriment to the party and defended
members of the John Birch Society, dismissing claims that they were extremists.149 It was
an incredible display of enthusiasm and support for conservatism. It was a wave that had
been building for some time. A year earlier Rockefeller had been asked to fund the
Young Republicans, but he had declined.150 Even when letters came in to his New York
offices offering to help set up Rockefeller-for-President chapters they were sent a polite
“no” in response.151 Rockefeller tried to convince himself that, despite the events of the
YR convention, history would stay the course, and he would take the nomination as the
rational choice for moderation. Only he could draw on the success of the 1962 elections
and Goldwater’s deficiency outside of pockets of the country. Or so he thought.
Rockefeller’s campaign organization was not a helpless group of amateurs,
though they may in retrospect appear to be. Ideologically, they were liberal Republicans
with a few renegade Democrats sprinkled in. They were lawyers, academics,
businessmen, and politicians in their own right. George Hinman was the polite, urbane
spokesmen tasked with selling the candidate to the party. William J. Ronan handled the
governor’s state affairs, influenced his views on state government, and consulted with
him on national politics. John E. Lockwood was Rockefeller’s personal lawyer, and he
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played a crucial role in gubernatorial campaigns, drafted major speeches, and was a
trusted advisor during times of crisis. Around the governor were an inner core of six
influential regulars and outside of them was an outer seven and on and on the circles
went, feeding information to the candidate whose professional philosophy was to gather
as many facts as possible before making a decision. Aides and advisors felt that they were
with a man who was going places. They should do all that they could to get next to him,
whether it was getting on the same elevator, riding in the same limousine, or sitting next
to the candidate when election returns started coming in.
Observers mocked their sycophancy and admonished Rockefeller for not
assessing blame when the occasion called for a shakeup. Most damaging of all,
Rockefeller tended to close himself off from outside views. In sum, his circle of advisors
were too close. Trusting in oneself in limited amounts is a net positive, but Rockefeller’s
trust in his own abilities and instincts came precariously close to dooming him. When
asked about his divorce, remarriage, and running for president, he supplied a revealing
quote, “If I let events flow along, I’ll know when and how I must decide these
matters.”152 For a man who collected facts and advisors in an almost mechanical way, this
might seem out of character to the point of recklessness, but that was Rockefeller in a
nutshell. He could be enigmatic, emotional, arrogant, and undisciplined like one of the
works of modern art that he cared so much about.
Because of or despite these personal qualities, Rockefeller had an allure about
him. He had the drive and ambition to realize a goal that was so far out of reach for so
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many that people wanted to be around him. In 1963, Rockefeller had the potential to be a
fantastic political figure if he could have learned to harness his energy and knowledge,
and control his ego even if that meant that he would have to put his money into funding
liberal causes instead of his own presidential campaigns. It is tempting to categorize him
as a tragic figure. Rockefeller was unable to realize, until it is too late, that he had spent
so much time collecting facts about politics and government that he missed the biggest
and most damaging fact of all. His desire for love cost him the affection of voters at his
moment of victory resulting in his own demise.
As the days and weeks flew by, a curious development threatened to derail
Goldwater’s rise. A stop-Goldwater movement organized around favorite-son
candidacies put forth by liberals, moderates, and a few conservatives. Candidates
included Congressman Walter Judd in Minnesota, Governor James Rhodes and
Congressman Robert Taft Jr. in Ohio, and House Republican Policy Committee
Chairman John Byrnes in Wisconsin. These new names added to a long list that already
included Scranton in Pennsylvania and Romney in Michigan.153 Rather than attack
Goldwater directly, so as not to further alienate conservatives, Rockefeller attempted to
shave off some of Goldwater’s more controversial supporters. For example, he
characterized the John Birch Society as radicals threatening to subvert the true
Republican Party. Rockefeller warned against the party’s courtship of segregationists
stating, “A program based on racism or sectionalism would in and of itself not only
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defeat the Republican Party in 1964, but would destroy it altogether.”154 His advisors
were now executing a shift in their strategy, electing to move their attacks on the far right
up in attempt to stave off Goldwater’s rising poll numbers, and they made an unofficial
announcement that Rockefeller would enter the New Hampshire and California primaries
to prove to Republicans that he was a winner.
Members of congress were not favorable to Hinman’s marketing message. They
“couldn’t find any friends for this guy Rockefeller,” and his remarriage was “still too hot
and too sensitive…many of these people don’t like Rockefeller anyway and they are
using it as an excuse to conceal their feelings about him.” Not only were his views on
civil rights hurting him but now his attacks on the far right were even worse.155 In
response, Rockefeller decided against criticizing the Birchers themselves or Goldwater
for not denouncing them.156 From the Democrats’ point of view, Kennedy took passing
shots at Goldwater for his conspiratorial remarks on the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and
Rockefeller for raising taxes after pledging not to. Kennedy focused more on
segregationist Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, after the governor and the
president clashed over school integration. That incident concluded with President
Kennedy federalizing the Alabama National Guard to ensure that the University of
Alabama was peacefully desegregated.157 A few weeks later, the Soviet Union and the
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United States ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Conservatives applauded Goldwater
for having the courage to lead the anti-treaty forces, but for both Kennedy and
Rockefeller, saw an opportunity to hit Goldwater on the issue down the road.158
After his remarriage, the Rockefeller had acted like a pilot struggling to level his
falling aircraft. He vacillated on whether or not to attack the John Birch Society. He
reached out to conservatives by visiting them in places like Illinois and Wisconsin then
antagonized them by continuing to speak out on civil rights. He courted Republican
leadership’s approval but gave no indication that he had squared things with voters.
When asked if he would support Goldwater if the latter became the nominee, Rockefeller
responded that he would but only if Goldwater ran on a Republican platform like the one
in 1960. Of course, there was little reason to believe that Goldwater would accept those
conditions. After all, Goldwater strongly opposed Rockefeller’s liberal additions to the
platform made with Nixon on the eve of the convention.159 William E. Miller, Republican
national chairman of New York, summed up the state of the Republican Party, “Our
greatest trouble as Republicans is in becoming unified and staying unified for a national
election.160 Rockefeller was not interested in backing Goldwater. He intended on winning
on his own, and he would start in New Hampshire. He believed that an intensive
campaign matched by a folksy style, and backed by huge sums of money would earn him
a victory in New Hampshire, and from there he would roll inexorably to the nomination.
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Chapter 4: The Media Acknowledges that Rockefeller is Running
Nelson Rockefeller stepped forward to the podium, looked out at the audience,
and spoke into the microphone, “I am here this morning - and I shall go to New
Hampshire immediately following this meeting – formally to announce my candidacy for
the Republican Presidential nomination and my entry, at the proper time, in the New
Hampshire primary election of March 10, 1964.” No one who had followed Rockefeller’s
maneuvers for the past three years could have been surprised. Amid a throng of reporters,
photographers, and television crew members for the Today show inside the Red Room of
the Capitol building, Rockefeller officially began his candidacy. He continued his speech
by listing the Kennedy Administration’s shortcomings: failure to reinvigorate the
economy, failure to strengthen alliances abroad, and failure to confront communism
around the world. This all seemed like standard procedure for the governor, since he had
been emphasizing these exact points all over the country. He then offered up a statement
that raised eyebrows, “[delegates at the party convention] will write a platform and select
a candidate consistent with the basic principles of the Republican Party and the realities
of the world in which we live, a platform and a candidate that will have my complete
support, a platform and a candidate that will lead our party to victory next November.”161
Rockefeller had announced his own candidacy, offered to support another candidate and
party platform that had yet to be written, and given the impression that he might fight to
shape GOP policy like he had in 1960. It was a mixed message. Fielding questions
immediately after his prepared statement, he reiterated that he would support another
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candidate but dodged a question on if he would support Goldwater. He then admitted to
being an underdog going into the New Hampshire primary, but he believed voters there
would not choose “extremism” over his “midstream” politics.162 After the press
conference in Albany, Rockefeller boarded a plane to New Hampshire and officially
began the presidential campaign of 1964.

Polls and Positioning
Rockefeller’s route to the nomination was impeded by two significant hurdles.
His candidacy lacked strong, organized support, and numerous Republican leaders were
leaning towards nominating Goldwater.163 If he was to swing the momentum he would
have to perform well in the primaries and raise his poll numbers. He needed to utilize his
natural campaign ability, take advantage of his abundant resources, maintain his good
relations with the press, and cultivate any grassroots supporters that might emerge while
on the campaign trail. To understand the primaries and their importance, it is crucial to
understand the importance of polling.
Elmo Roper and George Gallup pioneered scientific polling in 1936 by correctly
predicting Franklin D. Roosevelt would defeat Alf Landon. When other pollsters,
notably one commissioned by the Literary Digest, predicted the opposite, Roper’s and
Gallup’s status in politics increased. Their work transformed political forecasting into a
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valued and sought-after resource, bringing it into the modern era. Both Roper and Gallup
reached their numbers by sampling a cross-section of the voting age population while
taking into account undecided voters and those likely to shift their opinions. They also
considered a host of other variables such as when the voter made their decision and how
they answered follow-up questions. As a result, Roper and Gallup were able to accurately
predict the outcome of the 1936, 1940, and 1944 presidential elections. In 1948, Roper
and Gallup missed the mark by not accurately measuring attitude changes before the
election and not accounting for how undecideds would swing the election in favor of
Harry Truman. For the following election, Gallup and Roper picked the correct winner,
but they did not anticipate a landslide victory for Dwight Eisenhower. Again in January
1960, pollsters across the country had their credibility called into question when the lead
between Nixon and Kennedy switched back and forth five times prompting Tennessee
Senator Albert Gore to propose a congressional investigation. Following his narrow
victory, President Kennedy hired Louis Harris to conduct research as to why he won.
Likewise, the Rockefeller foundation funded the University of Michigan’s Survey
Research Center to reinterview the same voters polled in 1956 and 1958. After
conducting his own research, Republican pollster Claude Robinson concluded, “This
election showed that there is no essential difference between the merchandizing of
politics and the merchandizing of products.”164 Robinson was right, though it was
Eisenhower who hired advertising executive Rosser Reeves to produce the first television
commercial for a candidate. The decision to create the commercial bypassed the
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presidential kingmakers to appeal to the American public. This idea became an essential
element for winning national elections. Kennedy built on this approach by mapping
concentrations of persuadable voters using computers that might otherwise have gotten
lost in the shuffle through a broad advertising campaign.165 By 1964, the Gallup
Organization issued a warning about polls conducted during the primaries and urged
readers to be cautious. Polls were not be used as predictions, but rather as an assessment
of the current situation.166
With these changes in strategy in mind, candidates could not discount the
importance of polling. For one thing, polls diminished the power of party leadership. Past
candidates had to rely on leaders to tell them the opinions and attitudes of voters to know
how they were doing. With the advent of scientific polling, candidates were able to hire
pollsters or monitor independent organization’s assessments which were in turn
substantiated by scientific research.167 Another consequence of polling was the effect it
had on primaries and vice versa. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy used the primaries to
demonstrate to party leadership that they had popular support, therefore they were the
best choice to run against the opposing party. Moreover, when looking at the polls and
primaries from the view of the candidates in 1964, there were no examples of poll leaders
winning primaries, yet dropping in the polls. Winning primaries helped poll numbers, but
it was not always so cut and dried. There was a precedent for a candidate who did not
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enter the primaries but rose in the polls, liberal Republican Wendel Wilkie in 1940. Also,
primaries could take a candidate out of the running with a poor showing like Wilkie in
1944, Vice-President John Nance Garner in 1940, and Senator William Borah in 1936.
Finally, a loss in a primary had never taken a poll leader out of contention, but a loss had
eliminated lesser contenders.168
Strategists for candidates with questionable appeal were obligated to participate in
the primaries while managing their poll numbers. State primaries were a microcosm of
the American electorate and had to be treated as such or a candidate risked losing the
confidence of the party at large. At the turn of the century, political scholar and President
of Harvard University, Abbott L. Lowell, argued that parties restrained extremists and
“distorted” public opinion so as to appeal to voters in the ideological center. This
“unreality of party lines” derived from overly simplistic public opinion polls that asked
yes or no questions giving credence to the belief in a majority of voters were
moderates.169 Many candidates subscribed to this theory and tempered their views and
strategies accordingly. What Lowell and his adherents misunderstood was that while
parties are not unbiased filters of public mood, primaries are more likely to draw out a
large number of extremists not voters occupying the middle.170 Later political scientists
would observe that moderate candidates would be better served by positioning
themselves closer to their extremist opponent rather than remaining in the center. This
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strategy would depend on if there was more than one key issue for voters to decide on
and the strength of activist support.171 For Republicans in 1964, there were sixteen
primaries with their own unique dimensions that would bring the candidate one step
closer to the nomination or defeat.

The Assassination of John F. Kennedy
“I will say this,” Gerald Ford started to tell an interviewer, “although we as
Republicans thought Kennedy’s popularity following the election of ‘60 would make him
automatically reelected in ‘64, by ‘63 there was a growing anti-Kennedy political view.
By ‘63, before he was assassinated, there was a feeling among Republicans we had a
chance to beat him in ‘64. Now maybe we were overly optimistic. But it was a different
environment from ‘62 and ‘61.”172 Leading up to the day of the assassination, the
atmosphere around the Kennedy administration had changed. Democrats, like the
Republicans, were split. Kennedy’s supporters were reluctant to work with Lyndon
Johnson’s wing of the party on issues like civil rights, and, partisan politics had limited
domestic legislation. Rockefeller was highly critical of the president on his economic
policies and with his handling of communism abroad. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI agents
received incredible leeway with pursuing suspected communists and infiltrating the civil
rights movement and wiretapping its leaders. The Cold War was the over-arching theme
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of the era, contributing to the tension and antagonism that was so prevalent through the
ranks of government and politics.173
When Air Force One touched down at Dallas’ Love Field on Friday morning of
November 22, 1963, the sun shone, there were no clouds, people were lined up to cheer
for John and Jackie with Lyndon and Lady Bird trailing behind. They each waved to the
crowd, more interested in the Kennedys than the Johnsons, before the Johnsons climbed
into a convertible and the Kennedys got into the presidential limousine joined by Texas
Governor John Connally.174 When the procession reached the downtown, onlookers
pushed against the police lines to get a better look at the president and his wife. Members
of the press were anxious to see the reception for the Kennedys after U.N. Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson had been assaulted a few weeks earlier, but there were no indications of
hostility. A reporter would later recall that there were one or two Goldwater signs being
held up, probably with a “Kennedy for king; Barry for President” slogan, but that was
commonplace. It was a warm day, men were in their short sleeves, there were pretty girls,
and people appeared happy. As the cars exited Main Street and turned onto Elm, the
crowds melted away leaving only a few onlookers scattered about. For those inside the
limousine, the effect was like leaving the city and coming out into a big open space.175
Mrs. Kennedy, when asked about the scene, remembered that she thought there would be
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a moment of coolness when they reached the tunnel ahead. The sound of the shots was
like a motorcycle backfiring. Then she heard Connally saying, “No, no, no, no, no…”176
“My recollection is that they announced his death around one o’clock” journalist
Dan Rather said in 2003, “But before that, he was dead. And I remember on the radio
they played the national anthem when they announced it. That sort of cracked through the
zone.”177 A rapid sequence of events followed: the shooter, Lee Harvey Oswald was
arrested, and Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as the new president. Then Sunday morning,
Oswald was shot, and on Monday a funeral was held for the slain president. Millions
watched on television, and hundreds of thousands of people went to Washington D.C. to
pay their respects. It was a time of deep anguish and mourning. There was a riderless
horse symbolizing the fallen leader, and Mrs. Kennedy, dignified and poised, stood with
her children, “Caroline – she held my hand like a soldier, she’s my helper; she’s mine
now. But he (John-John) is going to belong to the men now. Caroline asked me, ‘what
kind of prayer should I say?’ And I told her to say either ‘Please God take care of daddy’
or ‘Please God be nice to daddy.’”178
A little over a year later in early December 1964, former Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles grappled with the events from that Friday in Dallas:
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Here was a man, Oswald [Lee Harvey Oswald], who had been a failure at
everything he had done. He was almost a misfit in the world, and yet he
carried through successfully the intricate details of this mad act, and as I
studied all that record I could see literally hundreds of instances where if
things had just been a little different, if one fact had been known that
wasn't known but which might have been known just as the fact of his
earlier attack on General [Edwin A.] Walker… If the employees of the
Book Depository had eaten their lunch in a little different place, if
somebody had been at one place where he might easily have been instead
of another at one particular time; the “ifs” just stand out all over it. And if
any one of these “ifs” had been changed, it might have been prevented…it
was so tantalizing to go over that record, as we did, trying to find out
every fact connected with the assassination, and then to say if any one of
the chess pieces that were entered into the game had been moved
differently, at any one time, the whole thing might have been different.179

Barry Goldwater and the South
Barry Goldwater had liked John F. Kennedy from their days together in the
Senate during the 1950s. Goldwater liked his sense of humor and his easy-going manner,
they debated with each other over partisan issues, and there were times when they agreed
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on a point or two; though Kennedy was a Democrat through and through. Kennedy got
along with Goldwater, participated in practical jokes, and, in one instance, went to
Goldwater when he lost his voice on the Senate floor and the Senator from Arizona
helped him with a speech. Goldwater was especially impressed with Kennedy’s memory.
Kennedy had the ability to listen to an aide on a particular subject then proceed to give an
impassioned speech on a topic that only a short time earlier he knew very little about.180
They were from different backgrounds, they were from different parties, and they had a
different set of ideological beliefs, but they respected one another, and both men expected
to run against each other in 1964. When news of the tragedy reached Goldwater, he was
as shocked and saddened as anyone. People from across the country sent letters to his
office accusing him of bringing about the president’s demise. One particularly ugly
message asked, “Are you happy now?”181 Republicans agreed to a moratorium on
campaign operations while the nation was in mourning. During that dark period,
Goldwater not only considered giving up his pursuit of the nomination, he wanted out of
politics all together.182
But, that was not to be. Before the assassination, the New Hampshire polls
showed Goldwater leading Rockefeller by almost three-to-one. Voters admired
Goldwater’s sincerity, though, not his support of the radical right.183 Both the far left and
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the far right would take considerable criticism from the general public in the months to
come. Richard Nixon’s phone call to FBI Director Hoover after hearing that the president
was mortally wounded is representative of that dynamic; “What happened? Was it one
the right-wing nuts?” Nixon asked, “No, it was a communist,” Hoover replied.184
Goldwater’s prospects before Kennedy’s passing showed that he was ahead in the South.
With Lyndon Johnson now the likely nominee for the Democrats, the Northeast and the
Midwest were back in play.185 The New Frontier was over. There was a new president.
He looked and sounded much different than his predecessor. Goldwater once wrote a
letter to Johnson in 1960 after the Johnson had told him that he that he would not accept
the vice-presidency. When Johnson accepted the offer to become vice-president after all,
Goldwater wrote, “Sitting here trying to think of how I feel about your taking the
nomination and all I can think of is ‘nauseated’.”186 It became a running joke between the
two. Goldwater had never trusted or liked the new president, especially after years of
watching up close how Johnson operated in the Senate.
The Young Republicans (YR), a right-wing political group that shared
Goldwater’s contempt for LBJ, began to write to the senator by the thousands. YR
leadership urged members to help convince Goldwater to run while the YAF went a
similar route and rallied supporters to defend the conservative movement.187 Then on
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December 5 and December 8, conservative leaders met with Goldwater in an apartment
in Washington D.C. to find out what the Senator was planning to do; they needed to
know his answer. Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire was prepared to lead
Goldwater’s campaign in the first primary, and former Senator William Knowland of
California was already organizing support in California come June. Not only was an
operation already underway, but they expressed concern that conservative grassroots
supporters might not be around in another four years.188 Most of all, if Goldwater did not
enter the race then Rockefeller would be the most likely candidate to win, something
Goldwater detested.189
Less than a month later, on January 4, 1964, Goldwater declared that he would
seek the Republican nomination and offer the nation a “clear choice” for conservative
leadership. He made the announcement from Arizona, wearing a cast on his right foot
after having a bone spur removed.190 It was an unbecoming look for the candidate, not
that he cared, he was intent on running a campaign based on principles not personality.
Not since Taft had a conservative appealed to so many voters within the Republican
Party, but he faced an uphill battle to win the White House. After reading from his
prepared remarks he answered questions from reporters. He refused to denounce
denounce the controversial John Birch Society, and he saw no reason for a debate with
Nelson Rockefeller. If he lost he would not agree to be the vice-president, and he would
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not “concede anything to anybody,” meaning President Johnson.191 Barry Goldwater, like
it or not, was running as a conservative candidate for conservatives. After twelve long
years, the right wing of the party were ready to make its comeback.

Southern Politics and a Second Opinion
Primary states are not the only means for assessing a candidate’s strength. They
give candidates a battleground on which to fight but, to use an imperfect analogy, they
are sites of a larger war. That war is fought to secure votes, to persuade the media to give
favorable coverage, to sway delegates to give their support at the convention, encourage
financial donors to inject funds into a campaign, and to get party leadership to convince
all the others to work for a candidate. If a party strategist took a step back from looking at
the New Hampshire primary and turned their attention to the South, they would see a
battle between Rockefeller and Goldwater, but, more importantly, they would see a battle
between Republicans and Democrats that had the potential to flip the electorate. In the
grand scheme of American politics, this was far more important than what was happening
between the liberals and the conservatives.
Since the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, civil rights and states’
rights overlapped in the field of education. The case made headlines around the world,
and made state and local politicians national figures. As of December 1963, in seventeen
southern and border states, only 9.2% of African-Americans of school age attended
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desegregated schools. In Alabama, eleven black students out of a total enrollment of
287,414 blacks went to school with whites; in South Carolina, ten blacks out of a total
enrollment of 258,955 blacks attended integrated classes.192 Implementing desegregation
in schools cost Kennedy dearly in the South and threatened to drive away voters while
segregationists like Alabama governor George Wallace and South Carolina senator Strom
Thurmond bolstered their careers on the issue. For example, there was a sentiment among
lawyers in the South that blacks had been “egged on” by the administration, which the
president denied, and conservative southern lawyers conscientiously believed that
segregation was the moral and correct basis for race relations. The Kennedy
administration enlisted the help of lawyers from both the North and South to persuade
them otherwise. They urged Governor Wallace to “stand aside,” and tried to get the more
important and sympathetic lawyers to become more involved with their local
governments.193 It would be a mistake to think that the South’s switch from voting
Democrat to Republican in 1964 was representative of the entire Republican Party; that
would be a gross overestimation of the conservatives’ power at the time and would ignore
pro-civil rights Republicans in the Midwest and the Northeast.194 With that in mind,
Republican leadership was unequivocally paying attention to the changing position in the

192

Miscellaneous clippings and statements by Marshall and others, 1964, accessed January 8,
2017, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/BMPP-014-004.aspx
193

Oberdorfer file on Southern business: Correspondence and miscellany, June 1963-February
1964 and undated, accessed January 8, 2017, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/BMPP030-002.aspx
194

Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 104.

87
South and whether or not most voters were set on Goldwater or would entertain another
candidate.
During the first week of November in Charleston, South Carolina, a thirteen state
convention of southern leaders met to discuss strategy and campaigning for the 1964
election. This was an important meeting not only for the morale of the conservative
movement, but also because almost everyone in attendance would go on to become a
delegate at the 1964 Republican Convention in San Francisco. Winthrop Rockefeller,
Nelson’s brother and active party member in Arkansas, told the group that he would
support his brother, though he did not promote him that day. He cited his allegiance to the
Republican Party over his brother’s political fortune. Attendees at the meeting felt
confident about their chances in the South. “Republican growth in the South was due
primarily to Democratic fiscal policies which are going to bankrupt this nation,” South
Carolina Republican chairman J. Drake Edens Jr. explained. Alabama chairman John
Grenier and Louisiana national committeeman Tom Stagg elaborated on the Southern
strategy. “Kennedy’s civil rights proposals were just the straw that broke the camel’s
back,” Grenier remarked, before adding that Kennedy appeared to be the extremist to the
man on the street. Stagg saw an opportunity to turn African-American support for
Kennedy into a political tool for getting the white vote. Observers sent by Rockefeller to
the meeting later relayed the bad news to the governor.195
Before his death, Kennedy became convinced that domestic affairs, such as the
economy and civil rights, would be the decisive issues in 1964. He ruminated on the
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dilemma for the Democratic Party during a White House meeting in early November,
wondering aloud how to convince the average person without much money to vote
Democrat while the people who did have money opposed him.196 He worried about
appearing out of touch with the common man and what the Republicans might do in
response to the March on Washington and civil rights legislation. After Dallas, the
political situation in the South underwent a period of uncertainty with a host of scenarios
and moving parts being considered. In Charlotte, North Carolina, support for Goldwater
cooled after Kennedy’s assassination leading swing voters back into the Johnson camp.
Goldwater remained popular with conservatives. Scranton triggered some interest, and
Rockefeller remained as unpopular as ever.197 Farther south in Greenville, South
Carolina, Goldwater supporters had been revving up to go against Kennedy in 1964.
Going into the new year, Johnson was expected to receive a higher percentage of the vote
if he did not overdo it on civil rights. This was in spite of a fierce opposition that
considered him to be a “turncoat” and a “traitor to the South.”198 Around the southern
region, a narrative gained traction that the assassination erased the anti-Kennedy appeal
of the Goldwater movement, businessmen were less concerned with Johnson than they
had been with Kennedy. However, any other Republican candidate would struggle to
garner votes, and even Johnson might be preferable because of the perception that he
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would be firm yet gentle when enacting civil rights legislation.199 Southerners prepared
themselves to act and reset party alignment in the region. James D. Martin, president of
Martin Oil Company of Alabama and former Republican Senate nominee, explained at a
meeting for southern businessmen, “The time has come to disavow a ‘me too’ aping of
limited socialism and faint-hearted surrender to minority votes. If that attitude prevails,
the battle of 1964 and, I am afraid, the battle to save America as the last bastion of free
enterprise, is already lost. Give it to the Democrats now and save the campaign
expenses.”200
Moderates outside of the South were not impressed with Goldwater nor were they
convinced that a southern strategy would lead the party to victory. A growing intellectual
movement was in the works to formulate a plan that would avoid carving up the nation
and settling for an overly simplistic, conservative view of Republicanism. Where
Advance magazine had once been a publication of note trumpeting the moderates’ views,
the Ripon Society took its place after the assassination. Despite significant financial
backing, Advance went out of business after pouring money into a November 1963 issue
that featured how Republicans would defeat Kennedy in 1964.201 On January 6, Ripon
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published “A Call to Excellence in Leadership,” that called for a new direction for the
party. Ripon charged the Democrats with offering “retreads of the New Deal”, and
denounced extremists who rejected the complexities of the world in which “policies are
either Communist or anti-Communist, and an “image of ‘negativism’” had too long been
attached to the Republican Party. Republicans needed to fight for the middle ground. The
center, it averred, was open for the taking, but that did not mean that the party had to ape
Kennedy’s tactics in order to succeed. Ripon warned “against a party realignment of the
small states of the West and South against the urban centers of America – or any similar
realignment that would pit American against America on the basis of distrust and
suspicion.” To prevail in these trying times, Republicans needed to nominate a candidate
with the “vision, intellectual force, humaneness and courage that Americans saw and
admired in John F. Kennedy.”202
Ripon received praise from editorial columns and moderate politicians such as
Dwight Eisenhower who hailed their work for drawing attention to what he believed was
the foundation of the Republican Party.203 Ripon’s open letter changed the conversation
within the party about alternatives to Goldwater and the southern strategy. However, this
was not a fatal strike against the Goldwater movement. As conservatives liked to point
out, it was not easy to find a passionate moderate and even those who agreed with society
questioned how progressive Republicans differed from moderate Democrats.204 The
significance of “A Call to Excellence” was that it articulated a competing view against

202

Lee W. Huebner, The Ripon Papers, 1963 – 1968, Washington, DC: National Press, 1968, 6-9.

203

Ibid., 1.

204

Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 77-78.

91
conservatives. It presented a general strategy for how the party might move forward into
the future, and provided leaders and intellectuals a pause to reassess and reconsider their
choice for the nominee. Conservatism was by no means a foregone conclusion. There
were other options that were arguably more in line with the party’s tradition, did not
attract extremes from the right or the left, and gave the Republicans a better chance to
win.

The Contenders
Moderates and liberals were by no means limited to choosing between
Rockefeller and Goldwater. Alternatives did exist. Each of these other candidates brought
to the table a set of strengths that uniquely qualified them as a nominee, but they also had
weaknesses that could torpedo their candidacies before they got started. This is not an
indictment of the chances that moderates and liberals had to win; they certainly could if
they chose the right candidate. A poll conducted by The Saturday Evening Post
demonstrates that most Americans agreed on major issues, regardless of party lines. For
example, 83% of Americans in 1962 thought the U.S. should stay in the United Nations,
70% in 1961 thought that Kennedy did the right thing by sending troops into Alabama to
oppose segregation, and 67% of respondents in 1955 favored an arms reduction if all
other major nations agreed.205 Moderates and liberals could make a dent on the national
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electorate by appealing towards the nation on these issues and offering a candidate with
ideas on how to confront them.
A brief look at the contenders for the nomination helps to frame the election in
broader terms for voters. An early dark horse contender for the nomination was Governor
George Romney of Michigan. He was not readily identified with any of the party strife
between Rockefeller and Goldwater, nor was he associated with the party’s defeat in
1960. He had a reputation as a good salesman from his days as president of American
Moters, where he sold the world’s first compact car, and his strong personality made him
a popular candidate in his home state and region. Romney despised raising money from
large donors; he wanted to raise money through small donations, and he wanted more
participation from the average person while reining in big business, big government, and
big labor. His opponents labeled him egotistical, moody, and misguided in the art of
national politicking. Behind the scenes, he promised Michigan Republicans that he would
serve out his full term as governor and would not run for president.
Entering 1964, Richard Nixon was the leading candidate for the nomination. A
Gallup poll in December showed him at 29% and the number remained the same in
January.206 Nixon’s stock within the party was trading largely on name recognition and
his carefully crafted image as an amalgamation of both liberal and conservative interests.
His attempt at the governorship in California brought negative attention on him from the
far right, including the John Birch Society. To voters in the Golden State, he appeared
disinterested in what was happening there and more interested in international relations.
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Even some of his supporters blamed him for not staying longer in California to restore
order to the party. Nevertheless, voters were intrigued by the former vice-president. They
saw him as a strong candidate with the chance to break the deadlock within the party.
Two lesser known candidates were also under consideration: Harold Stassen and
Margaret Chase Smith. Stassen was the progressive governor of Minnesota and a
perennial candidate; 1964 was the fourth time that he ran for president. His gaff during a
radio debate with Thomas Dewey on the issue of outlawing communism in 1948 had cost
him his best chance at becoming president.207 Stassen received attention by polling in the
top five in August 1963, but was considered a longshot to win the nomination, “The
principle problem of Harold Stassen [is] that someone early on told him that he should be
President and he believed it.”208 Margaret Chase Smith, Senator from Maine, sought to
prove that a woman could run for president. Her political career started after filling her
late husband’s House seat in 1940 before running for the Senate in her own right, and
became an outspoken anti-communist throughout her time there.209 Smith insisted that the
United States use counterforce to stop the Soviets advance, warning that President
Kennedy’s actions would provoke a response from the communists, promote an arms
race, or increase the likelihood for war. When the press corps asked President Kennedy
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about Smith’s chances at winning, he told the amused reporters, “She would make a
formidable candidate.”210
If Margaret Chase Smith was not to be taken seriously then William Scranton was
taken seriously by seemingly everyone but himself. As Pennsylvania governor, he was
concerned with improving the state’s social and business climate developing a reputation
as a shrewd politician with an eye on the White House. During his time in office,
Eisenhower employed him as special assistant to the Secretary of State. Afterward, state
leaders pushed him to run for a seat in the House of Representatives. His standing within
the party was on the rise following an impressive victory in the 1962 gubernatorial
race.211 Members of the media labeled him as a Republican Kennedy. He was articulate
and sophisticated; a progressive with political views on civil rights and foreign policy
that were far to the left of those of Goldwater. He had opposed Kennedy on only 34% of
125 roll-call votes, and he had disagreed with the New Frontier only 6% of the time on
foreign policy questions. During his race for a seat in Congress in 1960, he emphasized
his friendship with Kennedy. He then ceded prime television time to Kennedy,
rescheduling his own broadcast to follow immediately afterward so that he could inherit
Kennedy’s audience.212 Party leaders liked him, and he was considered a progressive
who conservatives would be willing to accept. He was one of several candidates
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Eisenhower pushed.213 After fourteen months as governor of a major industrial state,
Scranton had made huge strides towards improving conditions around the state that
increased his appeal to industry, labor, African-Americans, and voters in the Northeast.214
He was highly dubious of Goldwater, and told both him and Rockefeller not to contend
for Pennsylvania delegates under the guise of party unity. The ploy worked inasmuch as
it kept Rockefeller out of the state and resulted in the weakening and conversion of
Goldwater’s forces.215 As his opponents in Pennsylvania already knew, Scranton could be
a fierce competitor. However, he refused to participate in the primaries, offering instead
to be the nominee if drafted.
Another candidate tempting voters was Henry Cabot Lodge. He had lost his
previous two bids for office: in 1952 he lost his Senate seat in Massachusetts to Kennedy,
and in 1960 when the Nixon-Lodge ticket lost the White House to Kennedy and Johnson.
Lodge was in a quandary. Eisenhower pushed him to become an active candidate, but as
ambassador to South Vietnam, he was barred from promoting himself as a political
candidate per State Department regulations and the Hatch Act.216 Supporters placed his
name on the New Hampshire ballot despite repeated declarations that under no
circumstances would he return to the United States and campaign for the nomination.217
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Lodge had experience in campaigning, his record as ambassador to the UN was mostly
good, and his Cold War experience made him a strong candidate to oppose the Russians.
In his words, he offered something for both wings of the party, “I’m a conservative like
all of us, in the sense that I want to conserve the good things we have. I’m a liberal, like
all of us, in the sense that I want to go on to even better things.”218 Conservatives were
not impressed. They viewed Lodge as another member of the northeast Establishment
that had let down the party like so many before. His appeal to certain kinds of voters was
not unlike Scranton, but he lacked the personal charm and fiery political skill that the
governor possessed. Lodge’s failure to add much of anything to the ticket in 1960 was
unpardonable to many Republicans, and his refusal to take to the campaign trail, few
political observers and members of the media thought that he would win.

Let it Begin in New Hampshire
One of the more telling images of the New Hampshire primary campaign
appeared in the New York Times on Saturday, January 25, 1964. At the top of the page
was a picture of Nelson Rockefeller eating ice cream with a group of young men who
were too young to vote, and to the right of that picture was another of Mrs. Rockefeller
reaching across the hood of a car to sign autographs. To the left of Rockefeller was an
article about Barry Goldwater. Goldwater was described as having received an
“uproariously enthusiastic welcome” from one thousand Young Republicans in
Washington, D.C. At the event, he lashed into President Johnson’s relationship with
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notoriously corrupt Senate aide Bobby Baker, calling Johnson “a highwayman of the
bureaucratic system trying to buy votes by the most deceptive budget of our time.”219
These two images and Goldwater’s article are indicative of a sharp contrast between the
two candidates. Rockefeller had flown into Laconia, New Hampshire on a turboprop
airliner to be greeted by well-wishers. He then ventured into town on a campaign bus,
stopping to shake hands outside of a grocery store and barber shop, before delivering a
speech on doing more for small business and supporting a strong civil rights bill. He and
his wife received a warm welcome by the voters, eliciting sympathy for the way his
divorce affected his candidacy. Still, most voters admitted they were uncommitted. 220
Meanwhile, Goldwater spewed his fire brand conservatism to the faithful, pausing for
standing ovations, and waving to supporters as they chanted “We Want Barry.”
Rockefeller could be a tremendous campaigner, drawing people to him with his
magnetism and style, but Goldwater had something that he could not buy. Goldwater was
at the helm of an impassioned, dedicated movement that he was redirecting away from its
previous anti-Kennedy position to an anti-Johnson position. Whether Goldwater could
transfer his appeal into votes in New Hampshire had yet to be seen. Rockefeller, for his
part, was counting on person-to-person politicking, backslapping, and glad-handing to
carry the day. As the Times articles demonstrated, the choice between the two could not
be clearer.
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Goldwater’s style became an issue in New Hampshire.221 He had never publically
been known as a warm man, and he was not the kind of politician that could light up a
room when he walked in. He was an ideologue with bit of gruff and tough. His
appearance might be described as stern or hardened, he was not fashionable but utilitarian
in dress, and his features were marked by the cutting angles of his face, squared off by
black glasses below his silver hair. Magazines liked to depict him in blue jeans with a
cowboy hat, and they sometimes photographed him on horseback to show the rustic
qualities that politicians in the Northeast did not possess. To voters in the New
Hampshire, he came across as uncomfortable and awkward. For example, when he made
a campaign stop at a lunch counter in Laconia, he refused to answer some of the
questions that the audience posed and invited them to write a letter to his office
instead.222 If a candidate will not answer a question when you come out to see him in the
flesh, then there is hardly a reason to mail a letter that a secretary may or may not decide
to read. On his trips over to Salem and Woodsville, he avoided shaking hands with
voters. Other times he would greet as many people passing by as he let go without saying
a word. In the line to shake hands, voters could hear him mumble to them through a slight
smile without introducing Mrs. Goldwater.223 For those paying attention, the Senator
looked like he was terribly uncomfortable by the whole ordeal and wanted nothing more
than to go back to Arizona. His speeches, on the other hand, were polished, accented by
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sharp attacks on the Democrats. There was no doubt that Goldwater believed in what he
was saying, but the problem was whether he could get enough people to buy into him so
that he could follow through on his intentions.
Rockefeller set out to prove that there was more to him than style. During a
speech to the Young Republicans in New Hampshire, he made it clear why he had
entered the race. He declared that he was not in the state as part of a stop-Goldwater
movement. That was certainly part of why he was there, but it was not the basis for his
candidacy. He was running because of deeply held patriotic principles and the belief that
the Republican Party should be a responsible force for good government. As he told the
audience, “I’m in this race all the way.”224 Rockefeller shined during his speeches, he
was animated, poised, confident, and well informed. He liked to use statistics to back up
his points or historical analogies to underscore how imperative the situation with the
Soviet Union had become. Footage from the campaign showed him bouncing down the
sidewalk, smiling, and shaking hands. He displayed an easiness with voters who at first
were not sure how to act around the millionaire, but they then relaxed as they chatted
with him.
No matter how good he was at campaigning there were those in the audience that
were somewhere between curious to witness his charm and ready to tell a reporter how
much they disapproved of his remarriage. Instead of hiding Happy, Rockefeller decided
to make her into an asset by having her attend rallies, appear at photo opportunities, sign
autographs, and go to fund-raising dinners. Amongst voters, there was much debate about
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how important their remarriage was for selecting a candidate. Goldwater supporters liked
to remind people that Nelson cast aside his first wife for a younger woman who
subsequently abandoned her children.225 Editor and publisher of the Manchester Union
Leader William Loeb was major political force in the state, and he wrote, “We have
never had a wife swapper in the White House and…we believe…the people will not
accept a wife swapper as president.”226 Barbs from an editor like Loeb, no matter how
cartoonish and untrustworthy he was, hurt Rockefeller around the state. His newspaper
had a circulation of 50,000 in a state with around 600,000 people, giving him and his
conservative politics a weighted importance.227 New Hampshire was undergoing a battle
of its own between conservatives and liberals. Republicans lost the governorship after
holding it for forty years and Senator Styles Bridges subsequently passed away, leaving a
power vacuum. Observers suspected that Rockefeller’s remarriage was a cover for his
opponents. They were willing to exploit the issue for political reasons, not so much
because of their outrage, which some of them genuinely felt, but because they wanted
control of the party.
New Hampshire voters by and large did not rank the governor’s remarriage as a
top priority within the state. Sure, it served as juicy gossip, as it was national news, but it
did not rise to the highest level of voters’ interests. Republicans in the state tended to be
professional and business people, had a slightly higher income than the national average,
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and they were better educated. Voters in the state tended to be older as well, with just
under half the total population fifty years old and older compared to just 12% between
the ages of 21-29.228 Most important for Rockefeller’s candidacy, they wanted a
candidate who could bring jobs to the state, specifically to the shoe and textile industries.
As more and more information flowed back to the campaign, it became clear that he
needed to talk about improving the local economy, which would be bolstered by talking
about his record while in office. Eisenhower won the state in 1952 against Taft by
focusing on his knowledge of foreign affairs, an area that the governor knew well.229
Voters needed to get to know the candidate better, and reversing their ignorance of him
became a priority.
From there, Rockefeller went on a tear trying to improve his image. His
speechwriters crafted speeches entitled “We Need 20 Million New Jobs” and “How to
Meet the Communist Challenge.” He also began a regular column called “How
Rockefeller Sees It” explaining why he was running and how he could breathe life into
the state. He made speeches at Keene State College, then he flew back to Albany lest the
voters there grow too accustomed to life without him. Then he went off again to Concord
to speak at a hotel dinner, then to Laconia to meet with small business owners. Later he
visited Dover, and Nashua to speak with the local Chamber of Commerce. Members of
the campaign distributed information packets to locals on how to hold a fundraiser at
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their home, what issues to discuss, basic background information on the candidate, and
rebuttals to Goldwater supporters. As Rockefeller’s staff worked to get their candidate in
the best position before the primary, William Loeb made sure the headlines in his
newspaper made it clear who voters should elect. The song became incessant: “Barry is
Runaway Favorite,” “Rising Tide for Goldwater,” “Enthusiasm for Barry Tops Nixon
in ’60 Lure,” and “Barry Looms as Party Choice”. Some of the columns made their way
into the back sections of crowded Boston newspapers, casting doubt on the outcome of
the election. Loeb took it upon himself to take swipes at Margaret Chase Smith, and he
referred to Eisenhower as “Dopey Dwight.” Before his untimely death, Kennedy often
got compared to a mental patient; he was, according to Loeb, a “silly rich boy” inviting
“insanity in the White House.” Goldwater, on the other hand, became a symbol of
“determination to return to national sanity,” and he was able to free the nation from
“sleeping under the leadership of left-wing professors impervious to the freedom loving
demands of Chiang Kai-shek, Francisco Franco, and H.L. Hunt of Texas.230 This was an
interesting line of attack calculated to resonate with residents of a state with the motto
“Live Free or Die.”
Their campaign styles, along with their supporters, remained decidedly different.
Goldwater kept an unassuming, reserved attitude while Rockefeller bounced, boasted,
and rollicked on the campaign trail. Nevertheless, neither candidate was without flaws.
For every repetitive comment from Rockefeller on the “leadership gap in Washington,”
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Goldwater rattled off a quote that misconnected with voters making him look indecisive.
For example, in Portsmouth he railed against the civil rights bill, warning of
infringements on freedom of religion before commenting, “I am not certain of that
position yet.” Later, the widow of popular New Hampshire Senator Styles Bridges
praised him for supporting a “voluntary” Social Security system only to have the
candidate say that Social Security “may need some looking into about 1970, but I’m not
for breaking contracts.” On the other side, Rockefeller’s crowds tended to be larger, but
they were less enthusiastic. He liked to rattle off statistics, deliver adages and terms
that did not resonate with shivering onlookers in the February cold. Lingering whispers
about his remarriage continued to be heard, proving that the governor’s ceiling could only
go so high. By the end of the month, neither side expected a majority of the total vote.231
In the run-up to the primary election on March 10, both Goldwater and Rockefeller could
be seen glad-handing potential voters, trying to turn the screws of the local power
brokers, and promising all that they could to make the state a better place.232
To say that the New Hampshire primary was a two man race would not be
entirely inaccurate, though it would be an incomplete answer to why neither candidate in
the end carried the state. Both of the aforementioned leading candidates captured
headlines and produced quite a bit of buzz around the state, but despite their best efforts,
voters could not commit themselves to either side. Other candidates, among them Richard
Nixon, George Romney, and William Scranton proved that a candidate did not even have
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to appear in the state or even have his name on the ballot to be considered. All three
candidates withdrew their names from the ballot, though each one, especially Nixon
remained a favorite among party factions. Scranton kept one foot in the race by insisting
that would only be a candidate if drafted by the people, but his candidacy in the primary
never gained traction.233 Ostensibly, the three Republicans did not want to be a part of a
large field of contenders which would potentially hand a fluke victory to Goldwater.
From another perspective, they wanted Rockefeller to win if not to bolster his chances
but to increase their own chances should Goldwater lose momentum. A win for
Goldwater did not sit well with progressives within the party who feared a nuclear
exchange with the Soviets should he win the general election, Social Security becoming
optional, and equal rights being demoted from the national agenda.234
Still, for New Hampshire voters, another option seemed viable, writing in Henry
Cabot Lodge on their ballots. Few voters had a clear understanding of the ambassador
and his positions. Compared to Rockefeller and Goldwater he was an unknown. A vote
for Lodge was a vote for a phantom. His absence from the campaign trail only served to
propel his campaign that was operating without his public approval on a subterranean
level. In the election’s postmortem, political observers cited Lodge as a favorite-son
candidate; after all, many New Hampshire voters lived on the border with Massachusetts
and worked in Boston. They felt comfortable voting for someone that they knew from
past experience, regardless of how the situation had changed since his defeat in the
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Senate to Kennedy years earlier.235 In 1964, Nixon looked like a two time loser after
loses in 1960 against Kennedy, and in California in 1962. While Goldwater tried
unsuccessfully to tone down his bellicose rhetoric, Rockefeller satisfied no one with his
campaign biography, Nelson Rockefeller, a Political Biography which failed to put to rest
his marital issues. Making matters worse, a week before the election, a prominent Baptist
minister in Manchester spoke with Rockefeller about his remarriage, and afterwards he
refused to give his endorsement. With Margaret Chase Smith and Henry Stasson failing
to seize the opening, Lodge became the choice candidate.236 When the final results came
in, the numbers showed Rockefeller with 21%, Goldwater with 22%, and Henry Cabot
Lodge with 35%. A surprise indeed.
Following the election, Rockefeller had to lick his wounds and keep moving as
he was already campaigning in preparation for the Oregon and the all-important
California primary. In a letter to the governor dated March 23, retired Ford Motor
Company executive and PR man Charlie Moore laid bare the dilemma facing the
campaign: the New Hampshire primary resulted in a stalemate. Lodge was in the
impossible position of being a candidate while serving overseas for a democratic
administration. Opinion polls before the election failed to accurately take the temperature
of the electorate, and the press moved against the governor at the exact wrong time.
Goldwater survived because Rockefeller did not win. This was not because of
Goldwater’s campaign, although, his numbers in California went up, thus setting the
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stage for a future showdown between the two sides. Within Rockefeller’s campaign, an
argument over how the governor should proceed threatened stability moving forward.
According to Charlie Moore, he needed to make civil rights an issue in Oregon and
California. Goldwater, he argued, was an extremist who could not win the national
election, and there was no place for him in the party of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Goldwater
had the potential to wreck the party, and drive voters into the arms of the Democrats.
Moore advised the governor that while no other Republican needed to be attacked,
Goldwater had to be brought down.237 With the first primary in the long winding road to
the nomination in his rearview mirror, Rockefeller pressed on.

Chapter 5: Primary Season
A Vacuum in the Republican Presidential Race
Presidential primaries can cause immediate changes in national party preference.
There are a host of factors to consider: whether the candidate won or lost the primary,
media attention, expectations for the candidate, and where the election took place since
certain states carry more weight than others. There are many losers in primaries, and each
contribute to the winner’s gain. Each primary brings a chance for a new direction in the
polls leading to the next primary.238 Adding to the confusion for the Republican field
following New Hampshire, Goldwater and Rockefeller combined for less than 50% of the
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total vote. Nixon finished fourth thanks to a half-hearted write-in campaign, and Scranton
did not even run a campaign and received a miniscule 77 write-in votes. Essentially,
Lodge won the primary for being the least unpopular candidate after the Republicans
failed to move the needle.239 New Hampshire did not decide the likely nominee so much
as show the candidates that they needed to adjust their campaign strategy before the next
major primaries or else their supporters might abandon them for another.
At this point in the race, three distinct possibilities for the remaining primary
season seemed plausible. First, the early favorite, in this case Rockefeller since Nixon
refused to launch a formal campaign, might rally from defeat and regain the lead in the
polls. This happened twice in the decade prior. In 1948, Thomas Dewey, another former
New York governor, lost his lead to Harold Stasson in April after dropping the Wisconsin
and Nebraska primaries. Dewey turned his campaign around by splitting four more
primaries with his opponent and maintaining an advantage in the popular polls before
securing the nomination. Four years later, Eisenhower staved off Robert Taft after he
pulled ahead in the polls with a narrow victory in New Hampshire followed by a strong
second place showing in Minnesota. Both candidates dominated the public opinion polls,
and won the final poll before the convention. Goldwater proved in New Hampshire that
he could not win the nomination on the ground by shaking hands or giving speeches. He
would have to go another route if he wanted to stand on the podium at the convention in
California. Winning the public opinion polls was not going to happen for him.
Rockefeller, on the other hand, enjoyed this kind of politicking. He lived for the polls –
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some would say he paid too much attention to them – he was the best pure campaigner
that the party had. Winning the polls would take a series of deft moves, he would need to
confront Goldwater’s supporters before exposing them as extremists to the rest of the
Republican Party.240
A second scenario involved an eleventh hour challenger. This possibility would
require a challenger not necessarily winning the primaries or dominating the public
opinion polls. A candidate rising to the top at a late stage in the primaries had happened
before, but under unusual circumstances. For example, Wendell Wilkie in 1940 defeated
Dewey in only the last poll of the race. In another instance, Tennessee Senator Estes
Kefauver took over the lead position in 1952 after Truman dropped out of the race. He
then lost the nomination after Democrats drafted Adlai Stevenson as a compromise
candidate at the convention. An outcome like this was exactly the kind of nightmare that
conservatives thought might happen. Their candidate had a hardcore base of supporters,
but his lack of national political prowess might nudge key members of the Republican
elite to seek someone else. Liberals would most likely have the upper hand in this
situation as most their support lay in the Northeast, the traditional base of power for the
party. Rockefeller would not be seen as a compromise candidate at a late stage in the
campaign. If he wanted the nomination he would have to win it on his own. Moreover,
while liberal and progressive Republicans could take some comfort in a third candidate,
conservatives knew another option would spell disaster. Enlisting a third choice for the
general election would torpedo even the remotest chance of a Republican returning to the
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White House. Few candidates could be called upon to balance the ticket. Namely,
Richard Nixon would be asked to fall on his sword for the party making him a three time
loser with little hope of continuing a once promising political career. Any other nominee
would risk a similar fate: the party would be ripped in half, and the nominee’s chances of
success would pale in comparison to the negativity felt among rank-in-file Republicans.
A third scenario would be a horse race to the finish line with each candidate
jockeying for position along the way. This happened only four years earlier when
Democrats John F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson switched leads in the polls five times
before Kennedy took the lead for good in January 1960. Two months later, the primaries
began resulting in a sweep for Kennedy in each of the eleven contests that he entered.241
For the Republicans in 1964, several candidates took the lead at the start of the race
beginning with Nixon then Rockefeller then Goldwater, and then Lodge after the first
primary. No one had a steady command of the front position. If this scenario continued at
its current pace, then it would be hard to predict who would come out on top at the
convention.
Republican moderates and liberals alike had to like their chances should this
possibility come to fruition. For starters, most of the candidates could be labeled as
progressive or at least left-leaning raising the odds that one of them would be the winner.
Rockefeller would have to act fast. His image problem would come up again, a serious
handicap for a challenger trying to win because of his ideals, his record, and chance at
winning in November. Other candidates would also have the opportunity to move up in
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the polls, win a few primaries, and curry favor with the party establishment. At first
glance, Goldwater’s chances would not be better than even given his aforementioned
troubles with voters. That of course depended on him following the traditional path to the
nomination. If he focused not on capturing voter’s support, but gathering delegates, the
real prize of each primary, then his chances would improve. Understand that under this
scenario, the horse race, custom and procedure get altered. This is the wildest path for the
candidates to take precisely because there is so much uncertainty brought with it, by its
nature, it would be unpredictable. If a candidate could start a genuine movement heading
into the convention there would be no way to block him by nominating a compromise
candidate. On this point, the left wing of the party underestimated their competition. They
did not foresee how much the race would change if Goldwater continued unimpeded.242

Like a Prairie Fire
Perhaps Barry Goldwater would not be in the race if not for the activities of South
Carolinians. At least, he might not be as prominent a figure in the party. Goldwater first
came to South Carolina as a politician in 1958 thanks in part to National
Committewoman and member of the Greenville County Republican Party Patricia M.
Barnes. She headed a last minute fundraiser in Greenville that allowed him to speak to a
statewide TV audience. Two years later, she worked with Spartanville industrialist Roger
Milliken at the National Convention in Chicago on what was dubbed “The Historic
Platform Committee Upon Which the Voice of the South was Clearly Heard.” She also
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served as a member of a small group at the convention that was instrumental in placing
the Goldwater’s name in nomination.243 Former Democratic governor James F. Byrnes
did his part to turn the South towards a conservative candidate by continually supporting
Republicans in presidential elections. Two months before the 1960 election, he sided with
the delegation from South Carolina in their rejection of the Democratic platform and
nomination of Senator Kennedy.244 On a micro level, conservatives sprouted up almost at
their own will. In Anderson, South Carolina, president of the University of South
Carolina Young Republicans David W. Rice wrote to James Duffy for guidance on how
to better organize other high school and college students interested in giving their
support. Many of them already spoke the language of the conservatives but wanted to be
a part of a movement.245 These figures, leaders at various levels, played a pivotal role in
the creation of what would become known as the “southern strategy.” A stratum of
support built upon layers of passionate and often times disgruntled members of an
ignored social group, predominantly whites, bent on uniting to voice a common set of
beliefs that could be heard from the low country to the state capital. A voice that had for
too long been muted by outsiders, content with issuing directives while taking a key bloc
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of voters for granted. Goldwater would not have to tap into their support so much as dig
in and reap the rewards.246
Other Republicans carried this message throughout the South. In Alabama,
president of the Martin Oil Company and G.O.P rising star James D. Martin spoke on this
issue in late January. He urged southern businessmen to become involved in politics with
wholehearted support and not look for a “guaranteed winner.” He speculated that the
main issue in the South in the election would not be the economy or foreign policy;
instead, he believed that the issue at hand would be the power of the federal government
to impose its will upon the states and individuals. He stressed the immediacy of action,
“The time has come to disavow a ‘me too’ aping of limited socialism and faint-hearted
surrender to minority votes,” he stated. “If that attitude prevails, the battle of 1964 and, I
am afraid, the battle to save America as the last bastion of free enterprise, is already lost.
Give it to the Democrats now and save the campaign expenses.” Democrats needed the
South more than the South needed Democrats. Without the South, the Democratic Party
would be a minority party made even weaker if border states like Kentucky, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and West Virginia followed suit. He insisted that his listeners not simply give
their approval, but participate. He believed that the time for change had arrived. “The
solid, one-party South is gone; it is, at this very hour, in a state of flux; in a state of
change. The impressive victory we won on November the 6th, 1962 by shattering the
fixed idea of Democratic invincibility may not yet have established the two-party system
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in the South – but the South is ready.”247 Martin’s words expressed a deep sentiment, a
current running through the region. Democrats no longer held sway at the precinct-levels,
and these businessmen, lawyers, and politicians were banning together to thwart what
they saw as government overreach approved by a political party that no longer spoke for
them.
A poll conducted by the Democratic National Committee in late 1963 indicated
that the Democrats would lose an estimated six of seven Southern states that Kennedy
carried in the previous election, including Texas, Arkansas, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia.248 While the poll represented voters at a particular
moment, a month before Rockefeller became the first Republican to formally declare his
candidacy, it is indicative of a looming shift in the habits of the region. Furthermore,
election returns in 1963 confirmed the steady development of a Republican trend into
Democrat strongholds, but progress did not only come in Dixie either. A Republican
candidate in the Philadelphia mayoral race, a city that Kennedy carried by over 300,000
votes, polled at 47% in a close loss. For the first time in sixteen years, a Republican
became mayor of Baltimore. Special elections in California and Texas both produced
Republican victors, while in Indiana the party took control of a majority of its cities
including a majority of its most populous municipalities. Republican gains also included
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the Virginia General Assembly and the New York mayoral races. Mississippi had its first
two-party gubernatorial contest since Reconstruction, and one-third of the voters opted
for the Republican candidate.249 As conservatives saw it, a backlash had materialized.
These elections took place before Kennedy’s death, but Lyndon Johnson did not have the
support of many southerners either.
At this stage, it would be an overstatement to say that a conservative victory in the
primaries was inevitable, much less that they would be able to win in the general election.
It is clear that Republicans were on the upswing, but that does not mean that they could
be assured of even having their candidate nominated. Cracks in the South became clearer
as time moved on, which would not have been a surprise to a politician weighing his
chances in the early to mid-1960s. A better question would be how much did this matter
to them? Consider that in 1960 the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi combined for a total of 70 Electoral
College votes. Compare that to Ohio with 25, Illinois with 27, Pennsylvania and
California each with 32, and New York’s enormous number of 45. Maintaining
dominance in the industrial Northeast, along with a few key districts in the Midwest and
California, had to take precedence for the party at large.250 National Republican
leadership looked at the electoral map and wanted a candidate who best appealed to those
states deemed most valuable. For most voters in America that meant a candidate who
swayed to the left of center on specific issues or so Republican leaders thought. In 1964,
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Lyndon Johnson was often described as a conservative even though he would go on to
expand some of the most important “liberal” policies of the 20th century. A far-right
candidate like Barry Goldwater had an uphill battle to convince the “kingmakers” that he
could be a viable candidate in a political climate that indicated otherwise.
Before 1964, the way to gain delegates depended on courting county and state
leaders who would then support the candidate. This was exactly the campaign style that
George Hinman angled for Rockefeller to employ, which he did until his remarriage and
opening defeat in New Hampshire wrinkled his prospects. Winning in the primaries
would show the state and county leaders that Rockefeller had public support, thus higher
ratings in the polls would come, followed by more victories up until the convention. F.
Clifton White saw another way to the nomination. Goldwater could take advantage of the
conservative network already taking shape by using their passion to appoint delegates
outside of the norm, many of whom would not be party regulars loyal to leadership. They
would not go to San Francisco to vote for anyone else, and no matter what they would
vote for their candidate. When Phyllis Schlafly, author of A Choice Not an Echo, became
a delegate for Illinois there could be no doubt that she would vote Goldwater. White’s
strategy depended on getting conservatives into the lowest levels of party positions. This
included at the precinct level as well as county and state positions, all of them needed to
be put in play for conservatives to have a chance. Winning these positions would draw
little attention from either larger party affiliates or from the public. At the precinct
caucuses, winning depended on a commitment to see the process through.
Conservatives had waited in the wings for years to have their opportunity, now
was the moment to pull together at their opponents weak points. As William Rusher,
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editor of the National Review, made clear to Goldwater himself, “Our project was
designed from the outset to build up conservative strength at the 1964 convention, and
was not centered on a particular candidacy.”251 Conservatives harbored a resentment
towards party leadership stretching back to at least 1952 after the drama surrounding the
nomination of Robert Taft. Rockefeller and Dewey, and others on the Council on Foreign
Relations had earned the reputation of working the levers of power to force Eisenhower
to the top of the list of candidates. Over a decade later, resentment among members of the
right wing of the party kept them watching for another coup – especially the nomination
of Rockefeller or Nixon over their nominee. Conservative newspaper columnists floated
the idea of starting a new Conservative Party in the event that either of them should rise
to the top of the ticket.252 Paranoia would not be an apt description for their emotions
since strong evidence existed that Republican leadership had a history of deploying such
tactics. In 1964, the prevailing view held that the results of the primaries were by no
means binding; they could even be supplanted by the will of key members of the party.
With their eyes locked on the convention from the start, regional directors John
Grenier in the South and Stephen Shadegg in the West rallied their foot soldiers to get
into precinct meetings so that delegates favorable to Goldwater could be sent to the
county conventions.253 Consider the example of Fairfax County, Virginia. Located across
the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., more a northern than southern city, and not a
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place that Goldwater might be expected to win. Jack MacDonald, a former member of the
Republican National Committee’s staff, led the Republican organization and saw the
threat that Goldwater posed. He wrote and called other Republicans to stop the Goldwater
forces from taking over the precinct conventions, but no one came to his aid. In fact, in
Virginia any registered voter could participate, thus even Democrats could vote in the
Republican election. Still, only about one hundred people participated in each district
election. At the most crucial election in the Lake Barcroft District, Goldwater supporters
won by one vote, giving them two Goldwater delegates to send to the convention in San
Francisco.254 A conservative victory came by a razor thin margin.
White’s political brilliance lay in the way that he thumbed his nose at the
traditional methods of winning an election. His strategy did not rely on winning over the
Jack MacDonald’s of America. Instead, he captured the hearts and minds of a group that
could not be bought. Goldwater supporters shared his views on pushing a stronger
laissez-faire economic policy, weakening the power of the federal government to enforce
broad mandates, and standing up to the rising tide of communism. McCarthyism may
have been gone, but the after-effects still lingered. It is ironic to note that the tactics that
the Goldwater people used, such as infiltrating meetings or using voting procedures to
delay and eventually vote out their opposition, came from the communists . White
witnessed the communists’ loyalty to their cause, a loyalty that did not begin during the
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campaign or end on election night.255 Conservatives had to show determination to survive
when they did not possess the finances or the blessing of party leadership.
From out of the countryside, letters streamed into political offices expressing their
antipathy. From Texas, a hotel owner charged that Democrats no longer stood for the
ideas of Jefferson and Jackson. Roosevelt’s New Deal put the country on the path to
socialism by opening the floodgates of peak spending and government intervention.
Delving further into the conspiratorial, the author accused Truman of giving too much
money to the rest of the world, then firing a heroic general, while engaging in a war in
Korea to keep the country from sinking into an economic recession. Kennedy picked up
the mantle, weakening America with a misadventure in Vietnam, a fiasco in Cuba, and
rupturing society by pushing an agenda that defended minorities. He ruined the image of
America abroad in the face foreign affairs that required more resolute leadership.256 This
particular letter, though highly combative in tone and accusations, should be noted for
coming from a small business owner in a burgeoning region of the country who
committed himself to changing his party affiliation.
Another less aggressive letter, serves to highlight the gap in leadership that many
rural voters felt. Describing himself as not having much education, a voter from Dillon,
South Carolina wondered if anyone could make sense of the actions of the government.
Kennedy’s tragic death shocked and saddened him, but Johnson had to carry on. To his
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dismay, elected politicians seemed to be giving in to the State Department and Supreme
Court, preferring to send money abroad to communist countries who wanted to buy guns
to kill Americans and their allies. He closed his letter by asking Senator Thurmond to
“tell a God-fearing man who also loves his America as you, what he can do to bring
America back to us and what our forefathers died for.”257 A woman in Pasadena,
California wrote to defend Goldwater as a genuine visionary, someone ahead of the
mainstream. She stressed that conservativism did not mean a return to pre-modernity. On
the contrary, she stated, Goldwater was modern. Mainstream politicians attacked him
because he proposed an alternative and he had grassroots support that they did not.
“That’s why you can’t keep those grass roots from growing high to the sky, spreading
like a benign prairie fire across our nation,” she stated.258 Consider these letters together,
and a portrait takes shape.
Conservatives longed for a candidate that they could get behind in large numbers.
The John Birch Society and the YAF symbolized the disenchanted, the outsiders
considered too square to be anything like the kind of outsider that society began to
embrace by the end of the decade. It cannot be understated the significance these groups
played on the election, without them White’s plan would likely have come to a halt short
of completion. They are often described as the radical right or as extremists. The word
“radical” is Latin for “root,” therefore a radical is someone who takes political ideas to
their roots. They are committed to changing fundamental political structures, not only
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superficial ones. Labeling someone a radical suggests that the person is not being
rational, that they are operating outside of acceptable social standards of either thought or
action. After the war, industrialization and rapid economic growth occurred within an
abnormal climate of anti-communism propelled the growth of the radical right. As a
consequence of changes in the population, Americans spread out to the far corners of the
country. In places like California, Texas, and Arizona small-town conservatives jelled. A
new business class began to emerge in the Sun Belt states, drawn to conservativism by
their distrust for the eastern elite, their animosity towards the hoarding of resources in the
industrial states, and the use of the federal government to maintain the establishment.259
Some of these radicals became members of the John Birch Society or the YAF, and at
least many of them were familiar with their ideas or knew someone who was a member.
Goldwater’s campaign called forth these iconoclastic voters. They understood their
alienation could be the spark for burning down tradition and starting something new.

Segregation, Reinvention, and Other Primaries
One month after the New Hampshire primary, Rockefeller operatives sent word to
Albany of a change on the campaign trail. Barry Goldwater was no longer acting like the
Barry Goldwater from before. After New Hampshire, he reassessed and improved his
campaign strategy. During the last few weeks of March, each speech that he made
focused on a single issue whether it was Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Baker or
Agriculture or Civil Rights. He kept his focus for that particular audience and moved on.
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He spoke with confidence using catchy phrases, taking difficult themes and packaging
them into short descriptive words, making it easier for the average person to understand
his emotionally packed language. He did not talk about isolated ideas or controversies or
abstractions, he stuck to a script that avoided academic language and hammered home his
point on important national issues.
After speeches, a host would allow a few questions, many of which appeared to
be planted. While in Portland, newsmen travelling with the candidate were not allowed to
ask questions so that local reporters could be given an “equal opportunity.” Local
reporters complained that they were made to participate in a Goldwater commercial
without prior notification or consent. They objected to questions appearing on TV before
being published in their local papers. They objected to possible editing by a political
candidate resulting in a distortion or alteration of what actually happened. An entire thirty
minute conference telecast on a Portland TV station aired in the afternoon, and then was
repeated again later in the week on a second TV station with a paid political broadcast
label. The latter time was paid for by the Oregon Goldwater for President Committee.
Steve Sattig, Goldwater’s Oregon Campaign coordinator, defended the decision by
claiming that editing was “not planned” for the conference. This did not mean it was not
done, since newsmen knew it was televised. Sattig admitted he did have some reporters
ask specific questions, but as he claimed, he wanted to clear up some misunderstandings
and that others were free to ask whatever they wanted.260
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After a meeting with Eisenhower, Goldwater began to claim that the former
president approved of his message on key issues like the Bobby Baker investigation,
missile defense, extremism, and the need for party unity. To him, anyone who raised the
issue of the John Birch Society was being “hysterical.” He soft-pedalled his extreme
positions so as to change the dialogue in the national conversation. Most damaging to
Rockefeller, Goldwater continually emphasized that he was still married to the same
woman for over thirty years, that he campaigned with his family, and spoke on the issue
of family solidarity. He called Rockefeller a “hot-dog eating, blintz-eating, back-slapping
candidate” who increased New York government expenditures by 67% during his two
terms, implying he would do the same as president.261 The race had shifted, and
Rockefeller’s opponent grew stronger.
Goldwater’s shift in presentation was matched by his shift in tactics, and it gave
the appearance of a candidate seeking to redefine himself. Unconvinced, Rockefeller’s
people managed to compile a list of his opponent’s extremist views. They crafted a
number of issues on which to attack Goldwater on that they believed could help the
governor’s campaign recover. They did not have to go back too far to find quotes. At a
press conference in Concord, New Hampshire in January, Goldwater responded to the
question of whether “He (Supreme Commander of NATO) should be able to fire an
atomic tactical weapon without reference to the White House,” by saying, “That’s my
opinion.” When asked on Meet the Press two days earlier, whether he would renounce
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the nuclear test-ban treaty if the he were President, Goldwater replied, “If it appeared to
be to our advantage to test in the atmosphere, yes, I would do it.”262 Hanging the
extremist label on Goldwater like an albatross would not be a problem for Rockefeller
should he decide to go forward with the idea. For years, Goldwater made speeches,
published books, and answered questions with the same rhetoric. People either loved him
or despised him for it. He spoke his mind and he appeared genuine; voters often cited his
authenticity as one of his most admirable characteristics. If anything, he was consistent.
He sang the same tune over and over again. In Conscience of a Conservative, he wrote,
“Accordingly, we should withdraw diplomatic recognition from all Communist
governments, including that of the Soviet Union.”263 Again in Why Not Victory, “the
government of the United States should declare that if the United Nations votes to admit
Red China, our government will, from that moment until the action is revoked, suspend
its political and financial support of the United Nations.”264 Goldwater might be able to
deceive someone not privy to the Senator’s career, but for campaign watchers, he could
not undo his reputation overnight. Of course, he did he intend to do anything so dramatic.
His campaign staff realized that if he won a few key primaries before winning the
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nomination, he would need to shift to the center to appeal to a larger base. They insisted
that was not a regional candidate or simply a candidate of marginal support.265
Complicating the matter, a bill that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964
reached the Senate floor at the end of March. As part of the bill, discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was prohibited, including in schools, places of
employment, and public accommodations. Southern politicians such as Georgia
Democratic Senator Richard Russell lined up to oppose the legislation, “We will resist to
the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about
social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our [Southern]
states.”266 Goldwater agreed with the southern opposition, holding firm to his view that
the federal government could not remedy the issue of race relations through the passage
of law. He would go on to equate the passage of the bill and its enforcement to the
creation of a police state. On this particular issue, Rockefeller continued to refer to the
Republican Party as the party of Lincoln with a heritage of freedom and equality for all
men. Under Eisenhower, the first two civil rights bills since Reconstruction had passed
into law. According to a poll in February, 80% of House Republicans supported the final
passage of the bill while 61% of House Democrats supported it. Over in the Senate, 71%
of Republicans gave their approval compared to 54% of Democrats. During the first and
second attempts to kill the bill when it reached the Judiciary Committee, Goldwater failed
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to vote with the majority of Republicans.267 It is tempting to say now that he was on the
wrong side of history, but such phrases are not apt for the situation because the phrase
implies that history follows a linear path, invoking another term like “progress.” This is a
slippery slope, for the past is riddled with moments when progress turned on itself,
leading to a horrific outcome. For example, scientific and technological progress helped
lead to both World Wars and the slaughter of millions of people. Instead, it can be
concluded that Goldwater, by opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and assuming the
argument of protection against the federal government, became, whether by design or by
consequence, a candidate that bigots and genuine racists saw as their leading man
amongst the Republican field. To be sure, Goldwater took a principled stance against the
Civil Rights Act based on the Constitution rather than racism, and he maintained his
initial stance on the issue throughout his candidacy. As he described it, “The federal
Constitution does not require the States to maintain racially mixed schools. Despite the
recent holding of the Supreme Court, I am firmly convinced – not only that integrated
schools are not required – but that the Constitution does not permit any interference
whatsoever by the Federal Government in the field of education.”268 In 1957, Goldwater
voted to kill Part III of the Eisenhower civil rights bill, which would have permitted the
Attorney General to institute civil suits to protect 14th Amendment civil rights. A short
time later, he supported nineteen controversial proposed amendments to the Eisenhower

267

Statements and Record of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Summarized January 1, 1964, Civil Rights, in
21.2 Hugh Morrow General Files, Goldwater – Barry Domestic Policies October 1963 – May 1964, Box 55,
Folder 573, Rockefeller Archives.
268

Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative, 33-34.

126
1960 Civil Rights bill, voting with the die-hard Southern bloc 67% of the time.269 These
are only a few examples that speak to the Senator’s public position on race, and there
would be others in the run up to the nomination.
After New Hampshire, the next primary came in Wisconsin. For the Republicans,
this became a minor affair as favorite-son candidate, congressman John Byrnes won over
99% of the vote. On the Democrat’s side, a curious development took place. Governor
George C. Wallace of Alabama went into the supposedly liberal and progressive North
campaigning on a platform of states’ rights and segregation, and found a stunning number
of sympathetic voters. Wallace won over a quarter of a million votes, about 25% of the
total in his race with Johnson. This was notable not for the president’s inevitable victory
but for the timing of the primary and the turnout. The governor believed that his showing
in Wisconsin indicated that both parties would have to “conservatize” their party
platforms, and in defiance of stereotypes, a Northern strain of sympathy for the southern
opposition to the Civil Rights Bill existed. “We have shaken the eyeteeth of every liberal
in the country,” Wallace boasted. Columnists around the country fretted over the
emergence of a grassroots campaign aimed at resisting civil rights. Where observers
thought that civil rights had traction, they found that voters balked at the notion of
equality. Northerners seemed to be saying that they supported a toned-down version of
civil rights which did not impede on preexisting social norms. There were even
disgruntled Republican voters who considered Goldwater to be too liberal and cast their
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ballots for Wallace. In a survey of voters, they viewed Goldwater as “too soft on the
Peace Corps,” he needed to “abolish the income taxers,” “abandon the UN-ers,” and
“drop the bomb on the Communists now.”270 Wallace’s brief outburst on the national
election scene caused a stir for campaign watchers. His ability to articulate the zeitgeist
of an unknown number of voters harkened back to the days of Louisiana Governor Huey
Long in his bid to amass power before his planned run against FDR.
Attempting to wield control over the white opposition to civil rights would prove
to be a dangerous affair. With each sit-in, demonstration, and protest march, angry white
voters became convinced that social change would lead to their decline as the
government continued to side against them. A backlash may have been inevitable, but
politicians like Wallace inspired violence. His famous declaration, “Segregation now,
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever,” gained him an audience with hatemongers
bent on violent means to reach an uncivil end. Wallace, like Goldwater, opposed a
powerful central government, exaggerating his opposition to civil rights by warning that
the bill would mean a loss of personal freedom. Unlike Goldwater, Wallace gained a
deserved reputation as a bigot. Often times he shielded himself under the argument of
states’ rights only to retort with a discriminatory remark or downplay the cruelty of a
church bombing. Over his career, he faced other segregationist opponents, some even
more hardline than himself. By 1964, he seemed poised to make the leap into presidential
politics by riding the backlash against civil rights. Time would tell how much strength the
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segregationist governor possessed, but in the meantime, his performance rattled the
leadership of both parties.
A week after Wisconsin, Goldwater squared off against Margaret Chase Smith in
Illinois. Rockefeller dared not challenge Goldwater in a Republican primary dominated
by conservative downstate voters, nor did anyone else of much consequence. Lodge and
Nixon remained undeclared. Goldwater needed to prove to Republicans that he could
win, and Illinois, with 26 electoral votes, was a coveted prize. Women’s groups put
Smith’s name on the ballot, hoping that she could elicit the kind of challenge that made
her famous when she spoke out against Senator McCarthy. For Goldwater, her campaign
would bring a level of prestige to the race without risking a defeat. More importantly, a
write-in victory like the one in New Hampshire would not be possible as the Illinois
Lodge group soon discovered. Under the Illinois state election code, county officials did
not need to count write-in votes. In the end, Goldwater won with slightly over 500,000.
Reporters jumped on the disparity in totals, noting that Smith received 25% against his
60%. They labeled the contest a “defeat” for Goldwater for not reaching a higher tally.
Goldwater responded acidly to reporter’s inquires, “I’ll settle for 60 percent any time.”
As a footnote, the official canvass indicated that he won 49% of the total Republican vote
meaning that over two hundred thousand ballots did not enter the record. Also
noteworthy, of the forty-eight delegates at stake, thirty-three could be counted on as
Goldwater supporters with the remaining few edging towards him in the delegate count.
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Illinois did not inspire the inevitability of victory nor did it extinguish the hopes of
dedicated supporters. It simply ensured that the battle was far from won.271
According to a survey conducted by the Associated Press (AP) beginning in
April, Republican county chairmen, town leaders, and other party leaders believed that
Nixon would prevail to become the party nominee at the convention. This was the third
such poll taken by the AP with Goldwater winning the first poll in October, but the
second in December after Kennedy’s assassination caused a sharp decline in his position.
Rockefeller remained as the preferred candidate for county leaders, but they no longer
held an optimistic view of his chances. Most interesting of all, while most respondents
believed Nixon would likely win the nomination, Goldwater was the overall preferred
choice. However, 223 of the 1,006 respondents replied “no opinion” to the question of
who was most likely to win the nomination. For both sides, the conservatives and the
liberals, New Hampshire did not mean much to them or so they said, though confidence
in Goldwater’s campaign abilities varied based on ideology.272 Their concern lay in the
mega primary state of California, a winner-take-all contest. Till then, they would have to
wait while the other primaries captured the spotlight.
As the candidates hopped from one primary to the next, the lens on the outcome
of the nomination flared in and out of focus. Lodge won New Jersey on April 21 then
Massachusetts a week later in which no presidential contenders appeared on the ballot. It
became a write-in contest with Lodge carrying the day. Goldwater finished second,
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Nixon third, and Rockefeller fourth proving nothing for any of the leaders. That same day
in Pennsylvania, another write-in primary, Scranton claimed victory. Goldwater
supporters in the state wanted to place his name on the ballot, but the pro-Scranton State
Chairman Craig Truax, with orders from Scranton, bluffed Goldwater supporters from
trying to rally voters to their side. Clif White dared not risk a duel with them, though the
final count indicated that Scranton’s support was less than expected, resulting in only
three out of sixty-four delegates going to Goldwater. This result lent further credibility to
the idea within the Conservatives’ ranks that opposition to Goldwater from third
candidate would be futile. With the primary season in full swing, Goldwater continued to
pick up delegates in non-primary states. Delegates in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana each pledged their support to him. Delegates in Georgia, Kansas, and North
Carolina followed suit by committing their votes.273 On May 2, Texans threw their
support behind Goldwater in his best showing of the primaries. Rockefeller knew that he
would not come close to contesting in Texas, so he stayed away. Afterwards, the press
underscored Lodge’s write-in, noting that before the primary, Goldwater’s strength
should put him close to 100%. When he came up short, it did not look impressive. On
May 5, Ohio governor James Rhodes won his state as a favorite son in an election all but
ignored by the press and the other candidates. Goldwater won Iniana with two-thirds of
the vote, but his victory came only against perennial candidate Harold Stassen. Again,
Goldwater failed to impress as a vote for Stassen translated to dissent for the
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conservative’s views despite being considered a stronghold for his movement.274 By now,
liberal Republicans could see that their main opposition would not stumble on his own.
Goldwater proved that he could win in various regions of the country, and clearly he had
a following behind him. Exactly how robust his following could not be determined until a
later date. With the California primary looming ahead, liberals would need a candidate to
step forward.

Rockefeller Makes his Move
William Rusher once mused, “Every movement needs a villain. For the GOP
Right, Nelson Rockefeller was it.”275 Even in Rockefeller’s home state of New York, a
Conservative Party emerged in 1962 to thwart his reelection. Conservative Party
members opposed his stance on civil rights, among other things. There was no love lost
between the two sides. Rockefeller was often quoted as expressing his dismay at having
his party loyalty called into question. He believed that it was the other way around, that
the Far Right were the ones that did not belong in the G.O.P. After all, liberals believed
they had more in common with the roots of the Republican Party; namely, Hamilton,
Clay, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt who in turn inspired Wilkie, Dewey, and
Eisenhower. Goldwaterites claimed Jeffersonian roots, and they subscribed to a broader
definition of liberty. It would not be a stretch to call either one an extremist to the degree
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that both represented almost logical opposites of each other. Javits and the liberals were
on one side and Goldwater and the conservatives on the other.
From the outset, Rockefeller misunderstood his status within the Republican
Party. He did not understand or want to understand that he was the bane of the Far Right.
His supporters were the Establishment that key elements of the Republican Party wanted
to move away from. By courting lawyers, businessman, bankers, ethnic minorities, and
the professional class, he encouraged further scorn upon his campaign. His tactics may
have worked in the 1940s and 1950s, but by 1964 the path to the nomination no longer
hinged on winning over state officials. In the past, it made sense to lean towards the New
Deal, which millions of Americans did. For the Republican Party to survive during the
1930s and 1940s, it needed to link up with the popular program. Clif White pivoted away
from this outmoded approach, away from the Eastern Establishment, and understood that
delegates mattered most. They could not be turned against the Goldwater movement.
George Hinman charmed the wrong people. He thought he could pull the right strings at
the appropriate time and balloons would drop on the governor’s head at the convention.
Worse still, because of the lack of primary victories, various crises going on in New
York, and sagging enthusiasm there was a perception that their presidential campaign did
not match the sophisticated nature of their state organization. Rumblings within the inner
circle placed the blame on the wonkish approach taken to move Rockefeller forward in
the polls. Too many resources, too many experts, too many opinions, and not enough
leaders or instinct.276 Rockefeller liked to be seen as a man with ideas, a grand vision for
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the nation. He moved too far ahead, concerning himself with running against Johnson
when he needed to start with rest of the Republican field. Considering him in this fashion
could lead to the conclusion that he was an egotistical playboy pouring money into a
doomed campaign when he should have spent his time, money, and energy on guiding the
Republican Party through its own coming of age.277 Rockefeller did not want to do that.
Only four years earlier in 1960, Robert Kennedy judged Rockefeller as most
likely to win the White House had he decided to run.278 Rockefeller did possess the
qualities that someone needs to become president, but he had horrible timing and was
never able to pull it all together. He exited the 1964 Presidential campaign season a
changed man, but before the malice in San Francisco, his beliefs, background, and
funding made him a formidable leader. By May 1964, his chances of winning the
nomination seemed overly optimistic at best and delusional at worst. For all intents and
purposes, he no longer had a reasonable chance of getting his name at the top of the
ticket. Too much time had passed without moving the needle. Only the remotest
possibility remained for him to lead the Republican Party in November. All was not lost,
however, even if he along with those closest to him suspected the worst. The finale was
not cast in stone. Goldwater could have lost. He underwhelmed in his victories in Illinois,
Texas, and Indiana. Plus, the issue of integration and states’ rights clouded his prospects
given that one of the main strikes against him was his inability to appeal to the nation at
large. He could argue that he settled the debate over whether his campaign only had
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regional appeal, but he most certainly did not show an ability to contribute to the
expansion of the Republican Party. On the contrary, the extremist label stuck to him so
easily because of his views, which, in turn, stunted his growth. If Rockefeller or any other
candidate for that matter wanted to block Goldwater’s way to the nomination, they
needed to act fast.
Nixon took the next shot at the Goldwater campaign in Nebraska. Considered
home territory for Goldwater, most of the state’s top Republicans backed the candidate,
trumpeting his political good fortune. Much to his delight, initially no major candidate
revealed themselves as wanting to contest the primary. That changed after the election in
Texas proved once again that a write-in candidate could make waves in the press.
Lodge’s second place finish, matched by his initial success in New Hampshire and strong
showing in Pennsylvania, gave Nixon pause to consider his own candidacy. Nixon’s
notoriety among key officials and resonance with Republican voters in the past gave him
the opportunity to demonstrate his talent for getting votes. Moreover, Nebraskans could
be relied upon to execute a write-in strategy as evidenced by the 75,000 write-in votes
Nixon received in 1960, and in 1952 when Taft netted 79,000 and Eisenhower 66,000
write-in votes to finish ahead of the only candidate on the ballot that year. Under the
guidance of former Secretary of the Interior and newspaper publisher Fred Seaton, Nixon
organized a mail campaign to drum up support. Their tactics emulated Lodge’s New
Hampshire effort by explaining how to implement their plan on Election Day. After
officials counted the last ballot, they declared Goldwater the winner with 49%, Nixon
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came in second with 35%, and Lodge rounded out the top three with 16%.279 As before,
Goldwater disappointed only this time he did not even earn a majority of the votes.
Political observers expected him to win, but they wanted him to crush his competition.
Neither Nixon nor Lodge had a formal campaign, but combined they out-producedly the
supposed mighty conservative in a deep red state.
West Virginia also held its primary on that same Tuesday, and it resulted in a
Rockefeller victory. His people were considering the idea of repackaging his image in an
effort to distinguish him from the competition without appearing haughty or out of touch.
Advisors suggested that he position himself as the down-to-earth optimist, someone who
faced problems realistically, yet knew something could be done about them.280 As the
policy wonk, he failed. While watching him on a television show, viewers could see a
strong, confident figure with a sound memory, but during speeches he got too caught up
in the multitude of facts that his staff presented to him. From the start of his tour of the
state, he tried to connect with the people. He visited a coal mine in McDowell County,
gave a non-political speech in Morgantown, and toured with Governor Cecil Underwood
through the northern part of the state. His venture to the southern part, a heavily
Democratic coal-mining region, was the first for a Republican presidential candidate
since the New Deal.281 From there, he zeroed in on creating jobs for small businesses and

279

Novak, The Agony of the GOP, 367-368.

280

Memorandum from Harry Paxton to Hugh Morrow, 21.2 Hugh Morrow Campaign Files,
Literature, 1964 Campaign (Brochures & Memos), box 56, folder 584, Rockefeller Archives.
281

“Rocky ‘Captured’ West Virginia During Two-Day Campaign Swing,” Campaign Express, in 21.2
Hugh Morrow Campaign Files, Literature, 1964 Campaign (Brochures & Memos), box 56, folder 584,
Rockefeller Archives.

136
in the construction industry while trying to dispel the negative aspects of the state’s
reputation. He declared, “I have seen more pride in West Virginia than I have
poverty.”282 It worked. Goldwater leaders in the state urged Republicans to boycott the
primary. Goldwater did make appearances in the state, but his nor anyone else’s name
was placed on the ballot.
Rumors began to circulate that Goldwater had suffered a nervous breakdown
before the primary, causing him to skip campaigning to relax. As documented by his wife
in an article for Good Housekeeping, her husband suffered a nervous breakdown in 1937
while working at the family department store, and again later under the same
conditions.283 Adding to the speculation, Goldwater vastly cut back his campaign
schedule before taking time off in a West Virginia hotel. Similar stories of him taking
medication during a 1958 campaign and before major rallies in 1964 hinted that the
rumors may have some basis in fact.284 Whether or not the rumors were true, and if so,
how much this affected his later campaign, is unclear.
During his assessment of Rockefeller, the influential editor of the Beckley PostHerald noted that the governor seemed more interested in “slapping Goldwater” than
winning the nomination. Based on his talks with the Rockefeller’s supporters, he
concluded that remarriage continued to be an issue with voters and that without that issue
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he probably would be the nominee.285 Rockefeller’s late arrival into the winner’s circle
did not create much buzz in the media nor did his resounding tally add much in the way
of lending credibility to the notion that he could win the nomination. It did however give
the appearance of momentum heading into the next primary.
Oregon mattered. With the most coveted state still to go, Rockefeller needed a
win. Unlike the other primaries, the Oregon secretary of state placed the names of each
candidate on the ballot, declared or otherwise meaning Nixon, Lodge, Scranton, and
Romney all appeared on the ballot. The only way to remove a candidate’s name was to
sign an affidavit pledging not to become a candidate in November. Romney pulled out of
the race so that he could keep his promise to the Republican insiders who got him elected
in Michigan.286 Seeing a potential legal battle ahead if he did decide to run, Scranton
decided not to sign the pledge, but insisted that his staff not promote him because he
wanted a legitimate draft campaign. Craig Truax, Scranton’s state party chairman,
ignored the instructions and began to promote him anyway. When Scranton found out, he
squashed the effort. Scranton did not want to campaign in Oregon, period. Meanwhile,
Nixon eyed another write-in opportunity. He reasoned that he would do well based on his
victory over Kennedy in the state four years earlier and his connections to state leaders.
He authorized a public relations consultant to gage interest among the locals.
Unfortunately, Nixon’s supporters could no longer help him: they had divided themselves
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into the Goldwater and Rockefeller camps.287 After looking like a winner after Nebraska,
his political heartbeat flatlined.
Reporting from the state, Rockefeller’s staff summed up the experience for the
governor. Oregon voters seemed to be low intensity people who lacked personal
involvement in politics had little interest in the issues. Interviewers had to prod them to
even mention any issues during their interviews. They liked Nixon for his strong
knowledge of foreign countries and international affairs. Voters liked Goldwater, but the
more he said, the more they began not to like him. Real enthusiasm for him did not exist
the same way it did in New Hampshire, and his movement did not have the backing of
the locals in the same way it did in other parts of the country. Researchers noted that after
New Hampshire, Lodge did not have a bandwagon effect, he was like a “2-D knight in
shining armor.” People tended to idealize him, but most people did not know anything
about him, and many did not know where he stood on the issues or cared to learn about
him. Based on this research, Rockefeller’s slogan in Oregon became “He Cares Enough
to Come.” Researchers recommended that the campaign should educate the voters on
Lodge, he was not their knight nor was he all that smart to begin with. Once, after being
complemented by a fellow ambassador for how he handled himself on a recent trip
abroad, ambassador Lodge remarked, “Well, I’ve got a shallow mind, but I can usually
think of a quick answer.” Reading the tea leaves, Rockefeller’s staff foresaw both Lodge
and Goldwater falling by the wayside. There would be little to gain from criticizing them.
For Rockefeller, a bit of good news showed up in the report. While his family troubles
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did hurt his chances, few people saw him as too liberal. Before the election, the majority
of interview respondents said that the remarriage did not bother them. Where New
Hampshire voters often referred to Happy as “that woman,” Oregon voters did not.288
They believed that he could beat Johnson in the general election, but they wanted him to
show interest in their concerns without coming across a slick politician. Campaign
advisor George Hatzes told Hugh Morrow, “It would behoove the governor to speak over
their heads in lofty tones because this is the image which the Rockefeller’s enjoy
throughout the country. When the governor utters statements and speeches which have
the professional taint, it removes him from that pedestal and becomes another politician.”
Goldwater on the other hand, reserved his abuse for Rockefeller in a stately fashion, but
kept his attention on the administration giving him a more elevated tone than the others.
By their calculations, the candidate needed to “return to the pedestal enjoyed by the
Rockefeller legend.”289 This debate within the governor’s campaign gets to the crux of
his appeal, hence the difficulty of pulling all of the different parts together to vault him
into a higher echelon. He was a compelling figure with a pedigree unlike any other in
America; yet, his advisors often times wanted him to straddle the line between being a
man of the people and a cut above the rest.
Less than twenty-four hours before voters went to the polls, Rockefeller told a
television audience, “The Republican Party faces the danger of being dominated by a
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radical extremism out of tune with the time and contrary to the very principles upon
which the party was founded.”290 Another slug to the chin of his opponent, but Goldwater
was nowhere to be found, having decided that he would not fight back in the state after
all. His absence left room for guesses on his mental condition, though nothing could be
confirmed. Rockefeller’s campaign had crisscrossed the state. In the four days leading up
to the election, he gave twenty-four speeches in nine communities, and his hands had
become swollen and calloused from shaking so many hands. He looked exhausted,
thinner, and generally worn-out, but it was not in vain.291 He won with 33%, Lodge
finished second with 27%, with Goldwater and Nixon earned 18% and 17% respectively.
In the immediate aftermath, it appeared that Lodge, a longshot to begin with,
would not be able to get the nomination. Pollsters overvalued his chances: the Harris poll
missed badly in the weeks before the election by seeing an upswing for Lodge and only a
minor turn for Rockefeller. Lodge never did have the resources, the money, or the insight
from political pros that his opponents did. He was a phantom born out of a vague notion
that he would swoop in and save the day when in actuality, he was nothing of the sort.
Nixon’s absentee write-in campaign came up lame ending his bid for the nomination
should a brokered convention take place. Oddly enough, because he did not campaign at
all and despite finishing with a miniscule 2% of the vote, Scranton, in the weird logic of
politics, was still alive with a shot at being the nominee as a compromise candidate.
Goldwater performed fairly well considering his decision to skip the state in favor of
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keeping his mojo going in California. The problem for him became that he lost badly to
Rockefeller who he would run against in the next primary. After Oregon, the field
shrunk, but the enthusiasm on the campaign trail was about to reach a crescendo.
California would become the battleground for control over the heart of the Republican
Party.

Chapter 6: California and the Republican National Convention

You Don’t Have a Kingmaker without Someone to Make a King Out Of
Rockefeller’s win in Oregon emphasized the fractured nature of the Republican
Party. As his campaign slogan made clear, he visited the state when no one else would.
Lodge remained silent on whether or not he would formally join the race. He opted
instead to stay thousands of miles away in Vietnam to brood over the impending
American escalation with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. A few weeks before the
primary, Nixon traveled to Saigon for a picture with Lodge, inspiring one observer to
comment that Nixon had “a fantastic talent for muscling in.”292 Upon discovering that he
stood no chance in Oregon, Nixon promptly went on vacation. In Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, Scranton continued to execute his strategy of giving speeches and talking
about the election with no plans to run without a draft campaign. After recovering from
his reported mental exhaustion in West Virginia and sensing that Oregon would not aid
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him in his path to the nomination, Goldwater attended a raucous event at Madison Square
Garden. Amidst a colorful display of balloons and “Goldwater Girls” dancing in the
aisles, Goldwater rose to the podium as a crowd of over 18,000 whistled, stomped, and
cheered. He warned of the threat against states’ rights, offering up the line, “You can’t
pass a law that will make me like you or you like me. This is a problem of the heart and
the mind, not the problem of the lawyer, the problem of the Senator, the Congressman or
the President.” Applause followed with each barb whether against “Yo-Yo McNamara”
or the Democratic Administration intent on turning the states into “50 pigeonholes in a
new Washington bureau.” The next day, he made his case against the federal government
in a half-hour nationwide taped television program. Afterwards, he set off to California to
take part in a $10-a-person “Cruise with Goldwater” from Los Angeles to Catalina Island,
twenty-four miles off the coastline.293 Rockefeller may have won in Oregon, but
Goldwater was literally cruising into the California primary.
California in 1964 was a case study in how America grew and transformed
following World War II. In the post war period, the state’s population almost doubled.
Since 1929, it more than tripled in growth. During the war, broad-scale industrialization
revolutionized the state thus providing a basis for its expansion. Huge aircraft and other
defense plants and their suppliers changed the state’s prerogative from light consumer
goods to heavy products. This accounted for the rise in steel and chemical markets along
with an increased focus on consumer durable and nondurable products. Any decline in
defense or space activity would wound the local economy. In 1962, defense became the
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nation’s largest business, and between 1946 and 1965, 62% of the federal budget went
towards defense.294 Federal government contracts were the bread and butter of the
economy. National defense and government spending became major components of
prosperity.295 It is ironic to note that these industries, which built the communities, came
out of the New Deal, and yet received unbridled criticism from conservatives. They
adhered to an anti-communist, libertarian ethos that railed against some the institutions
that made their ascent possible. This is not to imply that conservatives did not have allies
in government as there were always sympathizers and instigators who championed their
cause within Washington D.C. For example, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover’s book
Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It influenced
likeminded conservatives who also enjoyed reading Robert Welch. To their credit, the
Far Right brought together various strands of people ranging from the ordinary to the
elite, and from the conspiracy driven to government structuralists. Their ideology bound
them as America underwent change on a large scale; changes in international status,
changes in societal relations, and changes in demographics. California became a political
setting for all of this to take place.
Three days after Oregon, a memo came across the Rockefeller’s desk with a
strategy. The author called for Rockefeller to not only win California to have a chance at
the nomination, but Rockefeller needed to make a play for other delegates outside the
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state. This would include reaching out to delegations in favorite son states like Wisconsin
and Ohio. He also needed to make frequent contact with uncommitted delegates. During
the remaining weeks, he should push for maximum television and magazine coverage
with an eye on raising his national position in the polls. Furthermore, supporters should
be instructed how to carry out off-the-floor activities at the convention such as voting on
the party platform. As a model for success, they should follow Wilkie’s 1940
experience.296 Campaign advisor Roswell Perkins pressed the governor to make civil
rights a critical issue in the state. Civil rights presented an opportunity to end
discrimination and promote equality as part of the American dream that the nation’s
founders, and Republican forefathers, set out to achieve. Opponents like Goldwater
created fear instead of understanding, and Democrats were more divided than many
realized on this issue.297
With that in mind, the overarching issue during the campaign needed to be about
the power of the federal government. Rockefeller represented a vision of America that
placed its faith in institutions. A notion that the government could be trusted to do the
right thing for the people. This idea won considerable praise in the aftermath of the war.
America proved its leadership to the world by being the best organized, most disciplined
nation, and by avoiding the devastation of its rivals as each one of them destroyed the
others economy. Rockefeller’s fundamental beliefs in the power of the government
through spending and enacting social change cut to the heart of the dilemma that
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Americans faced during the Cold War. As he often said, the problem was not a social
issue. The cultural conformity of the 1950s had made way for the slow and steady
progress that emerged during the early 1960s. The problem lay on the economic side.
Democrats spent money, but they did not spend money well. They put their faith in
institutions, as evidenced later by such public works as the Civilian Conservation Corps
during the Great Depression and later still by the Great Society. Only Rockefeller
believed that Democrats were not up to the task of continuing the financial boom of the
post-war era.
To articulate his message and improve his standing among voters, Rockefeller
hired a Los Angeles firm called Spencer-Roberts & Associates. William Roberts and
Stuart Spencer ran the firm and made their business by managing political campaigns.
Started in 1960, a string of success brought the firm national attention. Liberal
Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel hired Spencer-Roberts for his campaign in 1962. A
year later, the firm helped elect a Republican congressman in a heavily Democratic
district of Los Angeles. On election day, they located and brought registered Republicans
to the polls who had not voted by midafternoon.298 Drawn to their success, George
Hinman visited Spencer-Roberts during the summer of 1963 to ask for their help. They
had a gift for turning a politician’s negatives into positives. Hinman desperately wanted
them to do the same for the governor. The problem was that the firm only wanted to work
for candidates that they believed could win. When Hinman asked, they refused. That
October, Rockefeller flew out to their offices and presented them with a $2 million
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operating budget if they would work for him. They agreed. Right away, they snatched up
key advertising space for billboards and posters. From there, Hinman took up residency
in L.A.’s Ambassador Hotel, and got to work convincing the power structure of the need
to stop the Goldwater campaign. He warned them that they could be witnessing the end
of the Republican Party, the two-party system, and the economic strides made during the
post-war era. Californians would go to the polls to elect a slate of delegates pledged to a
candidate, not a candidate directly, so the delegates had to be convinced first. Hinman
targeted San Francisco mayor George Christopher, Hollywood tycoon Jack Warner, and
owners of the Los Angeles Times and Firestone tires.299 Rockefeller’s campaign strategy
wanted to work the powerbrokers, not the voters themselves, a strategy at odds with the
kind that Clif White envisioned for his candidate. The idea was not to ignore voters all
together, but it was a two pronged strategy aimed first at the delegates and then at the
voters.
In a survey from the middle two weeks in April conducted by his staff,
Californians laid bare the obstacles that Rockefeller would have to overcome. Goldwater
rated highest with southern Californians, men, and older voters. Rockefeller rated highest
with northern Californians and lower income voters. Voters most strongly in support of
Goldwater liked his conservative views on states’ rights, his idea of a decentralized
federal government, and his promise to have less government control over businesses.
Those on the opposite side referenced him as being too extreme or too conservative. One
respondent said, “He’s too biased and opinionated – a Republican version of Harry
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Truman. I think he’d get us in war too fast.” Another, “Because I think, as far as foreign
policy (is concerned), our President has more power in using the nuclear bomb. He is too
much for using it to suit me.” Close to 40% of respondents showed strong disapproval of
Goldwater’s campaign. They responded that he was too critical, too negative, he talked
too much, and said the wrong thing. Southern Californian Republicans, his biggest
supporters, did not like the way he carried himself on the campaign trail.
On the opposite side, respondents liked Rockefeller’s experience and ability, but
detractors thought him too liberal. They frequently mentioned his personal life, his wealth
or ties to big business, and considered him too ambitious. Most discouraging,
Californians approved of Goldwater’s conservative positions and disapproved of
Rockefeller’s liberal stance more so than voters in Oregon. Overall, Rockefeller’s liberal
views received more negative attention than his personal life. On the issue of
Rockefeller’s remarriage, almost two-thirds of respondents said they considered it his
personal business and it would not concern them when deciding how to vote. However,
his divorce would be a factor among women, middle-age voters, and among Republicans
in southern California.300 It is clear that the subject would be unavoidable come election
time. Too often it remained on the minds of voters. Right or wrong, it came to define how
Rockefeller would be viewed in 1964, both as a politician and as a person. His image
became like the Duke of Windsor, Edward VIII, who set off a constitutional crisis in the
United Kingdom upon announcing that he wished to marry Wallis Simpson. As head of

300

“A Re-Survey of Likely GOP Primary Voters in California,” RG 15 Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Gubernatorial, in Hugh Morrow Campaign Files, 1964 Campaign California (Memos, press releases,
survey), box 50, folder 616, Rockefeller Archives.

148
the Church of England, he could not marry the twice divorced Ms. Simpson because of
disapproval from the Church. Seeing the conflict ahead, the Duke of Windsor abdicated
the throne after less than a year as king. He chose love over power. Rockefeller did not.
Within his campaign, there continued to be nervous chatter over how the governor’s
personal life would affect the election. He needed to stay out of the headlines. Though,
unlike in New Hampshire, Happy was noticeably pregnant. By this point, she no longer
campaigned with the governor and to stay within the confines of New York. His
candidacy depended on everything going according to plan. There could be no let up, no
disruptions. Little did he know, his nomination would not be for his campaign to decide.

They’re Already Here

Southern California, particularly Orange County, proved to be a stronghold for
Goldwater. Since the early 1960s, conservatives had opened numerous right-wing
bookstores, and worked within their churches, schools, and communities as a
countermeasure to liberal policies sweeping the country.301 Robert Welch’s far right ideas
on the dark side of the government turned heads. Conservatives, already partial to
distrusting either party’s administration in the post-war era, converted to a more cynical
and paranoid brand of right-wing politics. Women played an integral role in the early
days of John Birch Society in California by mobilizing within their communities and
volunteering. A “ladies auxiliary” organized at the beginning of the decade to recall a
“known communist” from the school board, which inspired the formation of the first
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Anaheim chapter of the John Birch Society.302 Before then, many of the activists led a
quiet suburban life. It was not until the heady days of the early 1960s that many of them
became involved in preventing subversion. With each new layer piled on, the
organization grew in size. Housewives were known to join the organization first and then
bring their husbands into the group.303 In keeping with the times, they wanted more
political participation. Other members of the John Birch Society included retired military
officers, business executives, young people, and a smattering of haters and race baiters.
They held regular meetings, expanded national membership, and had a continuing action
program. Not all of the chapters preferred Goldwater. Some liked Strom Thurmond and
others liked General Edwin Walker, a staunch conservative known for being the only
U.S. general to resign in the 20th Century after angering both Republican and Democrat
administrations.304

By 1963, the John Birch Society had grown to between 20,000 and 100,000
members. In addition, the society boasted 124 full-time paid employees, 40 full-time paid
organizers, and 200 section leaders while also publishing a monthly magazine named
American Opinion.305 Membership tended to include middle and upper middle class
Protestants who were financially secure, educated, and had families and children. Large
numbers of Catholics could be counted on as well. They were drawn to the organization’s

302

Ibid., 78-79.

303

Ibid., 102.

304

“John Birch Society Background, The Governor, in Goldwater Positions,” box 3, folder 119,
Rockefeller Archives.
305

Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 64.

150
stance on fighting communism in Eastern Europe articulated by Catholic journals in Los
Angeles and New York. Cardinal Richard Cushing endorsed the John Birch Society
bringing credibility and support to the organization. Cushing had been a close friend of
the Kennedy family and had shared the stage with the late president at his
inauguration.306 Welch’s opposition to the civil rights movement kept African-Americans
a minority within the group as black leaders such as Martin Luther King would later be
labeled as a “troublemaker” and “favorite of the communists”.307 Birchers believed
themselves to be the true defenders of patriotism, opponents were either conscious or
unconscious agents of an international communist conspiracy.308 Their society demanded
their time, energy, and dedication to educating Americans on the dangers of communism.
Birchers equated the United States with ancient Rome adopting a pessimistic attitude that
warned of the death of civilization if the lessons of history were not heeded. Communism
was seen as the worst evil in the world while capitalism was championed as the greatest
system civilization had ever produced. As a result, communism and capitalism were
destined for a showdown. It was the job of the Birchers to use their political leverage to
stop the advances of communism. They perceived communism as the central conflict of
their age. If someone was not fully in agreement with the John Birch Society, then they
were either a “dupe” or a communist agent.309 Welch created a permanently organized
movement at the grassroots level focused on righting social turmoil brought on by
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communists. A crucial element of the movement was the use of mass propaganda. Not
only were Welch’s books made available to the general public through the organization,
but Birchers also had an approved reading list that included Barry Goldwater’s
Conscience of a Conservative as well as American Opinion and Review of the News
which shaped the perspective of members.310 Pamphlets and reprints of magazine articles
were distributed on subjects ranging from communism to race relations. Members
appeared on television talk shows, discussion panels, and radio shows to propagate their
opinions before a larger audience. Birchers spoke at college campuses, local civic
associations, service clubs, veterans’ organizations, and state and county fairs.311

Goldwater appealed to Southern California conservatives and far-right
organizations with his stance on economic and social issues as well as his hardened views
on communism. His campaign drew on preexisting mobilization and advanced it, thus
expanding conservative grassroots influence.312 In June 1963, the 12th annual report of
the California Senate Fact-Finding Subcommittee on Un-American Activities found that
the John Birch Society was influential on American culture but not subversive. Based on
its investigation, the subcommittee concluded that the society was not secret, fascist,
subversive, un-American or anti-Semitic. Also noted in the report were reasons for
joining the organization, “it simply appeared to (new members) to be the most effective,
indeed the only, organization through which they could join in a national movement to
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learn the truth about the Communist menace and then take some concerted action to
prevent its spread.”313 Goldwater reached the same verdict. He wanted their support and
they fit in naturally with his firebrand conservatism. Best of all, they were organized,
committed, and connected enough to have a real impact on the outcome of the election.
Without them, he would likely lose.

Meanwhile, Republican leadership showed ambivalence or hostility towards the
organization. Former president, Dwight Eisenhower feigned interest in the group,
commenting, “I have no interest in the Birch Society. I know nothing about its
organization. In my experience, I have handled other such movements as the Birch
Society and I ignored them. I think that's the best policy."314 Richard Nixon went in a
different direction from his former running mate by repeatedly condemning the group
despite his loss of political alliances.315 Influential conservative and intellectual William
F. Buckley locked himself in a bitter ideological dispute with the extremist wings of the
Republican Party, specifically Robert Welch, and continued his criticism in newspaper
columns and in the National Review. Buckley pleaded with Goldwater to distance himself
from the group to no avail. Goldwater reasoned that there were too many influential
members in Phoenix. An outright denunciation of the group would put his presidential
campaign and Senatorial seat at risk.316 These early bouts between entrenched leadership
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and the Birchers are emblematic of the struggle that conservatives and the far-right faced.
While some top Republicans like Rockefeller and Javitis pushed back hard against the
group, others like Eisenhower wavered on their opposition. Buckley, while supportive of
Goldwater, could not stand Welch or his theories. Nixon’s loss in California in 1962,
proved the power of the Far Right in the state. They could not single-handedly beat him,
but they could tip the scales.
In late January 1964, Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb premiered in theaters. After a delayed release because
of Kennedy’s assassination, the film’s satirical take on geopolitical events poked fun at
conspiratorial elements of American politics. In the film, a cabal of crazed generals work
to prevent a nuclear doomsday with the Soviet Union as an ultra-nationalist Air Force
general sets in motion a chain of events culminating in the destruction of both nations. A
Russian ambassador is depicted working closely with the top echelon of the American
government. Mad bombers follow their orders without question, and a general discusses
fluoridation as a communist plot. All while Dr. Strangelove comments on the brilliance
and simplicity of the end of the world, applauding the government for its rationalism.
Events are shown as being triggered automatically and impossible to undo. Paranoia and
commitment mixed with madness and the perversion of ideals bring about the
apocalypse. At the end of the film Vera Lynn sings “We’ll Meet Again” over footage of
nuclear explosions flashing on screen. Critics of the John Birch Society saw traces of the
organization in the events on screen. Audiences were presented with a movie that spoke
to the fear that the nation was feeling. Sixteen months earlier, the Cuban Missile Crisis
had proven how close the world was to a collision between capitalism and communism.
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Extremists working within the John Birch Society saw the conflict as inevitable. Their
message attracted more members to the group who saw a communist conspiracy at work
either in their schools or offices or in a broader context relating to the civil rights
movement and the Cold War.
During the election cycle, Goldwater supporters used the slogan “Do You Want a
Leader or Lover in the White House?” to remind voters about Nelson and Happy’s
marriage. Rockefeller’s supporters countered with, “Do You Want a Leader or Loner?” in
an attempt to cast the governor as part of the mainstream and Goldwater as an extremist.
This latest division within the Republican Party did not begin in 1964. Nixon’s campaign
for governor in 1962 and the fallout that divided the two sides heavily influenced the
political climate for the California Primary. In 1962, Nixon refused to endorse any
congressmen or congressional candidates, including liberal Republican Senator Thomas
Kuchel. Neither one of them wanted much to do with each other because each believed
the other would hurt his campaign. Instead of uniting the Republican Party, factions
appeared. Furthermore, Nixon’s hostility towards former governor Goodwin Knight
coupled with a liberal-conservative split that conservative leader Joseph Shell did not try
to fix created a standoff.317 Nixon did not win the governor’s race in part because he
never convinced voters that he wanted the job badly enough. He failed to court middle of
the road voters, and bite back at his opponents. Democrats organized themselves more
efficiently than in years past knocking Nixon off of his pedestal. Angry and bitter over
his loss, Nixon headed off to New York leaving newly elected governor Pat Brown and
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the Democrats in charge of California. At the time, Democrats outnumbered Republicans
in California three to two. With the Republican Party in disarray, someone needed to
come into the state to fill the void.

At the statewide convention of the California Republican Assembly (CRA) in
March, moderate Republicans clashed with conservatives. Both Rockefeller and
Goldwater saw the assembly as a key moment in the primaries. Victory for either
candidate would all but guarantee the Republican nomination. The CRA met in Fresno to
choose a slate of leaders for the coming year and endorse a candidate for election. For
some time, the CRA had been under moderate Republican control. After spreading
grassroots fears of liberalism, the conservative wing of the party was able funnel in an
incredible amount of support for their cause. Following a hard fought and bitter debate,
the conservatives outmaneuvered Rockefeller’s supporters in parliamentary procedure
winning the CRA’s endorsement of Goldwater as well as the election of conservative
candidates. It was an important and influential decision for the Goldwater campaign and
for the right-wing of the party. An organized voice of the right-wing had spoken. Such a
decisive victory shaped the nation’s politics by helping to bring conservatism onto the
national political stage.318 President of the CRA, William Nelligan, responded acidly,
saying that the debate had been “a fight with extremist guerrillas sniping at our flanks.
The fanatics of the Birch variety have fastened their fangs on the Republican Party’s
flank and are hanging on like grim death.”319 Alarmed by the result, moderate
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Republicans around the country started a “stop Goldwater” movement. In the South,
moderates attempts to paint Goldwater as an extremist failed because his opinions were
either not seen as radical by the vast majority of Republicans or were deemed necessary
to remedy the ills of and threats to the nation.320

Leading up to the California primary, the power struggle within the Republican
Party continued as the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) and the John Birch Society
competed for influence. Members of the YAF had worked closely with Republican
strategist William Rusher to gain support for conservative candidates in the Senate but
they were met with stiff competition. A membership drive led by local Birchers in the
state topped off by the opening of a six-state headquarters in San Marino put the John
Birch Society in a strong position. In addition, several positions within the California
Young Republican organization were also captured by Birchers.321 Volunteers for the
Goldwater campaign were asked point blank if they were members of the John Birch
Society in an effort to dislodge the most hardened supporters. F. Clifton White reasoned
that the society’s influence with its rising membership, strong representation in
California, and litany of voter information could be weakened if it could be merged with
his own organization. This idea failed as Birchers continued to establish maverick clubs,
shift volunteers, and increase cash flow.322
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Conservatives working within the Goldwater campaign perceived Birchers as
loyal and patriotic while liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats characterized the
movement as extreme. Still, it would be a mischaracterization to equate the John Birch
Society with the larger Republican ideology. Many conservatives did find that their
interests at times overlapped with Birchers. They were however put off by the
movements leadership and unsubstantiated accusations. It would have been harmful to
Goldwater’s image if he endorsed the John Birch Society, but the organization
campaigned for him anyway. Welch made clear that the purpose of the society was to
“supply information from which our members can decide for themselves. There are
places where Goldwater’s philosophy coincides with mine and others where it does not,”
but the organization maintained that they would not endorse any candidate.323
Attacks from both the liberals and the Far Right on their opponents made a
reconciliation at the convention less and less likely. Conservative radio host Fulton Lewis
Jr. circulated a smear sheet titled, “The Nelson Rockefeller Story,” painting the governor
as associating with communists in New York. In it, an African-American lawyer serving
as chairman of New York’s temporary state commission on low incoming housing was
tied to the “communist front” and “subversive” groups. Lewis charged that “the only
possible conclusion that can be reached is that governor Rockefeller doesn’t care about
these communist and communist front connections and is not disturbed about them.”
Lewis’s remarks fell under the umbrella of extremists lending their support to Goldwater.
The fear amongst liberal Republicans became that if Goldwater became the head of the
Republican Party that the Birchers would follow behind him. Attacks on liberal
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Republicans did not only come from the fringes. Goldwater spoke in Fresno on how
Senator Kuchel policies did not fit into “the mainstream of the whole Party.” An odd
accusation when considering Kuchel overwhelmingly voted with Republican Party
leadership. Goldwater himself wanted to end Republican National Platforms seemingly
because he was a minority within the G.O.P.324
Meanwhile, the Rockefeller campaign produced a short film entitled “The
Extremists” to be aired one week before the primary. In the film, a narrator explained that
the extremists were pushing a communist conspiracy. Their appeal was melodramatic,
they were neither reasonable nor realistic, and they presented an oversimplified world
from the fringes of the political scene. After this expository, three witnesses to the tactics
of the extremists were brought in front of the camera. Reverend John Simmons relayed
how he received hate mail and threatening phone calls after he said he supported the U.N.
He then recounted the night he and another speaker had their homes bombed. Next, a
local Republican described how thirty members of the John Birch Society disturbed a
meeting of over 400 Republicans, and took control of Young Republican clubs in the
south bay area. Last, a former school teacher told how Birchers infiltrated the local
assembly by voting themselves in as members.325 Before the film could be aired,
Rockefeller halted its distribution, seeing the film as McCarthyism in reverse.
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His decision to not air the film speaks to the inner conflict that plagued his
campaign. In September of 1964, months after the primaries, Lyndon Johnson’s
campaign aired the famous “Daisy” television advertisement. In the ad, a young girl is
shown in a field picking up daisies, then counting as she plucks them one by one. When
she counts to nine, another voice from an intercom begins to count down from ten, it is a
missile countdown. She turns to look off screen and the image freezes. The camera then
zooms into the little girl’s eye as the countdown reaches zero, then a bright flash along
with the sound a nuclear explosion can be seen as a mushroom cloud rises to the heavens.
A narrators comes on, "These are the stakes. To make a world in which all of God's
children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die."
At the end of the ad a voice reads the words on the screen, "Vote for President Johnson
on November 3rd. The stakes are too high for you to stay home." This is perhaps the most
famous political advertisement ever. Johnson essentially used the campaign that
Rockefeller crafted in California, but to a much larger effect. A primary is different than
running a national election. The value of the election is smaller and what is important in
one primary may not be important in the next. Also, because there are fewer voters and
they are predominantly from one party, unless it is a closed primary, then the message
may not resonate the same way as it would in a national election where more people can
participate and may be swayed. California Republicans were predisposed to supporting
the military and the use of nuclear weapons. Some of Goldwater’s supports and those to
the right of him wanted him to use nuclear weapons immediately or at the very least use
them as a means to force the communists to capitulate. National voters would not see it
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that way. They saw Dr. Strangelove and the “Daisy” ad, when the Goldwater people saw
a tough, no nonsense approach to a threat to national security.326
Rockefeller’s people grappled with this view. Early on in his campaign he pushed
the extremist issue, then he backed off once he faced criticism for dividing the
Republican Party into further divisions which would hurt his chances in the primaries. He
then reversed course late in his campaign by attacking conservatives and extremists with
ferocity. Rockefeller believed that their position within the Republican Party represented
a major obstacle to the healing process. Republican leaders had a choice. They could
either allow the extremists along with the conservatives to have their candidate, thus
avoiding further fracturing of the Republican Party or have a vicious feud, possibly
ending in the creation of a Conservative Party only to have the Republican candidate lose
in November as had been expected all along. Extremists were taking over the Republican
Party, both Birch and pro-Birch forces. They captured full or partial control of the Young
Republicans, the United Republicans of California, the California Central Committee,
and the Republican Assembly. Birchers in San Francisco and other areas used the
Citizens’ Committee of California as a front for members wanting to work behind the
scenes for Goldwater. At numerous Goldwater headquarters, enthusiasts could walk in
and receive John Birch Society literature or reactionary materials.327 This kind of tactic
could be seen in other parts of the country not only among members of the John Birch
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Society, but also among would be Goldwater supporters looking for other outlets for their
views. A delegate to the Maryland Republican convention pledged to Goldwater arranged
a rally for Governor Wallace in Rockeville for him to spread his message of states’ rights
and segregation.328 While Goldwater could not be expected to control all of the people
supporting him. Nevertheless, it became another example of the kinds of people voting
for him.
Goldwater’s supporters were the most enthusiastic of the campaign, not only in
California, but throughout the primaries and before. Goldwater gave speeches to
thousands of admirers in New York and around the country. His advisors gave a
passionate effort to get him to run in the primaries after Kennedy’s assassination when he
considered getting out of the national spotlight altogether. There were also the small
district elections decided by a single determined voter in some cases. In California,
organizers gathered over three times the number of signatures needed to get their
candidate on the ballot in a single morning while Rockefeller employed pay-per-signature
professionals to get the necessary number only one week before the deadline.329 This
momentum kept building and building throughout the primaries. It was not a smooth
process. His candidacy was part of a larger social movement that chose him, not the other
way around. Kennedy’s death brought serious doubts to whether or not Goldwater would
run and under what circumstances. He lost several primaries, and underperformed and
underwhelmed in the ones he was supposed to win. Along the way to the nomination, the
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civil rights bill and Governor Wallace’s campaign threatened his standing in the
Republican Party. This raised a fundamental issue of whether or not he even belonged in
the party considering its historical roots and the support of civil rights by the majority of
Republicans. On top of that, his nervous breakdown before the West Virginia and
Nebraska primaries called into question his ability to finish the campaign. Had this
happened in a different era, it could have destroyed him. Thomas Eagleton in 1972 lost
his spot on the Democrat ticket with George McGovern after it was discovered that he
underwent electric shock therapy. Members of the press in 1964 had a reverence for the
office of the presidency and the men vying for their place in it that did not exist in later
campaigns.

In the final days of the election, the California primary was too close to call. With
one last push, Goldwater’s campaign supporters managed to get their candidate over the
top. It was a culmination of factors. Goldwater’s preaching about clamping down on
“lawlessness” elements of society, in reference to the civil rights and student movements,
resonated with Californians. Not to be confused with a white backlash necessarily, if that
were true then he would have won more votes than he did, but it did strike a chord with a
number of voters. Likewise, his campaign drew on the mobilization of supporters at
various rallies and events that brought in movie stars John Wayne and Ronald Reagan.
Even religious conservatives joined along with the local press to spread his message. This
was not a bottom up movement either. Powerful businessman already supporting regional
anticommunist candidates added financial support. After earning their wealth in the postwar boom, they wanted to have a say in presidential politics. Their money and leadership
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was a major contribution to the campaign.330 Then, a political gift dropped into their laps.
Mrs. Rockefeller gave birth on the Saturday before the election. On Sunday, baby
Nelson’s picture appeared in the Los Angeles Times next to full-page pictures of
Goldwater and his family. There was a deluge of paid advertisements in the press that
day. Asked a week prior how the birth might affect the outcome, Spencer-Roberts told
Rockefeller’s staff to muffle the announcement until after the election. Stu Spencer
recounted the event saying, “The New York people thought that this was going to be a
plus – that he become a father and the whole thing.”331 On Tuesday, the results told the
story: Goldwater 51% and Rockefeller 48% respectively. Californians had made their
choice. They preferred the hard-talking, extremist courting Arizonian to the millionaire
divorcee from New York.

Laughing and Crying at the Same Thing

Rockefeller campaign advisor Lloyd Free sent a message to the governor giving
him the California post mortem. Free believed that the companies hired to do the polling,
Opinion Research of California and Merv Field’s California Poll had been correct in
predicting that Rockefeller was ahead going into the election. Only, he was ahead at that
moment. After re-interviewing most of the participants, Opinion Research of California
concluded that most of the undecideds did vote in the end, and voted 2 to 1 in favor of
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Goldwater. In Los Angeles and Orange County, Goldwater won 3 to 1. Goldwater’s
campaign reached out to the undecideds in the final days before the election which
flipped their vote. Rockefeller’s campaign, perhaps the most expensive primary campaign
ever, fell silent in those final days. They did not want to rock the boat. Volunteer work
along with a barrage of T.V. and newspaper advertisements resonated with undecideds.
They claimed that because of those ads, they knew where Goldwater stood on the issues.
Amazingly, voters claimed that they did not know much about Rockefeller until the end
of the campaign. Free believed that the media blitz and personal contact, not the birth of
Nelson Jr., accounted for the loss.332 Whether or not that is in fact the case may never be
known for sure, given that people tend to bend the truth when speaking to pollsters or
may not necessarily know or understand their own reasons for pulling the lever for a
candidate.
There can be no doubt that the birth of Rockefeller’s son impacted the election.
However, Free believed that it did not have as a great an impact as other elements of the
Goldwater campaign. Possibly he wrote that report to make his boss feel better, but it is
clear that Rockefeller got the wrong advice right up to the end. He should never have
allowed his team to relax or give the impression that they were going to win and did not
need to fight for the election. Rockefeller should have known that his remarriage was still
an issue for voters, he should have made a speech about the issue, however
uncomfortable it might have been for him, and he should have known that the birth of his
son would create waves before election day. Stu Spencer strongly believed that the birth
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of Nelson Jr. caused the loss in California, but he also believed that Rockefeller could not
have won the nomination even if he had won the state.333 Both Free and Spencer were
probably right, Goldwater simply was the man of the hour. His supporters were an
entrenched opposition. They had the motivation and the wherewithal to know that they
needed to battle until the last vote was counted. Moreover, the power structure within the
campaign knew the right notes to play to bring out anyone left on the fence.
On June 6th, the Republican governors met in Cleveland for the annual
Governor’s Conference in what would become yet another battle for the nomination.
There were only sixteen Republican governors that year. They governed over 58 million
Americans, but they showed no signs of unity. With Lodge and Rockefeller out of the
race for the nomination, and Nixon no longer thought of as a possibility aside from a few
outliers believing he could get in on a second or third ballot, Scranton became the choice
to stop Goldwater. Mrs. Scranton, along with friends and staff, began to put pressure on
him after seeing Goldwater gain more of a following during the election cycle. Scranton
even met with Eisenhower in Gettysburg in what was interpreted by the press as the old
general giving his blessing for his candidacy. In reality, Eisenhower did nothing of the
sort. He pushed Scranton to accept a nomination if a majority of the delegates wanted
him to run. Sensing a double cross, Clif White met with Scranton upon his return to
Cleveland to gage his interest in being the Vice-Presidential nominee. Within the
conservative block, he would be an acceptable nominee. They needed an alternative
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choice in case of an open convention.334 Scranton would then be in position to heal the
Party before making a run in 1968 with the backing of a realigned base of support
stemming from the conservatives.335 White thought he could stop the Pennsylvanian
before he got started except Scranton did not want the second slot, he wanted to be top
billing.

That Sunday, Scranton took a call in his Sheraton hotel room from Eisenhower.
He told Scranton that did he not support a cloak and dagger assault on Goldwater. Press
reports of his meeting with Scranton had the story wrong. He did not want or want to
appear as if he was masterminding an eleventh hour stop-Goldwater movement. Scranton
hung up. He then decided not to tell his staff about the Eisenhower’s message and went
downstairs for a breakfast meeting with the other governors. Much to everyone’s surprise
Romney entered the meeting, declaring that he would lead the stop-Goldwater
movement. The other Republican governors did not have an affinity for Romney. He
irritated them on a host of issues ranging from his sanctimonious attitude to his decisions
to not attend other functions involving the governors in years past. If anyone was waiting
for a white knight, George Romney was not it. After he announced his intentions,
declaring that the fight was not over, the liberal governor of Mark Hatfield asked
Romney, “Where were you George when Nelson here was trying to stop Goldwater?
Were you helping him then?” At his seat, Rockefeller sat in silence with his hands
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masking the smile on his face.336 Hatfield continued, “George, you’re six months too late.
If you can’t add, I’ll add it for you.” Scranton chimed in to support Romney thus
prompting Hatfield to retort, “Rockefeller has been working his head off day and night
for the past six months, while both of you have remained gloriously silent. Any stopGoldwater movement now by you eleventh-hour warriors is an exercise in futility.”337

Around midnight, Nixon arrived in Cleveland. On the way to the hotel, he learned
that Ohio governor Jim Rhodes, Romney, Rockefeller, and Scranton aimed to stop
Goldwater. Bleary eyed from his travels, Nixon listened to Rhode’s staff as they
recounted the events of the weekend until two o’clock Monday morning. After a brief
rest, he attended a breakfast for the governors to discuss the campaign against Lyndon
Johnson. Nixon told the crowd that he wanted to hammer Johnson on the Bobby Baker
scandal. Rockefeller sat unmoved by his oratory. He knew, based on his own researchers’
investigation, that if the Republicans opened the file the Bobby Baker case then a number
of Republican senators would become collateral damage. It would not work. An opening
to attack Democrats did appear, but few saw the opportunity. Democrats were divided on
the upcoming civil rights vote, and when two reconnaissance planes were shot down over
Vietnam, a Walt Rostow of the State Department told the New York Times that the
American military should be prepared for all options, “up to and including all-out nuclear
war.”338 On both of these points, Republicans could have positioned themselves to make
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a united stand on civil rights as they pacified concern over the extremist wing of the Party
and their support of the nuclear option. Instead, they busied themselves with blaming
each other for the outcome of the primaries and posturing for control. After the breakfast,
confusion reigned.

A series of meetings held in hotel suites with and without key players, including
one in which Rockefeller refused Nixon entry, took place. Newsmen crowded the
hallways trying to make sense of the story. Meanwhile, Nixon informed his aide that he
wanted the next plane out of Cleveland. Before he could bolt, he met with Romney.
Accounts differ on what happened. Romney claimed afterward that Nixon urged him to
become an open candidate. Nixon claimed that he merely wanted Romney to barnstorm
the country for moderate principles, and that he, Nixon, would remain neutral. After
leaving the suite, Romney announced to the press that Nixon had urged him to run. Nixon
then got into a car heading to the airport. Unbeknownst to him at that moment, his
chances in 1964 ended there. From Goldwater’s vantage point, it looked like Nixon was
attempting to orchestrate a hostile takeover by using Romney as his pawn. If Nixon
wanted to deadlock the convention, then the conservatives would give him no quarter.
Any hopes of him healing the Republican Party ceased. A day later, he boarded a plane to
London leaving the mess behind.339
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At the Convention

When Republicans gathered at the Cow Palace in San Francisco for their
convention beginning June 13, it soon became a convention unlike any other in
presidential politics. From a historical perspective, it changed the direction of the
Republican Party. Only eight years earlier, Republicans met at the Cow Palace to reelect
Dwight Eisenhower, a center-right representative of the power structure. Now, that
branch of the party would be laid to rest by the conservatives and the extremists bent on
seizing control. Their struggle, between the Northeastern elites and the Midwest
conservatives, had raged for years. Candidates like Wilkie and Dewey had reluctantly
taken the nomination in years past and time and time again they lost. Even Eisenhower’s
unpopularity within the party was muffled by the fact that he won the White House. He
had been able to do what no other candidates could do since the onset of the Depression.
The convention in San Francisco represented a gateway to a new era, an opportunity to
right the wrongs of the past. This was the moment when, after all the begging and
pleading, the discipline and unbending devotion paid off. For once, conservatives would
have their moment underneath the glow of the television lights from the major networks,
and the country would see the new face of the Republican Party.

Television coverage of the national conventions began in 1952, since then, the
commitment from the networks mushroomed into a spectacular display to be beamed out
to the tens of millions of Americans watching around the country. Estimates suggest that
the three major news networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, would go on to spend between 25
and 30 million dollars on covering the 1964 presidential election. On the California
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Primary alone, they spent 1.25 million dollars, followed by another 15 million dollars
spent on both conventions. The Republican convention became the basis for modern
television convention coverage. Nearly 5,500 credentials were issued to over 1,000 news
organizations with the networks doubling the size of their staffs from 1960. They packed
hotels, transportation terminals, and the streets of San Francisco with close to 200 tons of
equipment, twice as much tonnage as before, but with advancements in technology, this
represented a far greater amount of equipment. To make sure that they covered every
angle, the networks used wireless cameras and microphones, along with mobile units in
cars and trucks capable of almost instantaneous broadcasting.340

Inside the Cow Palace, thirteen radio and television booths sat high above the
convention floor to preserve floor space for the 14,500 in attendance. A forty foot high
pool camera platform faced the speaker’s rostrum, itself blocking the view of hundreds of
delegates, forcing them to watch the proceedings on strategically placed monitors. As
part of the network build up to the nomination, newsmen conducted hundreds of
interviews to be recorded, edited, and broadcast for mass consumption. They pieced
together montages of the history of the party, backed by expert analysis, predictions,
debate, and hype. After the bitterness of the California Primary, producers expected the
convention to be of considerable interest to the audience. To bring the action to their
living rooms, each network assembled a broadcasting team of stars: Walter Cronkite,
Robert Trout, and Roger Mudd for CBS, David Brinkley and Chet Huntley for NBC, and
Edward P. Morgan and Howard K. Smith for ABC. Helping them sort through the
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confusion, networks enlisted the help of Theodore White, Louis Harris, and computers
from IBM. Each night, they competed for ratings, getting feedback on audience size and
distribution, but viewership was not their only goal. In fact, fewer viewers watched the
Republican Convention than would for a regularly scheduled summer broadcast.
Networks competed for prestige and an indirect return on their investment. “It’s an
intangible,” NBC News Chief William McAndrew commented, “but sales people say that
our news image definitely makes sales for the whole network schedule.”341 Money and
politics could not be separated. With television cameras peering over their shoulders,
politicians entered into a new arena where they would be scrutinized and observed in
ways unlike anything else before.

On the eve of the convention, networks got a preview of the mayhem that would
become synonymous with the next week of activity. Forty thousand protestors marched
towards City Hall Plaza carrying signs reading “DEFOLIATE MISSISSIPPI,”
“GOLDWATER FOR PRESIDENT – JEFFERSON DAVIS FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.”
Other signs read “GOLDWATER ’64, BREAD ’65, HOT WATER ’66.” Organized by
church and labor groups to challenge the conservative’s on civil rights, the march
absorbed other interest groups such Women’s Rights protestors and peaceniks calling for
a halt to the arms race. Only a few short weeks had passed since three civil rights workers
in Mississippi disappeared. They would later be found executed by the Ku Klux Klan
after being assisted as to their whereabouts by the local police force. Rockefeller
appeared before a rally with baseball superstar Jackie Robinson, attempting to speak to

341

Ibid., 33-53.

172
the masses about the Republican Party’s pro-civil rights past only to be met by jeers and
sarcastic laughs.342 Conservatives moved past the crowds, flocking towards their own
heroes like Phyliss Schlafley, William Buckley, and Ronald Reagan. They did not come
so far to be deterred by the opposition, even if it was the largest protest since the March
on Washington.

New York Senator Jacob Javits published his book, Order of Battle: A
Republican’s Call to Reason, pleading with party members, “I would fervently hope that
[conservatives] would slam the door shut against the Trojan Horse of nihilism which the
Radical Right, in the name of conservatism, has been trying to introduce into the inner
citadel of the Republican Party. I would hope that they would do so in unmistakingly
clear terms.”343 Scranton’s ran his brief five-week campaign with this sentiment in mind.
He loved the Republican Party, but the events in Cleveland humiliated him. In spite of
this, he felt a conviction to run against Goldwater for opposing the Civil Rights Bill.
Scranton along with the other moderates and liberals feared that Goldwater’s upcoming
vote on civil rights would bring in the white backlash voters that Wallace appealed to on
the Democratic side. They feared that Goldwater would become a surprise winner like
Harry Truman in 1948. When Rockefeller ended his run for the presidency on June 15, he
donated his entire nationwide professional organization to Scranton. A week later, Lodge
resigned as ambassador to South Vietnam to join in on the campaign. Then on June 28, a

342

Nelson Rockefeller Transcript of Civil Rights Rally, July 12, 1964, Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Gubernatorial, in Hugh Morrow Papers, Subseries 1. Campaign Files, Presidential, folder 560, box 54,
Rockefeller Archives.
343

Donaldson, Liberalism’s Last Hurrah, 195.

173
Gallup Poll pairing Scranton and Goldwater head to head showed a 55 to 34 advantage
for Scranton. On the weekend before the opening proceedings of the convention,
Scranton met with Rockefeller, Javits, Kenneth Keating, Hugh Scott, and Lodge.
Together, they thought and plotted for a way to stop Goldwater. Scranton wavered
between an attack on his record on civil rights to his threats of using nuclear weapons.
Rockefeller pitched the idea that they should follow his lead in the primaries by
denouncing Goldwater as an extremist thus forcing him to admit his true feelings on the
John Birch Society. Upon his arrival, Eisenhower was presented with a resolution signed
by former seven of his former cabinet members by Scranton rebuking Goldwater’s
nuclear policy. After weighing the desperate act to force a convention fight, the exPresident declined citing the secrets of national defense as unfit for a former commanderin-chief to discuss in public.

By Monday conservatives had closed their ranks after learning of another attempt
to bring down their candidate coupled with a scathing letter from the Pennsylvania
governor describing delegates as “little more than a flock of chickens whose necks will
be wrung at will.”344 Scranton would not be able to alter the convention. Barry Goldwater
would be their nominee. Conservatives had been down this road before. They recounted
stories to each other about Robert Taft going to the convention in 1952 with enough
delegates to win on the first ballot only to have Eisenhower’s picture spread across
newspapers and magazines before he took the nomination and the White House. Writers
called Taft “a sure loser” much like the press in 1964 called Goldwater. Lodge was in
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Chicago that year stretching banners across hotel lobbies with Taft’s initials, gloating that
they spelled “RAT.”345 They believed that the national media blanketed their candidate
and the truth, portraying him as a foot-in-the-mouth politician in order to save the
“international-socialist Establishment,” and their monopoly on control. California voted
to revive the two-party system, the primary preserved democracy.346 An Associated Press
survey revealed that 694 delegates intended to cast their vote for Goldwater, 39 more
than necessary for the nomination. Meanwhile, Scranton carried 138 votes or 303 if he
gained all the Rockefeller, Lodge, and Smith votes, well short of the required number.
Syndicated Liberal Republican columnist Joseph Alsop wrote, “The reading is grim at the
moment. The trouble is that there are just too many hot-eyed fanatics in the uncommitted
delegations that ought to stand up for Scranton. If the Republicans give the nomination to
Goldwater the most grisly fate threatens the Party in these delegates’ states; but their
emotions rule them and they could not care less.”347 Remarks like that only strengthened
the resolve of the opposition. Conservatives warned that the Establishment wanted liberal
domination, they warned that liberals threatened to dominate both parties; that was why
they did not want Goldwater.
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Soviet officials observing the election took a different view of the outcome. The
Soviets viewed the struggle between the two sides of the Republican Party as a struggle
between the Wall Street financiers leading the internationalist wing of the party and the
Chicago and Cleveland financial groups leading the isolationist wing of the party. The
Soviets believed that profound economic and political currents had altered the character
of the Republican Party. The nouveau rich Southerners and Midwesterners had aligned
themselves against the old patrician families. This reactionary, militant, and racist
coalition adopted Goldwater because he lined their pockets and they preferred his “small
town, bourgeois, locker-room personality.” Goldwater’s nomination would further
increase the need for an arms race. This would in turn make his financial donors
wealthier, particularly those in southern California who had a vested interest in the
growth of the military-industrial complex. His connection to pro-fascist ultra-groups
concerned the Soviets so much that a Soviet news article called Goldwater’s
“understanding of international affairs frighteningly primitive.” According to their
sentiments expressed in both Russian and American media outlets, the Soviets preferred a
Democratic candidate because they preferred the Democrats rhetoric on freedom from
action to Goldwater’s extreme reaction.348 In their eyes, Goldwater posed the greater
threat to global stability. The choice in November should have been obvious for voters.

On Tuesday, the final battles for control of the Republican Party commenced.
That day, the platform committee produced the most conservative party platform in
decades. Opponents, led by Scranton, proposed an amendment that would condemn the
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extremism of Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, and the communists. Also, they
called for a stronger civil rights plank and a plank that would allow only the president to
authorize the use of nuclear missiles, a highly contested point that the Goldwater forces
opposed. For the liberals and moderates, time was running out. There would be little
chance of getting the amendment approved, they simply did not have the votes to do it.
That night, Eisenhower gave his speech to the convention. He highlighted the internecine
struggle within the party and asked each side to reflect, “This means that only for a
moment I must ask you to bank the fires of personally competitive intra‐party politics and
contemplate with me the whole of this big party.” He continued by appealing to the
conservative’s rhetorical defense of freedom, “We have ever sought to create an
atmosphere of liberty and to sustain its substance.” Then, he recalled the history of the
Republican Party dating back to Lincoln and the sweeping changes made to America
under Republican leadership. He began to speak about the outsiders threatening the
Republican Party, “So let us particularly scorn the divisive efforts of those outside our
family, including sensation seeking columnists and commentators, because, my friends, I
assure you that these are people who couldn't care less about the good of our party.”
From there, he took a turn, aiming his remarks at the fear brought on by the far-right,
“Let us not be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal, who roaming the streets with
switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a helpless prey, suddenly becomes upon
apprehension, a poor, underprivileged person who counts upon the compassion of our
society and the laxness or weaknesses of too many courts to forgive his offense.”
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Audience members groaned, they did not want to hear the former president lecture them
on their nightmares.349

Afterwards, convention officials muscled to have the party platform read, giving
the convention ninety minutes to cool off. By 9:00 San Francisco time, it was 11:00 in
New York late enough that the majority of Americans would not bear witness to the most
dramatic of the Republican war amongst themselves. First, Hugh Scott came to the
podium to propose the extremist amendment, which was applauded by the delegates from
the East. Then he introduced Nelson Rockefeller. An applause went up from parts of the
crowd. Camera bulbs flashed as Rockefeller raised his arm in acknowledgement. At once,
a mixture of clapping and boos competed followed by jeering and horns. The governor
pointed and grinned at his cheering section. When the chairman banged his gavel for
order, a chant of “We want Barry” came down from the rafters. From his trailer outside
the hall where he could see and communicate with his staff positioned inside, Clif White
pushed a button to radio his men on the convention floor, demanding that they quiet their
delegates. White radioed that they should not boo or appear unseemly, but the delegates
were not making the noise. The chanting came from the people in the stands. Rockefeller
began his speech by supporting the extremist amendment with everyone in the building at
full attention to see what would happen next. “The time has come for the Republican
Party to face this issue realistically and take decisive action.” After each sentence, a hail
of cheers and jeers rained down on him. Each time he spoke, Rockefeller paused and
looked out into the crow before making his move, “It is essential that this Convention
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repudiate here and now any doctrinaire, militant minority, whether Communist, Ku Klux
Klan or Bircher which would subvert this party to purposes alien to the very basic tenets
which gave this party birth.” The crowd screeched in anger and discontent, but he
continued by warning that “the Republican Party is in real danger of subversion by a
radical, well-financed and highly disciplined minority.” Rockefeller and the other
moderates were trying to embarrass Goldwater. There were at least ten delegates who
were members of the John Birch Society there in the hall. If Goldwater agreed to the
amendment, then he would have to reject them. If he disagreed, then it might look like he
supported communists or the Ku Klux Klan. A smile ran across Rockefeller’s face.350

Rockefeller continued to poke and jab at the hostile audience, using words like
“liberalism,” “middle course,” and “mainstream” to describe the kind of party that he
believed Republicans represented. Members of the audience begged to differ. “During
this year, I have crisscrossed this nation fighting for those principles, fighting to keep the
Republican party of all the people - and warning of the extremist threat, its danger to the
party.” At this moment the chants of “we want Barry” became so overwhelming that he
stopped his speech. Again, the chairman banged his gavel to bring order. Anyone
watching on television could hear the two men at the microphone bickering about
quieting the crowd and keeping the remarks to five minutes in length. After order was
restored, Rockefeller began again. With each comment, he riled up the crowd further,
goading them into behaving as exactly the kind of extremist reactionaries that the liberals
believed them to be. As they yelled in defiance, he unmasked the ugly truth to the
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cameras, “This is still a free country, ladies and gentlemen. These things have no place in
America. But I can personally testify to their existence,” his voice firm and steady, “and
so can countless others who have also experienced anonymous midnight and early
morning telephone calls, unsigned threatening letters, smear and hate literature, strongarm and goon tactics, bomb threats and bombings, infiltration and take-over of
established political organizations by communist and Nazi methods. Some of you don’t
like to hear it, ladies and gentlemen, but it’s the truth.” He stood before them with moxie
and poise determined to make his point. If it looked self-serving, that would be all right
with him if it also meant exposing the opposition in front of the cameras. Rockefeller
appeared like a man calling for civility when the audience wanted to wander in the
darkness. It was a career defining moment for him.351

Towards the end of his brief speech Rockefeller gathered momentum for a final
attack, “There is no place in this Republican Party for those who would infiltrate its
ranks, distort its aims, and convert it into a cloak of apparent respectability for a
dangerous extremism.” The crowd rocked in their seats hardly able to control their
emotions. Then with an emphatic denunciation, “And make no mistake about it - the
hidden members of the John Birch Society and others like them are out to do just that!”
Audience members yelled and screamed with great fury. Hammering away, he pummeled
them again, “These people have nothing in common with Republicanism. These people
have nothing in common with Americans.” With one final wallop he struck his last blow,
“The Republican Party must repudiate these people!” The crowd had booed and catcalled
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mercilessly throughout, but he withstood their indignation and vitriol. It was a
magnificent performance captured on every major network. When he walked down the
stairs from the platform, he walked away having given his all to roll back the tide of
extremism.352

On Wednesday, Goldwater watched the roll call vote from his suite at the Mark
Hopkins hotel. One by one, his loyal delegates and those who saw the writing on the wall
did as they came to do and nominated him for the presidency of the United States.
Goldwater sat in his chair, contemplating his fate as his advisors shook hands and
congratulated one another. “I couldn’t have done it without you,” he told them. When one
of his aides informed him that Rockefeller was on the line to offer his congratulations,
Goldwater barked, “Hell, I don’t want to talk to that son of a bitch.”353
On the following night, Nixon gave a short speech describing himself as a “simple
soldier in the ranks” before introducing the nominee. It was Goldwater’s turn to address
the convention. New York Congressman William E. Miller would be his running mate,
the first Catholic nominated to the Republican presidential ticket. Goldwater strode to the
rostrum in a hail of applause. Under the lights he looked out on a patchwork of
Republican supporters, tense with excitement. He stoked the flames of their passion by
declaring, “It is the cause of Republicanism to remind ourselves, and the world, that only
the strong can remain free – that only the strong can keep the peace!” He buoyed his
remarks with words like “freedom,” “balance,” and “destiny.” His supports roared in
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agreement as his vision materialized. Then he turned his speech to echo the divisions
within the party, further alienating conservatives from the liberals, “Anyone who joins us
in all sincerity we welcome. Though those who don’t care for our cause, we don’t expect
to enter our ranks in any case.” Half of the audience cheered as the other half sat in
stunned silence. Goldwater could have used his nomination speech to change his image;
instead he lifted his voice to the rafters proclaiming, “Extremism in the defense of liberty
is no vice! Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” With that, the crowd broke
into a thunderous applause.354

As delegates, reporters, admirers, fanatics, and the vanquished emptied out of the
Cow Palace, they were left to ponder the maverick now representing the Republican
Party. His speech writers had composed a bouquet of words to justify the inescapable
drama of the past year, but they had failed to account for the lack of unity that followed.
There would be no way to put the party back together where the pieces had become
jagged and crumbled. There would be too much bitterness and too much anguish for
many to join again. The initial reaction became that the conservative movement
represented a deviation from the norm, the puzzle would realign itself, and return to some
recognizable form. In time, that theory would fall by the way side. Thus, on that warm
July night, an era of Republican Liberalism began to fade further into the darkness,
returning in sporadic intervals, but never again in the 20th century to reclaim its former
glory. Such is the ebb and flow of politics in America, not to be held up as divine when
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they are in power and not to be mourned too deeply when they pass from it. Their end
signaled the beginning of another.
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